# 1NC

## T

#### ‘Antitrust’ preserves competition

Dr. Babette Boliek 11, Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. from the Columbia University School of Law, and Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Davis, “FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality is Defining the Boundaries”, Boston College Law Review, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1627, November 2011, Lexis

Although the two regimes share a commonality of purpose--to protect consumers and to promote allocative efficiencies in production--the two have quite distinct, predominately opposing, means of securing social benefits. As Justice Stephen Breyer stated when serving [\*1629] as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, although regulation and the antitrust laws "typically aim at similar goals--i.e., low and economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production methods"--regulation looks to achieve these goals directly "through rules and regulations; [but] antitrust seeks to achieve them indirectly by promoting and preserving a process that tends to bring them about." The battle between these two regimes may be broadly summarized in a single issue thusly: in the face of the industry-specific regulator, what is (or what should be) the role of antitrust law?

Antitrust law preserves the process of competition across all industries by condemning anticompetitive conduct when it occurs. In contrast, industrial regulation by its nature is a public declaration that, in a given industry, market forces are too weak or underdeveloped to produce the consumer benefits that are realized in competitive markets--regulated industries are carved out from the rest of the economy and are subject to proactive, regulatory intervention that goes above and beyond antitrust enforcement measures. Not surprisingly, regulatory agencies were historically created as substitutes for market forces in the few markets that, by the nature of the product or technology, were natural monopolies or severely prone to monopoly. In the vast majority [\*1630] of markets, however, the antitrust law is the default government control, designed to supplement market forces to inhibit or prevent the growth of monopoly.

Again, although the goals of the two regimes may be similar, the means by which each can achieve those goals are in opposition. Therefore, the threshold determination of which industries are to be singled out for industry-specific regulation, and to what degree, is of vital importance as it simultaneously determines the predominance of the regulator versus the antitrust authority in securing the social good.

#### Vote neg:

#### Limits---they make the topic bidirectional by ending competition---undermines predictable neg links and doubles the topic

#### Extra-topical---changing the way antitrust is enforced and the structure of the economy are outside the bounds of the resolution---doesn’t meet fundamental aff burden to prove the resolution is a good idea and should be rejected. Destroys core negative ground like the FTC Overstretch DA.

## K

**Next Off – Frame Subtraction:**

#### First – our links:

#### The 1AC defines assertive self-interest as a “blind pursuit of self-interest”.

#### Non-visual references to “blindness” entrench ableist violence.

Ben-Moshe ‘5

(Liat, Syracuse University, Doctorate in Disabilities studies - 4-1-05, “Building Pedagogical Curb Cuts: Incorporating Disability in the University Classroom and Curriculum,” http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Pedagogical%20Curb%20Cuts.pdf, accessed: 7-5-2012, p.108, CAS)

Disability has negative connotations when used metaphorically, while the real experience of living with a disability can be quite enriching and empowering. In all the examples above disability is used in a value-laden way. “Lame idea” means bad idea or one that is not constructed in a sufficient and persuasive manner. When we call a notion or act “idiotic/moronic/ retarded” we are trying to convey the message that the idea or notion is ill-conceived, lacking in thought or unintelligent. When we describe someone as “blind” to a fact (for example, men are blind to sexist practices), we mean that they are lacking knowledge or have no notion of what transpires around them. “Crazy” means excessive or without control. None of these signifying phrases carries positive and empowering interpretations.

#### Our Alt: We can defend the rest of their advocacy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is the best alt:

#### One – The Aff’s “justification v. plan” distinction dooms them.

#### Their own arg is that justifications are prior questions that shape how and when policies take place. They’ve shaped their justifications to be ableist.

#### They can’t claim we’re too “plan inclusive” – they negated the value of that very distinction.

#### Two – – Praxis: our model teaches a form of engagement that corrects flaws in political strategies. Rejecting our approach is normatively worse for the Aff’s own cause.

Williams ‘15

Douglas Williams is a third-generation organizer, He earned his BA in Political Science at the University of Minnesota at Morris and his MPA at the University of Missouri Columbia, where he was also a Thurgood Marshall Fellow and a Stanley Botner Fellow. He is currently a doctoral student in political science at Wayne State University in Detroit, where his research centers around public policy as it relates to disadvantaged communities and the labor movement. From the article: “The Dead End of Identity Politics” - From: The South Lawn - March 10, 2015 – Internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer, Purdue University. DeBoer holds a PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue and an MA in English, concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance a capital “B” was adjusted to a lower case “b” in a manner that boosted readability, but did not alter context. https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. Refusing to say ‘*this* is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making *that* accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.”

----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer)

Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

#### Three – contingent agreement is good: negating the whole aff makes only the most extreme stances strategic, like prejudice is good. We should debate framing strategies rather than impact turns to injustice

#### Four – its fair: frame subtraction auto gives the aff ground – just be accountable for the perspectives you opted to place in the 1AC.

## CP

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase maximum civil penalties on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector.

**Prohibit has to criminalize the activity**

US District Court ‘01 --- United States District Court, WD Texas, “Texas v. del Sur Pueblo”, NATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY, Sept 2001, https://narf.org/nill/bulletins/sct/documents/yselta.html

The Tribe insists that, under either IGRA or the Restoration Act, the analysis for determining whether the Tribe's proposed gaming activities are allowed is the same. Specifically, it insists that ? 107(a) of the Restoration Act does not operate as an independent bar to its proposed gaming activities because Texas does not “prohibit” the proposed gaming activities. The first sentence of ? 107(a) of the Restoration Act provides: “All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.” 25 U.S.C. ? 1300g-6. The Tribe maintains that the term “prohibit” has **special significance** in federal Indian law, which is derived from Cabazon Band, and whether a federal court is interpreting IGRA or the Restoration Act, it should apply the same analysis, i.e., the Cabazon Band criminal-prohibitory/civil-regulatory dichotomy. Thus, according to the Tribe, the critical question under either IGRA or \*683 the Restoration Act is whether Texas law and public policy “prohibit” (that **is, criminalize rather than regulate**) the proposed gaming activities.

#### Plan expands the prison industrial complex

SNYDER 90 --- EDWARD A. SNYDER University of Michigan, “The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on Antitrust Enforcement”, The Journal of Law & Economics Vol. 33, No. 2 (Oct., 1990), pp. 439-462, https://www-jstor-org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/stable/725372?seq=1#metadata\_info\_tab\_contents

In 1974 Congress elevated penalties for criminal antitrust offenses from the misdemeanor to the felony level, an action that significantly increased the maximum penalties available to the courts.1 This legislation is one example of frequent congressional interventions that either regulate sentencing practices or are intended to raise penalties for particular crimes.2 This article will analyze the potential effects from such legislation and assess empirically the effect of the felony penalties on antitrust enforcement. The empirical work uses an original data set and a technique that has only recently been applied to analyses of litigation.

In assessing the deterrent effects of the felony penalties, the following questions are relevant. First, how do the courts react to statutory changes in penalties? In this case, the courts followed congressional intent by sentencing those convicted to substantially longer jail terms and higher fines.3 Second, and more difficult to answer, does the threat of higher penalties significantly reduce the number and severity of offenses com- mitted? While no direct measures of offender behavior are available, reductions in the number and severity of offenses may be reflected in changes in the set of criminal antitrust cases filed under the felony penalty regime

## CP

Evaluate the Counterplan as a holistic – we affirm that:

#### - The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### - A Zapatista Communist rebellion should reject current anti-trust as an antagonistic element of Racial Capitalism and instead affirm it in service of Communism

#### Zapatista rebellion solves and is mutually exclusive with violent revolution

Shukaitis & Graeber 7 [Stevphen, David Rolfe, 2007, Stephen is a Senior Lecturer @ University of Essex, Graeber is an American anthropologist and anarchist activist, “Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations Collective Theorization.”, https://selforganizedseminar.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/shukaitis-graeber-constituent-imagination.pdf]

Thoughts. Provocations. Explorations. Forms of investigation and social research that expand possibilities for political action, proliferating tactics of resistance through the constituent power of the imagination. Walking, we ask questions, not from the perspective of the theorist removed and separate from organizing, but rather from within and as part of the multiple and overlapping cycles and circuits of struggle. For the removed theorist, movements themselves are mere abstractions, pieces of data to be categorized, analyzed, and fixed. The work of militant investigation is multiple, collectively extending forms of antagonism to new levels of understanding, composing flesh-made words from immanent processes of resistance. Far from vanguardist notions of intellectual practice that translate organizing strategies and concepts for populations who are believed to be too stupid or unable to move beyond trade union consciousness, it is a process of collective wondering and wandering that is not afraid to admit that the question of how to move forward is always uncertain, difficult, and never resolved in easy answers that are eternally correct. As an open process, militant investigation discovers new possibilities within the present, turning bottlenecks and seeming dead ends into new opportunities for joyful insurgency. A beautiful example of this is John Holloway’s book, Change the World Without Taking Power World Without Taking Power. Holloway, a soft-spoken Scottish political . Holloway, a soft-spoken Scottish political philosopher, was associated with the “Open Marxism” school developed at the University of Edinburgh where he taught in the 1970s and ’80s. In 1991, he moved to Mexico where he took a position with the Instituto de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales in the Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. After the Zapatista rebellion broke out in 1994, he quickly became one of its chief intellectual supporters. In 1998, he helped compile a book of essays on the Zapatistas called Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico; this was his attempt to think through the implications of this new revolutionary paradigm, one which rejected classic Marxist ideas of vanguardism and the very project of trying to seize state power for one of building autonomous communities rooted in new forms of direct democracy, using the categories of Marxist theory. The result was an extremely dense book. At certain points, it reads like a mixture of Marxist jargon and lyric poetry: In the beginning is the scream. We scream. When we write or when we read, it is easy to forget that the beginning is not the word, but the scream. Faced with the mutilation of human lives by capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, a scream of anger, a scream of refusal: NO. The starting point of theoretical refl ection is opposition, negativity, struggle. It is from rage that thought is born, not from the pose of reason, not from the reasoned-sitting-back-and-refl ecting-on-the-mysteries-of-existence that is the conventional image of the thinker. We start from negation, from dissonance. The dissonance can take many shapes. An inarticulate mumble of discontent, tears of frustration, a scream of rage, a confi dent roar. An unease, a confusion, a longing, a critical vibration.1 More than anything else, it’s a book about knowledge. Holloway argues that reality is a matter of humans doing and making things together: what we perceive as fi xed self-identical objects are really processes. The only reason we insist on treating objects as anything else is because, if we saw them as they really are, as mutual projects, it would be impossible for anyone to claim ownership of them. All liberatory struggle therefore is ultimately the struggle against identity. Forms of knowledge that simply arrange and classify reality from a distance—what Holloway refers to as “knowledge about”—may be appropriate for a vanguard party that wants to claim the right to seize power and impose itself on the basis of some privileged “scientific” understanding, but ultimately it can only work to reinforce structures of domination. True revolutionary knowledge would have to be different. It would have to be a pragmatic form of knowledge that lays bare all such pretensions; a form of knowledge deeply embedded in the logic of transformational practice. Furious debates ensued. Leninists and Trotskyites lambasted the book as utopian for adopting what they considered a naïve anarchist position—one that was completely ignorant of political realities. Anarchists were alternately inspired and annoyed, often noting that Holloway seemed to echo anarchist ideas without ever mentioning them, instead writing as if his positions emerged naturally from a correct reading of classic Marxist texts. Others objected to the way he read the texts. Supporters of Toni Negri’s Spinozist version of Marxism denounced the book as so much Hegelian claptrap; others suggested that Holloway’s argument that any belief in self-identical objects was a refl ection of capitalist logic seemed to imply that capitalism had been around since the invention of language, which ultimately made it very diffi cult to imagine an alternative. In Latin America, where the battle was particularly intense, a lot of the arguments turned around very particular questions of revolutionary strategy. Who has the better model: the Zapatistas of Chiapas or Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela? Were the Argentine radicals who overthrew four successive regimes in December of 2001 right to refuse seizing power, to reject the entire domain of formal politics and try to create their own autonomous institutions? Or had they allowed an opportunity for genuine revolutionary change to slip through their grasp? For many in the global justice movement in Europe and North America, the book provided the perfect counterpoint to Michael Hardt and Negri’s Empire, then being hailed in the media as the bible of the movement. Where Hardt and Negri were drawing on an Italian autonomist tradition that saw capital not as imposing itself on labor but as constantly having to adjust itself to the power of workers’ struggle, Holloway was arguing that this approach did not go nearly far enough. In fact, capital was labor and capitalism the system that makes it impossible for us to see this. Capitalism is something we make every day and the moment we stop making it, it will cease to exist. There were endless Internet debates. Seminars and reading groups were held comparing the two arguments in probably a dozen different languages.

## DA

**Tech innovation high --- expanding the scope of antitrust laws stifles it --- Causes China tech dominance**

**Packard 6-22** --- Clark Packard, Trade Policy Counsel, Finance Insurance & Trade, R-Street, “Hamstringing America’s most innovative firms is no way to compete with China”, JUN 22, 2021, https://www.rstreet.org/2021/06/22/hamstringing-americas-most-innovative-firms-is-no-way-to-compete-with-china/

The United States is locked into a **geopolitical competition with China** over the commanding heights of the 21st century economy. Much of the competition revolves around the nexus of international trade and investment and technology. **Washington has very legitimate concerns about China’s pursuit of indigenous innovation through high tech industrial policy**, but the situation warrants a smart response. At a time when policymakers are signaling their desire to outcompete China economically, **why are they also rushing to** ~~hobble~~ **[stifle] private sector American tech**nology **and innovation?**

Over the last several weeks, lawmakers have introduced five separate bills in United States House of Representatives aimed at cracking down on “Big Tech.” I’m not an antitrust scholar, but as my colleague Dr. Wayne Brough has written, the bills would, if enacted, “impose the most significant overhaul of the nation’s antitrust laws in our country’s history.” Rather than broad and durable antitrust principles that apply to all sectors of the economy, which have guided our competition policy for more than a century, the legislation under consideration is aimed squarely at large tech companies in the United States.

It is worth considering the **geopolitical and international economic ramifications of such a radical departure from existing law.**

In 2018, the United States released a report documenting China’s predatory commercial practices, which served as an indictment of sorts. The overarching theme of the report is that Beijing uses a number of unfair and pernicious methods to acquire American technology with the ultimate goal of supplanting the United States as the global leader in high tech innovation. Specifically, the report alleges that China pressures American firms into transferring technology to Chinese joint-venture partners as the cost of doing business—reaching the 1.4 billion potential consumers—in the country; China abuses intellectual property; engages in targeted foreign investment to acquire strategic American firms and assets; and with pervasive state support, hacks into commercial networks to steal trade secrets. On top of that, China provides massive subsidies to its leading technology firms to pursue research and development in critical areas. **These are very serious problems**, and demand a thoughtful and targeted response.

Instead, the United States has flailed at China. The Trump administration imposed tariffs, which triggered predictable retaliation against American exporters, imposed significant costs onto American consumers—both families and firms—and will almost certainly fail to change Beijing’s predatory commercial practices. It is estimated that the tariffs cost about 300,000 American jobs and lowered market capitalization by about $1.7 trillion through diminished investment, according to the New York Federal Reserve. In other words, the tariffs made the United States weaker and less competitive. Now, some in Congress want to pursue misguided antitrust policies that will unintentionally undermine the United States’ global competitiveness.

The firms targeted by the proposed legislation are among America’s **most globally competitive and innovative.** They drive **significant investment in cutting-edge tech**nologies like robotics and artificial intelligence, the types of research China is pursuing through its Made in China 2025 indigenous innovation industrial policy. A recent report from the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) highlights how many of the largest American tech firms—Amazon, Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Intel, Facebook, Microsoft and Apple—were among the top 15 nonfinancial firms driving U.S. capital expenditures in 2020. Together, PPI estimates that these six firms made nearly $90 billion worth of private investment in 2020—up 6 percent from 2019, which is remarkable considering that the U.S. economy was lagging in 2020 due to the outbreak of COVID-19. Cracking down on these firms will mean less investment in research and development.

These American firms already must compete with heavily subsidized foreign competitors and face discriminatory foreign practices, particularly in China. Despite these hurdles, the American tech industry pushes the envelope on exactly the type of research and development that policymakers in the United States should welcome. These firms lead the world in current and next-generation technologies. Instead of embracing this type of American global commercial and technological leadership, or at least staying neutral toward it, the legislation under consideration would **favor foreign competitors** by [stifling] ~~kneecapping~~ our domestic technology firms with **heavy-handed regulation**, which will almost certainly benefit their foreign competitors.

The American tech industry is the envy of the world. That’s why China, the European Union and others are trying to mimic it through subsidies and discriminatory practices against foreign competition. Yet those policies are no match for a relatively free and dynamic economy fostered by existing competition policies. It simply **belies common sense** that the way to outcompete Beijing is by making the United States **weaker, less efficient and less dynamic through misguided efforts to single out** our most **globally competitive and successful firms**.

#### Causes US-China war --- Only private tech development solves

Talent & Work 19 --- Prepared by Taskforce co-chairs The Honorable Jim Talent Senior Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center Former U.S. Senator (R-MO) and The Honorable Robert O. Work Distinguished Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, et al, “The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition”, Ronald Raegan Institute, Dec 2019, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355297/the\_contest\_for\_innovation\_report.pdf

The United States has entered an era of long-term competition with revisionist powers. A key aspect of this competition will revolve around a contest for technological superiority waged between the national innovation bases of the respective competitors. The outcome of this competition will determine not just American national security but also how the nations of the world interact—and whether a free and open political and economic system will remain the foundation of those interactions.

After a long post-Cold War focus on rogue regional powers and nearly two decades of continuous warfare in the Middle East and a focus on rogue regional powers, the United States now faces a new defining national security challenge: a long-term strategic competition with a resurgent Russia and a rising China.

Russia seeks to reestablish itself as a global power. While Russia is able to compete with the United States militarily in certain domains, its economic outlook and long-term demographic prospects are grim. Accordingly, it is unlikely to develop and nurture a true national innovation ecosystem. Given these disadvantages, Russia is limited to acting as a geostrategic spoiler seeking to undermine and weaken the United States, its alliances, and its global interests.

China, on the other hand, is already challenging the United States economically, militarily, and politically. China’s economy has surpassed that of the United States in terms of purchasing power parity and could, under some scenarios, pass the U.S. GDP in absolute terms in the mid- to late 2020s. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, China defines its vital national interests in ways that are irreconcilable with both the interests of the United States and the values of self-determination and individual freedom to which we and our allies are committed. China’s global expansion, from both a trade and military perspective, is challenging the United States in virtually every region of the world.

In pursuit of its goal of reshaping the world order, China aims to supplant the United States as the world’s leading technological power by 2030. China has articulated a distinct strategy of state-driven innovation, defined by its concept of “military-civil fusion,” to lead the world in cutting-edge technologies that might allow it to leapfrog the United States both economically and militarily.

That strategy presents a two-fold challenge for the United States. Economically, the challenge is to sustain American prosperity and access to markets on equal terms with other nations against China’s ambition to control the economic sectors that will determine national primacy in the decades ahead.

Militarily, the fundamental mission of the U.S. government (USG) is to deter a great-power war and, if deterrence fails, to prevent escalation of the conflict and end the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. An important key to this mission is achieving and maintaining military-technical superiority. However, over the last several decades, China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—has invested heavily in advanced military capabilities specifically aimed at overcoming the technological lead of America’s armed forces.

As a result, the conventional overmatch that the United States has relied upon to undergird its deterrence posture since the end of the Cold War is eroding. The balance of power in East Asia has already shifted substantially in China’s direction. If this trend continues, effective deterrence in that region will likely fail, leaving the United States to face the unattractive alternatives of accepting aggression against its interests or its allies or triggering armed conflict with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with all the attendant risks of escalation.

The National Security Strategy recognized the importance of technological innovation to every domain of the competition with China. Consistent with that, a key theme of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is that the U.S. military must move rapidly to arrest further erosion of its technical advantage and then restore and maintain a comfortable conventional overmatch.

Unfortunately, the technological development relevant to national security is no longer exclusively or even primarily in the control of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its prime contractors.

In the past, cutting-edge technology was usually developed by the government sector for military use and then migrated into the civilian sector. Today, the direction of innovation has reversed. Many of the technologies most important to national security are being developed and produced for civilian purposes by civilian actors who have no history with or connection to the national security community. China is aware of this new reality. Its policy of military-civil fusion seeks to better exploit dual-use technologies originating from the commercial sector. To avoid a ~~crippling~~ [devastating] competitive disadvantage, the United States must adopt means to accomplish the same end.

## DA

#### Vanguardist regimes are inherently totalitarian

Gray 20 (Phillip W. Gray, Assistant Professor at Texas A&M University at Qatar, formerly taught at numerous institutions in Hong Kong as well as at the United States Coast Guard Academy, research focuses on research ethics, comparative political ethics, extremist organizations and ideology, and terrorism, Vanguardism, Routledge, 2020, Kindle Edition, ISBN: 978-0-429-31825-2, pp. 4-5

The preceding discussion is not meant to deny any connection between vanguardism and totalitarianism. As noted earlier, it is not an accident that vanguard organizations create totalitarian regimes when in power, and indeed often have totalitarian-like elements within their internal organization even if they lack political power. For vanguard parties, their aim of reshaping the totality of experience, their belief in the epistemological supremacy of a specific population, their faith in the historical inevitability of victory, and their fixation on Enemy populations as attempting to subvert social revolution, provides ample incentives - organizational and ideological - to form totalitarian regimes. That vanguard organizations will be totalitarian in regimes under their control, however, is a separate issue from whether totalitarian regimes are inherently vanguardist. On this issue, this text (and its author) is agnostic; it may indeed be the case that vanguardism and totalitarianism are essentially linked, but it is also fully possible that totalitarianism can arise from numerous sources, with its vanguardist style being merely a historical accident of the early twentieth century. One can safely say that, although not all vanguard organizations succeed in bringing about totalitarian policies, their ideologies are inherently totalitarian; it would require a separate investigation to determine whether totalitarian systems are inherently vanguardist.

#### Totalitarian regimes with advanced technology cause s-risks – an eternity of torture

Minardi 20 – (Di Minardi, BA in Political Science from Boston College, with work appearing in National Geographic, BBC Future, The Guardian, The Boston Globe, International Living, and Cincinnati Refined, “What would it take for a global totalitarian government to rise to power indefinitely? This nightmare scenario may be closer than first appears.,” 10-15-2020, BBC Future, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence)kab

What would totalitarian governments of the past have looked like if they were never defeated? The Nazis operated with 20th Century technology and it still took a world war to stop them. How much more powerful – and permanent – could the Nazis have been if they had beat the US to the atomic bomb? Controlling the most advanced technology of the time could have solidified Nazi power and changed the course of history. When we think of existential risks, events like nuclear war or asteroid impacts often come to mind. Yet there’s one future threat that is less well known – and while it doesn’t involve the extinction of our species, it could be just as bad. It’s called the “world in chains” scenario, where, like the preceding thought experiment, a global totalitarian government uses a novel technology to lock a majority of the world into perpetual suffering. If it sounds grim, you’d be right. But is it likely? Researchers and philosophers are beginning to ponder how it might come about – and, more importantly, what we can do to avoid it. Toby Ord, a senior research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at Oxford University, believes that the odds of an existential catastrophe happening this century from natural causes are less than one in 2,000, because humans have survived for 2,000 centuries without one. However, when he adds the probability of human-made disasters, Ord believes the chances increase to a startling one in six. He refers to this century as “the precipice” because the risk of losing our future has never been so high. Researchers at the Center on Long-Term Risk, a non-profit research institute in London, have expanded upon x-risks with the even-more-chilling prospect of suffering risks. These “s-risks” are defined as “suffering on an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far.” In these scenarios, life continues for billions of people, but the quality is so low and the outlook so bleak that dying out would be preferable. In short: a future with negative value is worse than one with no value at all. This is where the “world in chains” scenario comes in. If a malevolent group or government suddenly gained world-dominating power through technology, and there was nothing to stand in its way, it could lead to an extended period of abject suffering and subjugation. A 2017 report on existential risks from the Global Priorities Project, in conjunction with FHI and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, warned that “a long future under a particularly brutal global totalitarian state could arguably be worse than complete extinction”. Singleton hypothesis Though global totalitarianism is still a niche topic of study, researchers in the field of existential risk are increasingly turning their attention to its most likely cause: artificial intelligence. In his “singleton hypothesis”, Nick Bostrom, director at Oxford’s FHI, has explained how a global government could form with AI or other powerful technologies – and why it might be impossible to overthrow. He writes that a world with “a single decision-making agency at the highest level” could occur if that agency “obtains a decisive lead through a technological breakthrough in artificial intelligence or molecular nanotechnology”. Once in charge, it would control advances in technology that prevent internal challenges, like surveillance or autonomous weapons, and, with this monopoly, remain perpetually stable. If the singleton is totalitarian, life would be bleak. Even in the countries with the strictest regimes, news leaks in and out from other countries and people can escape. A global totalitarian rule would eliminate even these small seeds of hope. To be worse than extinction, “that would mean we feel absolutely no freedom, no privacy, no hope of escaping, no agency to control our lives at all", says Tucker Davey, a writer at the Future of Life Institute in Massachusetts, which focuses on existential risk research. “In totalitarian regimes of the past, [there was] so much paranoia and psychological suffering because you just have no idea if you're going to get killed for saying the wrong thing,” he continues. “And now imagine that there's not even a question, every single thing you say is being reported and being analysed.” “We may not yet have the technologies to do this,” Ord said in a recent interview, “but it looks like the kinds of technologies we’re developing make that easier and easier. And it seems plausible that this may become possible at some time in the next 100 years.” AI and authoritarianism Though life under a global totalitarian government is still an unlikely and far-future scenario, AI is already enabling authoritarianism in some countries and strengthening infrastructure that could be seized by an opportunistic despot in others. “We've seen sort of a reckoning with the shift from very utopian visions of what technology might bring to much more sobering realities that are, in some respects, already quite dystopian,” says Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, a bipartisan non-profit that develops national security and defence policies. In the past, surveillance required hundreds of thousands of people – one in every 100 citizens in East Germany was an informant – but now it can be done by technology. In the United States, the National Security Agency (NSA) collected hundreds of millions of American call and text records before they stopped domestic surveillance in 2019, and there are an estimated four to six million CCTV cameras across the United Kingdom. Eighteen of the 20 most surveilled cities in the world are in China, but London is the third. The difference between them lies less in the tech that the countries employ and more in how they use it. What if the definition of what is illegal in the US and the UK expanded to include criticising the government or practising certain religions? The infrastructure is already in place to enforce it, and AI – which the NSA has already begun experimenting with – would enable agencies to search through our data faster than ever before. In addition to enhancing surveillance, AI also underpins the growth of online misinformation, which is another tool of the authoritarian. AI-powered deep fakes, which can spread fabricated political messages, and algorithmic micro-targeting on social media are making propaganda more persuasive. This undermines our epistemic security – the ability to determine what is true and act on it – that democracies depend on. “Over the last few years, we've seen the rise of filter bubbles and people getting shunted by various algorithms into believing various conspiracy theories, or even if they’re not conspiracy theories, into believing only parts of the truth,” says Belfield. “You can imagine things getting much worse, especially with deep fakes and things like that, until it's increasingly harder for us to, as a society, decide these are the facts of the matter, this is what we have to do about it, and then take collective action.” Preemptive measures The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence report, written by Belfield and 25 authors from 14 institutions, forecasts that trends like these will expand existing threats to our political security and introduce new ones in the coming years. Still, Belfield says his work makes him hopeful and that positive trends, like more democratic discussions around AI and actions by policy-makers (for example, the EU considering pausing facial recognition in public places), keep him optimistic that we can avoid catastrophic fates. We need to decide now what are acceptable and unacceptable uses of AI Davey agrees. “We need to decide now what are acceptable and unacceptable uses of AI,” he says. “And we need to be careful about letting it control so much of our infrastructure. If we're arming police with facial recognition and the federal government is collecting all of our data, that's a bad start.” If you remain sceptical that AI could offer such power, consider the world before nuclear weapons. Three years before the first nuclear chain reaction, even scientists trying to achieve it believed it was unlikely. Humanity, too, was unprepared for the nuclear breakthrough and teetered on the brink of “mutually assured destruction” before treaties and agreements guided the global proliferation of the deadly weapons without an existential catastrophe. We can do the same with AI, but only if we combine the lessons of history with the foresight to prepare for this powerful technology. The world may not be able to stop totalitarian regimes like the Nazis rising again in the future – but we can avoid handing them the tools to extend their power indefinitely.

## T

**“Should” means “must” and requires immediate legal effect**

**Summers 94** (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16)

[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]

[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as **more** than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti*means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or ***immediately effective***, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective ***in the future*** *[in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### Reasons to vote: Limits – justifies ANY temporal respecification – huge difference between happens a year from now versus a decade versus a century versus a counterfactual before the historical emergence of mercantilism – each requiring an entirely different set of strategies Ground – rigs any of the strategies developed in favor of the Aff given structural unavailability of uniqueness evidence regardless of which timeframe is chosen – AND failure to specify a timeframe makes moving targets inevitable and leveraging any offense impossible

## Case

### Cap Good

#### Capitalism stops environmental collapse – reject evidence that ignores synergistic deployment of adaptative tech – the public won’t transition to Maoism but WILL channel political energies into innovative solutions that turn case.

Bailey ’18 [Ronald; March 12; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Climate Change Problems Will Be Solved Through Economic Growth,” <https://reason.com/2018/03/12/climate-change-problems-will-be-solved-t>; RP]

"It is, I promise, worse than you think," David Wallace-Wells wrote in an infamously apocalyptic 2017 New York Magazine article. "Indeed, absent a significant adjustment to how billions of humans conduct their lives, parts of the Earth will likely become close to uninhabitable, and other parts horrifically inhospitable, as soon as the end of this century." The "it" is man-made climate change. Temperatures will become scalding, crops will wither, and rising seas will inundate coastal cities, Wallace-Wells warns. But toward the end of his screed, he somewhat dismissively observes that "by and large, the scientists have an enormous confidence in the ingenuity of humans….Now we've found a way to engineer our own doomsday, and surely we will find a way to engineer our way out of it, one way or another." Over at Scientific American, John Horgan considers some eco-modernist views on how humanity will indeed go about engineering our way out of the problems that climate change may pose. In an essay called "Should We Chill Out About Global Warming?," Horgan reports the more dynamic and positive analyses of two eco-modernist thinkers, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker and science journalist Will Boisvert. In an essay for The Breakthrough Journal, Pinker notes that such optimism "is commonly dismissed as the 'faith that technology will save us.' In fact, it is a skepticism that the status quo will doom us—that knowledge and behavior will remain frozen in their current state for perpetuity. Indeed, a naive faith in stasis has repeatedly led to prophecies of environmental doomsdays that never happened." In his new book, Enlightenment Now, Pinker points out that "as the world gets richer and more tech-savvy, it dematerializes, decarbonizes, and densifies, sparing land and species." Economic growth and technological progress are the solutions not only to climate change but to most of the problems that bedevil humanity. Boisvert, meanwhile, tackles and rebuts the apocalyptic prophecies made by eco-pessimists like Wallace-Wells, specifically with regard to food production and availabilty, water supplies, heat waves, and rising seas. "No, this isn't a denialist screed," Boisvert writes. "Human greenhouse emissions will warm the planet, raise the seas and derange the weather, and the resulting heat, flood and drought will be cataclysmic. Cataclysmic—but not apocalyptic. While the climate upheaval will be large, the consequences for human well-being will be small. Looked at in the broader context of economic development, climate change will barely slow our progress in the effort to raise living standards." Boisvert proceeds to show how a series of technologies—drought-resistant crops, cheap desalination, widespread adoption of air-conditioning, modern construction techniques—will ameliorate and overcome the problems caused by rising temperatures. He is entirely correct when he notes, "The most inexorable feature of climate-change modeling isn't the advance of the sea but the steady economic growth that will make life better despite global warming." Horgan, Pinker, and Boisvert are all essentially endorsing what I have called "the progress solution" to climate change. As I wrote in 2009, "It is surely not unreasonable to argue that if one wants to help future generations deal with climate change, the best policies would be those that encourage rapid economic growth. This would endow future generations with the wealth and superior technologies that could be used to handle whatever comes at them including climate change." Six years later I added that that "richer is more climate-friendly, especially for developing countries. Why? Because faster growth means higher incomes, which correlate with lower population growth. Greater wealth also means higher agricultural productivity, freeing up land for forests to grow as well as speedier progress toward developing and deploying cheaper non–fossil fuel energy technologies. These trends can act synergistically to ameliorate man-made climate change." Horgan concludes, "Greens fear that optimism will foster complacency and hence undermine activism. But I find the essays of Pinker and Boisvert inspiring, not enervating….These days, despair is a bigger problem than optimism." Counseling despair has always been wrong when human ingenuity is left free to solve problems, and that will prove to be the case with climate change as well.

#### Growth is sustainable, physical limits aren’t absolute or are chronically underestimated, AND resource use is declining now – BUT – transition away unleashes disaster that slips into Malthusian population crunches.

Bailey ’18 [Ronald; February 16; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor; RP]

Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that's the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth." Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity. Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person. On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country's citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent. So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita. On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent). On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita. Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively. The country that currently comes closest to the researchers' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam's per capita GDP is $2,306. "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer. O'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There's a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century. Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields. O'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air. Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland,

and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers' worries about overconsumption of biomass. And humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerialization take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities. After cranking their way through their models of doom, O'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity's footprint on the natural world. Rather than degrowth, the planet—and especially its poor people—need more and faster economic growth.

#### Elites react with war – if goods don’t cross borders, then soldiers will.

Liu ’18 [Qian; November 2; Economist, Managing Director at Greater China, citing the economist Thomas Piketty and political scientist Samuel Huntington; Project Syndicate, “From economic crisis to World War III,” p. 1-2; RP]

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

#### Data proves all forms of violence – state, structural, and environmental – are declining – because of capitalism

--this book does not cite Pinker, they cite a variety of sources with different datasets, focusing on the post-Cold War period coinciding with the rise of neoliberal global capitalism including:

--interstate war: Therese Pettersson and Kristine Eck, “Organized Violence, 1989–2017,” Journal of Peace Research, June 18, 2018, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343318784101; Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–637.

--state killings of civilians: from Jay Ulfelder’s work for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Center for the Prevention of Genocide, data set is based on one that Dartmouth’s Ben Valentino created for the Political Instability Task Force

Cohen and Zenko 19 (Michael A. Cohen, former lecturer at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, regular contributor for The Boston Globe on national politics and foreign affairs, has written for dozens of news outlets, including as a columnist for the Guardian and Foreign Policy, US Political Correspondent for the London Observer, former speechwriter at the US State Department; and Micah Zenko, Whitehead Senior Fellow on the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House, former Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former research associate on the Project on Managing The Atom, Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, PhD Politics, Brandeis University; *Clear and Present Safety: The World Has Never Been Better And Why That Matters To Americans*, Yale University Press, Kindle Edition, 2019, locations 57-712)

Introduction Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to think sanely under the influence of a great fear. —Bertrand Russell On a crisp January day in 2016, in the small hamlet of Pittsfield, New Hampshire, several hundred voters were gathered for what is a quadrennial rite of passage in the Granite State: listening to a politician make his or her pitch to be the next president of the United States. The speaker this day was Chris Christie, who was then the Republican governor of New Jersey and one of more than a dozen presidential candidates campaigning across the state. Christie discussed everything from illicit drugs and immigration to the federal budget and the U.S. war against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. “He was pretty good,” one woman unenthusiastically shrugged after he finished. But as she struggled to say anything of substance, it seemed clear that Christie had not made much of an impression. When asked, though, if any specific policy issue took on particular importance, her face lit up: “ISIS. I’m really worried about ISIS.” The thought of her kids and grandkids growing up in a world where groups like the Islamic State would be threatening their future seemed to cause her genuine and palpable concern.1 The woman’s anxieties were sincere, but her fear could not have been more misplaced. The Islamic State had yet to launch even one direct terrorist attack within the United States, and if the group had drawn up a list of potential targets, the chances that Pittsfield, New Hampshire—an hour’s drive north of Manchester—would be high on that list were decidedly slim. At a time of ever-widening income inequality, stagnant wage growth, gun violence, and a raging opioid epidemic that in the previous year had claimed 422 lives in New Hampshire alone, this woman considered a shadowy terrorist group that had not killed a single American on U.S. soil one of the biggest challenges facing the country.2 She was far from alone. Public opinion polling consistently shows that Americans have long exaggerated the danger that terrorism represents to the United States. Since 9/11 the average number of Americans killed yearly in a terrorist attack is twenty-seven—and 90 percent of them were in Afghanistan or Iraq. Yet, in 2018, 81 percent of Americans ranked “cyberterrorism” as the most critical threat facing the United States, followed by international terrorism at 75 percent.3 Eighty-three percent of voters expect that a major terrorist incident with large numbers of casualties is likely to occur in the near future. Remarkably, in November 2017, more than half (52 percent) of Americans thought the United States was less safe then than it was before 9/11—as if the trillions spent on homeland security and fighting terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan had done nothing to make America less vulnerable to international terrorism. Seventeen years after September 11, the outsized fears of another 9/11-style terrorist attack provided compelling—and depressing—evidence that terrorist groups had succeeded, beyond their wildest imaginations, in transforming American society.4 It is not just armed jihadists that scare Americans. A 2012 poll showed that six out of seven Americans agree that “the United States faces greater threats to its security today than it did during the Cold War”—a time when the United States found itself in the crosshairs of approximately ten thousand nuclear weapons, each with a destructive power up to fifty times that of the nuclear bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima.5 How Americans, such as this woman from a small town in the “Live Free or Die” state, became convinced that the United States faces such acute and harmful foreign threats is, at its core, the story of this book. The American public is being fed, by politicians and pundits alike, a steady diet of threat inflation that has made them deeply fearful of the world outside their borders. They have become convinced that overseas menaces are perpetually becoming more likely, lethal, and complex. The world is forever on fire; America is always getting weaker; and its citizens are facing a constant drumbeat of tremendous and unceasing risks. The pervasiveness of threat inflation is such conventional wisdom that alternative—or even less threatening—descriptions of the world are largely nonexistent in foreign policy debates. As a result, most Americans are simply unaware of the extraordinary and unprecedented political, economic, and social progress that has taken place in virtually every corner of the globe over the past three decades. On that January day in New Hampshire, while alluding to the national debate on the balance between security and privacy, Christie declared ominously, “You can’t protect civil liberties from a coffin.” Pittsfield voters who had watched the most recently aired Republican presidential debate would have heard former Florida governor Jeb Bush tell them that the Islamic State had formed “a caliphate the size of Indiana with . . . 30,000 to 40,000 battle-tested soldiers that are organized to destroy our way of life.”6 They would have heard candidate and former pediatric neurosurgeon Ben Carson claim that dirty bombs and cyberattacks are, “in fact, an existential threat to us.”7 Those following the Republican primaries would have heard Donald Trump, the eventual Republican nominee and president of the United States, tell them that the only way to keep America safe was to ban all Muslims from entering the country, torture suspected terrorists, and “take out” (murder) their families.8 As regular consumers of news, Republican voters might have heard South Carolina senator Lindsey Graham tell Americans, “The world is literally about to blow up,” in January 2014 (spoiler: it did not).9 They might have caught Sen. John McCain, who, having been born in 1936, had lived through conflicts that killed an estimated sixty million people and had fought in one of those wars, say in 2015, “We are probably in the most serious period of turmoil in our lifetime.”10 Perhaps in the spring of 2017, they caught secretary for homeland security John Kelly claiming, “Make no mistake—we are a nation under attack” and “We are under attack every single day. The threats are relentless.”11 Or, in the summer of 2018, they might have heard his boss, President Trump, warn that “people coming in from the Middle East” would come across the border by using “children to get through the lines.”12 This incessant, default threat-mongering is neither a partisan issue nor a habit reserved for elected officials. Those Americans tuning in to CNN in October 2014 might have the chyron asking the hypothetical question “Ebola: ‘The ISIS of Biological Agents?’ ”13 Maybe they saw local reporting on defense secretary Chuck Hagel saying, “Cyber threats . . . are just as real and deadly and lethal as anything we’ve ever dealt with,” or New York senator Kirsten Gillibrand calling Iran an “existential threat” to America, or perhaps Arkansas senator Tom Cotton warning that the Islamic State, in coordination with Mexican drug cartels, could infiltrate the border and “attack us right here.”14 Even if viewers missed all that, they would have found it far more difficult to avoid the nonstop news coverage of the latest terrorist attack in Paris, Barcelona, or London. Even more important than what Americans hear from the nation’s leaders is what they do not hear. They do not hear that terrorism harms fewer Americans each year than falling televisions and furniture, bathtub drownings, and lightning strikes do. Annually, more Americans lose their lives from these three rare killers—roughly thirty-three, eighty-five, and forty fatalities, respectively—than at the hands of wild-eyed Islamic jihadists.15 These numbers pale next to the number of Americans killed each year prematurely by preventable, noncommunicable diseases (more than 2.5 million), suicide (44,100), and gun homicides (14,400). In short, Americans do not hear that America is unusually safe and secure from foreign threats. Part of this is a function of geography, but it is also true that the United States faces no serious great-power rival and no near-term political or economic competitor. So it should not be surprising that 86 percent of Americans view Russia’s military power as either an important or a critical threat to America, even though Russia is hemmed in by NATO, has a moribund economy, and has no enduring military partnerships in South Asia, the Middle East (outside of Syria), or the Western Hemisphere. Nor should it be surprising that 87 percent of Americans are concerned about China’s military power even though China faces its own pressing social, economic, and environmental challenges—and its primary near-term interest is maintaining Communist Party rule, not directly challenging the United States. Nor should it be surprising that 75 percent of Americans called the development of nuclear weapons by Iran a “critical threat”—even though Iran has surrendered its nuclear fuel and has allowed invasive inspections of its nuclear facilities through at least 2030.16 Finally, we should not be surprised that half the American people believe that U.S. armed forces are not the number-one military in the world, even though the United States spends more on national defense than the next nine nations combined, is allied or has mutual defense treaties with five of those countries, enjoys long-term security partnerships in every region of the world (outside Antarctica), and is, quite simply, the world’s most dominant nation and more secure than any other great power in history.17 In addition, the Republican primary voters in Pittsfield—or those who voted for a president who regularly told them “the world is a mess”—almost certainly did not hear that the world today is cumulatively more peaceful, freer, healthier, better educated, and wealthier than at any point in human history.18 Like most Americans, they would not have heard that in the year 2015 the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (on less than two dollars a day) dropped to below 10 percent of the global population, the lowest level ever and down from close to 50 percent in 1981.19 They are likely unaware that AIDS deaths have declined for more than fifteen years in a row, global life expectancy has increased by seven years since 1990 alone, and child mortality rates (for children under five years old) has been halved over that same period. Unbeknownst to them and the overwhelming majority of Americans, improvements in polio vaccines and delivery methods have practically eradicated the disease (just eleven active global cases by July 2018), saving more than 650,000 lives since 1988.20 What is most remarkable about all these positive developments is that they are uncontestable—the data are simply that strong. This fundamental disconnect between what Americans have been encouraged to believe about the world and the reality of global affairs is the most critical foreign policy issue facing the United States today. The American people are being sold a dangerous bill of goods that is distorting our foreign policy choices and leading politicians and policy makers to focus more on the threats that Americans perceive, rather than the ones that actually exist. This strategic misdiagnosis has led to consistently mistaken foreign (and domestic) policy choices that are diverting resources and attention away from the actual dangers that Americans face in their homes, neighborhoods, and workplaces. Every dollar spent bombing and then rebuilding Middle Eastern countries, modernizing a duplicative nuclear weapons arsenal, or building the next generation of combat aircraft that are intended to fight yesterday’s enemies means less money for America’s greatest domestic challenges. This includes America’s underperforming schools; a health care system that performs far worse than those of other affluent countries; crumbling roads, bridges, and water systems in places like Flint, Michigan; inadequate preparation for the inevitable and irreversible effects of climate change; and a tattered social safety net that is a far cry from those enjoyed by other developed countries. Pointing out that foreign threats pose a relatively insignificant risk to Americans compared to vastly greater domestic dangers and systemic harms is not to suggest that the United States should pull up the drawbridge and abandon its global role. If anything, at a time of relative peace and stability in the world, smart American leadership and active involvement in global affairs are more important than ever. In the seventy-plus years since the end of World War II, the United States, along with its allies and partners, has helped construct an international system that limits large-scale interstate conflict; encourages democratization, adherence to the rule of law, and respect for human rights; and advances human development. The challenge for the next generation of U.S. policy makers is to solidify the gains that have been made and to ensure that this extraordinary progress is not reversed. For that to happen, Americans must change the ways they think and talk about foreign policy and national security—and the first step is to acknowledge that foreign-threat inflation and the corresponding policy choices that it encourages are a problem. Americans need to think about the world in a whole new way, one that is more accurate and more uplifting than the dystopian view promoted by politicians and pundits. In the following six chapters, we will spell out how this paradigm shift might occur. First, there must be greater recognition that potential rivals and complex issues—frequently portrayed as dangers to Americans—are, in reality, relatively minor threats to Americans. Great-power wars have disappeared, interstate wars have become vanishingly rare, and the world is a safer and freer place than it has ever been in human history. Second, there needs to be better appreciation of the extraordinary global progress that has been made over the past several decades—and why it benefits the American people. The world today is healthier than would have been scarcely imaginable decades ago and is far richer and better educated than ever before. It is also more united and interconnected through travel, communications, economic links, and diplomatic relations. These trends make this current era of relative peace, safety, and prosperity not a momentary blip but, more likely than not, the future reality of global affairs. Third, it is imperative that Americans rethink what “national security” means and focus on the systemic dangers that diminish economic opportunities and the American people’s basic quality of life. From noncommunicable diseases to gun violence to crippling political dysfunction, the things that actually injure and kill us receive rare moments of national attention, while foreign terrorists and other outside threats perpetually occupy our minds. Political attention, policy changes, and expanded government resources can significantly—and cost-effectively—reduce these risks, but that will happen only if Americans recognize the need to address them. Fourth, the loose collection of politicians, government officials, pundits, private security firms, think tankers, academics, cable news hosts, and news editors that we call the Threat-Industrial Complex demands far greater scrutiny. These are the individuals—and institutions—who shape public perceptions about international relations and promulgate a false narrative of danger and insecurity. Fifth, our modern era of threat inflation must be placed in a larger political and historical context: namely, as an enduring feature of American politics and foreign policy debates since World War II. From “missile gaps” and the “domino theory” to the “evil empire” and “evildoers,” foreign threats have been consistently manipulated both in times of actual danger and in times of genuine peace and security. Sixth, to dramatize our argument, we offer a case study and cautionary tale of how threat inflation occurs and its larger political consequences: namely, the response to the tragedy of September 11. Public statements and policy decisions made by President George W. Bush and his administration set the tone, agenda, and political incentives of our contemporary fear-mongering but also wasted opportunities in a disproportionate response to a relatively minor and manageable threat. Finally, we lay out recommendations for reversing this unbalanced perspective and approach to foreign policy that will answer the question of what a U.S. domestic and global policy—properly informed by a more accurate understanding of the world—should look like. This book is not meant to be a comprehensive treatment of threat inflation or the final word about the nature and degree of foreign threats facing the United States and its citizens. As has been true for the past 240 years, the degree to which foreign dangers threaten America and its citizens has changed dramatically over time and will continue to evolve in ways that nobody can predict today. Nonetheless, it is quantitatively true that the current global environment is one of relatively few foreign threats, particularly in comparison to other great powers and to America’s historical experience. The fixation of American foreign policy and national security should not be what former president John Quincy Adams spoke of nearly two hundred years ago: namely, the impulse to look “abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” Rather, it must be to remain focused on ensuring that today’s hopeful present is America’s brighter future. A Safer and Freer World I think, what we need to do is to remind people that the earth is a very dangerous place these days. —White House press secretary Sean Spicer, February 7, 2017 February 16, 2012, was, from all appearances, an unremarkable day. The political world was focused on the upcoming Republican presidential primary in Michigan, in which the frontrunner, Mitt Romney, was facing a spirited challenge from former Pennsylvania senator Rick Santorum. Journalists were mourning the loss of the New York Times reporter Anthony Shadid, who had died on a reporting trip to Syria. New Yorkers obsessed over the Knicks’ budding superstar point guard, Jeremy Lin; the Simpsons marked its five hundredth episode; and Chinese President Xi Jinping was in Iowa hoping, as the Washington Post put it, “to emphasize the idea of an enduring U.S.-Chinese friendship.”1 Yet, on Capitol Hill, the most senior officer in the world’s most powerful military, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey, saw something else altogether: danger. Testifying before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on budget sequestration—the congressional mandate passed in 2011 that required all federal agencies, including the Pentagon, to automatically cut their budgets by 5 to 10 percent in the following decade—Dempsey warned, “in my personal military judgment, formed over thirty-eight years, we are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime, right now.”2 This is a surprising statement. After all, Martin Dempsey was born in March 1952, during the tail end of the Korean War—which killed more than two million people, including 36,574 Americans. When he attended elementary school, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world closer to nuclear holocaust than at any other point during the Cold War. By the time he enlisted in the army in 1974, the Vietnam War had been going on for several years and before it ended would take the lives of more than three million people, including 58,220 Americans. As Dempsey rose through the military ranks, he witnessed the strategic nuclear arms buildup of the 1980s, when the United States and the Soviet Union had tens of thousands of nuclear-armed missiles pointed at each other. Later, on September 11, 2001, the most lethal terrorist attack in American history took the lives of nearly three thousand people. While all of these events directly affected Americans, there were plenty of other dangerous moments in Dempsey’s lifetime, such as the Biafra separatist civil war in Nigeria that killed two hundred thousand, the Angolan civil war in which one million people died, the Khmer Rouge’s genocide in Cambodia that took the lives of approximately a quarter of that nation’s eight million people, the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s that killed more than one million people, and the internationalized civil war in Congo that has led to three million war-related deaths since the mid-1990s.3 Yet, if Dempsey is to be taken literally, none of those moments compared to the dangers facing the world on the morning of February 16, 2012. What made Dempsey’s statement particularly odd was an observation he made one year later testifying before Congress: “I will personally attest to the fact that [the world is] more dangerous than it’s ever been”—in other words, since the earth was fully formed 4.6 billion years ago.4 Though Dempsey’s comments were clearly hyperbolic—and easily disprovable—they garnered little attention. In a political environment dominated by habitual threat inflation, they barely stand out. Indeed, two years after Dempsey’s testimony, the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, told Congress, “looking back over my more than half a century in intelligence, I have not experienced a time when we have been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.” Remarkably, he had made virtually the same statement—word for word—a year earlier when testifying before Congress.5 In January 2015, army chief of staff Gen. Raymond Odierno told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “today the global environment is the most uncertain I have seen in my thirty-six years of service.”6 This assertion was especially well received by the committee’s chairman, Sen. John McCain, who only days before had proclaimed, “we are probably in the most serious period of turmoil in our lifetime.”7 In November 2017, Air Force Lt. Gen. Steve Kwast went further back in time proclaiming, “There’s no question that this generation . . . is living in the most dangerous time since the Civil War for the Republic.”8 There are specific bureaucratic and political reasons for such apocalyptic descriptions of the global environment (the more vivid the threat, the more likely Congress will be to maintain military and intelligence-community funding). Such views, however, are mimicked across the national security community. Indeed, in the elite world of foreign policy punditry (and national politics), the notion of grave, growing, and irreversible dangers facing the United States is the default (and unchanging) position. So we should not be surprised that most Americans think the world is getting more and more dangerous.9 In the immediate aftermath of the bombing of a subway train and airport terminal in Brussels in March 2016, MSNBC news anchor Brian Williams asked Senator McCain if the world was on the verge of World War III. McCain unsurprisingly said yes.10 Sen. Lindsay Graham, then in the running for the Republican nomination for president, echoed these fears, claiming, “there is a sickness in the world that has to be dealt with, and the civilized world must come together to confront it.”11 Quite simply, this is the lingua franca of the Threat-Industrial Complex. There is one problem: this image of the world is completely wrong. In virtually no element of our national discourse are Americans provided with a more inaccurate depiction of the world than when it comes to matters of war, peace, and freedom. Americans live in a world that is safer and freer than ever before in human history—and it is not even close. To state this is not to be insensitive to those who are suffering real harms or being denied their personal freedoms. It doesn’t mean one is naïve to the potential of current global challenges—some of which are neither illusory nor false—to become serious threats in the future. But facts are facts, and the transformation in the human experience over the past two to three decades is the most consequential global trend in security affairs in any of our lifetimes—and it is largely unknown to the wider public. A Safer World The data supporting the proposition that the world is safer than ever are so overwhelming that they can barely be disputed. For example, interstate war, or war between states, was the defining characteristic of international relations for centuries. Today, such wars have largely disappeared. Since 2012, there have been just two interstate wars: one between Sudan and South Sudan in 2012 and one between India and Pakistan in 2014 and 2015 that led to fewer than one hundred fatalities in total over both years.12 In the seven years before 2010, there was one major interstate conflict—started by the United States in Iraq in March 2003.13 How about great-power conflict? These protracted and bloody wars—such as the Thirty Years’ War, World War I, and World War II—have been historically the most devastating and consequential conflicts. They’ve repeatedly led to massive death tolls of soldiers and civilians, forced transfers of millions of people, and the redrawing of national boundaries to the benefit of the victors. As the historian Timothy Snyder has documented in Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, 10.5 million civilians (Germans, Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Jews from various countries) were killed by Germany and the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1945.14 Put another way by the eminent British historian Max Hastings, approximately twenty-seven thousand people lost their lives every single day of that conflict.15 That means that during World War II, between a given Monday and Thursday, there would have been as many deaths as there were battle-related deaths in all of 2016.16 Despite the December 2015 claim by Chris Christie that the United States was “already in World War III,” the world has not seen such a total global conflict in more than seven decades.17 All of this might sound like apostasy when you consider the daily fare on cable news segments, in social media feeds, and in the nation’s newspapers and magazines. Foreign reporting in these outlets has been dominated in recent years by North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, stories of terrorist attacks in Iraq and western Europe, a bloody civil war in Syria that has killed an estimated five hundred thousand people, the barbaric cruelty of the Islamic State, Russia’s meddling in its near abroad, and China’s campaign of building military facilities on disputed territories in the South China Sea.18 For those whose lives are directly affected, these crises are serious matters. But alarmist coverage of these global hot spots has deluded Americans into believing that the world is a chronically violent place. It’s not. In fact, modern war is not only a rare occurrence, but when it does happen, it tends to be less violent and of shorter duration. On average, conflicts kill about 80 percent fewer people now than in the 1950s, when wars in Korea, Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa took millions of lives.19 The vastly greater harm today is the displacement of civilians caught up in the fighting between combatants. By June 2018, sixty-eight million people around the world had been forced from their homes.20 To the credit of the United Nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental groups, the breadth and depth of understanding about the underlying dynamics and drivers of conflict have expanded dramatically, and there now exist far more tools for preventing and mitigating such armed violence. Not surprisingly, conflict gets more attention than does the successful use of international and regional conflict-prevention methods to prevent wars from occurring in the first place. The wars that never occurred between Israel and Iran, Peru and Ecuador, Russia and its Baltic neighbors, and Turkey and Russia after the shooting down of a Russian fighter in 2016 receive precious little attention. Despite routine alarms of mounting tensions between China and its neighbors over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, conflict there has been avoided. This is true of the overwhelming number of maritime and land disputes, which a majority of countries have with their neighbors. Additionally, of the 430 bilateral maritime boundaries in the world, most are not defined by formal agreements between affected states. Unfortunately, peace, even between bitter adversaries, is not an “event” worth recognizing, much less celebrating; the dominant media narrative is that of an ever-threatening world.21 The current era of relative peace and stability has also contributed to a notable decline in the prevalence of state-directed mass killings of civilians.22 During the Cold War, approximately one in seven countries experienced a state-sponsored mass killing. This number increased to nearly 25 percent immediately after the Berlin Wall came down and declined to between 5 and 10 percent by the 2010s.23 In fact, far fewer people have been killed in war in the past quarter century than in any other quarter century over the past six hundred years. In 1800, one out of every two thousand people on earth—civilians and combatants—died from a combat-related death; in 1900, it was one in every twenty thousand; by 2016, it was one in every one hundred thousand.24 The overall decline in global conflict has had extraordinary ripple effects. William Tecumseh Sherman famously declared in 1879 that “war is hell,” but his words barely capture the full costs of warfare and armed violence. As one would expect, warfare significantly limits life expectancy. The Syrian civil war, for example, reduced life spans there from 79.5 years before 2011 to 55.7 in 2015, an extraordinary twenty-year decline in just a four-year period.25 Children living in conflict-affected poor countries are twice as likely to die before their fifth birthday as are children in other poor countries, and warfare diminishes educational opportunities at all levels as well as overall quality of life. For example, children who grow up in conflict-affected countries are less likely to be literate and far less likely to be enrolled in primary school.26 Beyond the immediate human costs, wars do untold physical and environmental damage. In 2016, a time of relative peace and stability, all of the world’s armed conflicts combined cost the global economy an estimated $14.3 trillion. That is nearly 12.5 percent of global GDP.27 The relationship between conflict and economic distress is self-perpetuating—just as war drains government coffers, economic slowdowns also increase the likelihood of the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. Finally, conflict-prone countries are far less democratic, and, in fact, the presence of an autocratic government increases the risk of a civil war starting within that government’s territory.28 As noted previously, this matters because civil wars—including those like Syria’s that became “internationalized” with external support—are virtually the only type of armed conflicts that still occur in the world today. Ironically, Americans tend to see the world as far more dangerous than it is precisely because the world is safer. Conflicts that were once far more routine have become more unusual and thus receive greater (and more vivid) media attention. This bolsters the impression that we live in a world of constant conflict when compared to recent history. Yet it is often forgotten exactly how bloody the final years of the Cold War were, particularly in comparison to today. The Cold War is mistakenly remembered as an era of relative quiet in which Washington and Moscow co-managed global affairs. For example, in February 2016, Clapper said the reason there were more threats than at any point in his seventy-three-year lifetime was the disappearance of the superpower rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. “Virtually all other threats were sort of subsumed in that basic bipolar contest that went on for decades and was characterized by stability,” said Clapper.29 Yet, in the decade preceding the end of the Cold War in 1991, there were more than two million battle-related deaths around the world. In the ten years immediately after, there were 651,000, and in the past ten years, there were even fewer: 402,000.30 While the Cold War saw a bipolar (albeit unimaginably costly) peace between two nuclear-armed superpowers, it does not mean the rest of the world enjoyed peace and safety. There were significant internationalized wars, genocides and mass killings, and lengthy and bloody civil wars dotting the globe, from Indonesia and Afghanistan to Vietnam, Nigeria, and throughout Central America. There is also the inconvenient fact that the United States and Soviet Union possessed nearly seventy thousand nuclear weapons, many perched on intercontinental missiles pointed directly at each other. The two adversaries also had tactical nuclear weapons deployed in twelve countries—many poorly secured or with the authority to use them resting with local military commanders.31 In the event of a full-scale superpower conflict, human life as we know it would have likely ceased to exist. Since Americans misremember what happened during the Cold War—and forget how real the threat of nuclear conflict was—they are far more prone to accept claims that the world is less stable and safe today. One more reason Americans perceive the world to be so dangerous is that the overwhelming foreign policy focus of government leaders, Congress, and the media is on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Chronic political instability, proxy wars, and occasional interstate wars have long come to dominate the region. Indeed in 2017 alone, eight of nineteen MENA countries experienced intrastate conflicts (noninternational conflicts that resulted in twenty-five or more battlefield deaths).32 That is the exception, not the rule, in comparison to every other part of the world. Though the MENA region gets oversized media attention, it constitutes less than 5 percent of the world’s population and is not representative of the overwhelming majority of the planet’s seven and a half billion residents. Painting a picture of the world solely using the chaotic and violent imagery from the Middle East severely distorts one’s image of global affairs. More Freedom The world is not merely safer than ever before; it has also become demonstrably freer over the past quarter century. Just as the Cold War is misremembered for being an era of relative peace and stability, it is often forgotten that the world then was defined far more by authoritarianism and totalitarianism than by democracy. In most corners of the globe, political freedom represented an aspirational, seemingly unachievable, goal. Today, even in the face of troubling reversals and assaults on democracy, a greater percentage of people are freer than before. They enjoy personal, political, and economic self-determination that would have been unimaginable to most people living outside the United States and western Europe just thirty years ago. In November 1989, as the Berlin Wall was being dismantled, there were just 69 electoral democracies in the world, or 41 percent of 167 countries in total. Today, according to the Freedom House Index, that number is 116 (out of 196 countries), or 59 percent.33 In the 1980s, Latin America was mired in economic stagnation, social injustice, persistent conflict (both civil wars and cross-border conflicts), and above all, an almost complete lack of democratic governance. In Chile in 1973, a democratic election was overturned by a military coup, leading to dictatorship, widespread human rights abuses, and a full-fledged economic crisis. In Argentina, a military junta invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982, sparking a pointless war with the United Kingdom. Throughout the late ’70s and ’80s, Central America became a hotbed of human rights abuses, civilian massacres, and economic deprivation, fueled by superpower competition between Washington and Moscow. Today, while economic and political progress across the region has been uneven and backsliding is evident, all of Latin America—with the exception of Venezuela and Cuba—is today designated as “free” or “partly free” by Freedom House. Thirty years ago in Europe, half the continent was under the thumb of totalitarian leaders, basic freedoms were restricted, and barbed-wire-topped walls prevented citizens from traveling outside their borders. With the exception of Belarus and Russia, every country in western and eastern Europe is today considered a free or partly free democracy. In the Far East, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan—countries once (wrongly) considered by Western academics as culturally inappropriate for political liberalization—have become full-fledged democracies. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, which has experienced a decline or stagnation in democratization since 2005, the majority of people live in free or partly free countries.34 Once again, it is the Middle East that remains outside the global shift toward greater political freedom, with only Tunisia and Israel being considered free countries and a handful ranked as partly free.35 These gains have also led to greater political stability as there has been a marked decline in the number of coup attempts across the globe over the past three decades.36 The Polity IV project, a widely respected data source of global governance trends, assigns “polity scores” to states to quantify their governing authority on a scale of –10 to +10. It does this by coding democratic and autocratic traits, such as political participation, competitiveness of political leadership positions, and constraints on the chief of state. A polity score of +10 would be a full democracy, such as Sweden, while a –10 would be a severe autocracy, such as North Korea.37 In 1989, the average score for all governments was –0.5, the equivalent of an Afghanistan governance score by the latest rankings. By 2016, it had moved all the way to +4.3.38 Meanwhile, today a country with a score of –0.5 would be somewhere between Afghanistan and the Central African Republic. Moreover, when changes in polity scores from 1949 to 2014 are tracked against changes in “human rights scores” over the same period, a hopeful trend is apparent: as countries become more democratic, their respect for human rights also increases.39 Democratic progress, however, remains fragile, and according to Freedom House—which tracks relative democratic rankings—global freedom has declined for the past twelve years. In aspiring great and midlevel powers such as China, Russia, and Turkey, there has been a disturbing uptick in autocratic behaviors. In all three countries, there’s been the silencing and even murder of independent journalists, the overregulation and harassment of civil society organizations, consolidation of political rule by authoritarian leaders, and more centralized control of security forces. Notable and troubling declines are also evident in the Philippines, Poland, Hungary, and Nicaragua. Moreover, confidence in elected officials in strongly democratic countries—including the United States and in western Europe—has notably fallen in recent years as populist, nativist, and xenophobic political movements have made inroads.40 The extraordinary democratic progress made in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall is now moving in the opposite direction. Struggles for more entrenched democratization and personal freedoms are constantly contested, messy, and even bloody affairs—and many young democracies go through extended periods of political turmoil. Those who hold power generally seek to exercise it with the fewest possible restraints, and those restraints are growing. Indeed, if there is one area where the path of human progress could potentially be slowed or even reversed, it is on the expansion of political freedom. The growing disinterest among U.S. policy makers toward the issue—and the cultivation of authoritarian leaders by President Donald Trump—will undoubtedly make this situation worse. Yet the path of progress over the past thirty years cannot be denied. Quite simply, the world is far more democratic and free today than it was during the height of the Cold War. Why Does This Matter for America? While fewer armed conflicts and increased political freedom is good news for the vast majority of the world’s seven and a half billion people, it is also great news for America. If there is one relatively ironclad rule of international affairs, it is that democracies tend to have happier, healthier, and better-educated citizens. They almost never go to war with other democracies, much less even threaten each other; and they are also far less likely to find themselves in conflict with nondemocratic governments.41 A world that is relatively freer and thus less conflict-prone is one that is indisputably better for the United States. It means the U.S. homeland is less likely to be threatened or attacked by great powers with conventional or nuclear weapons. It means treaty allies are not at war, and as a result, the U.S. military is not required to come to their defense. Indeed, in 2015, only five armed conflicts (all internal) took place in countries that are U.S. treaty allies: Philippines (two of them), Colombia, Thailand, and Turkey.42 It means that fewer countries host or sponsor transnational terrorist groups dedicated to attacking the United States, its citizens, or its overseas diplomatic facilities. It means there are fewer disruptions to global flows of trade, tourism, and energy supplies that benefit the U.S. economy and American jobs. It means fewer people grow up in societies where hopelessness, resentment, and alienation make them susceptible to the appeals of violent extremists. Finally, it means governments are more likely to cooperate on transnational challenges such as fighting climate change, preventing the spread of infectious diseases, lowering the barriers to global trade and furthering human development.43 Since terrorism dominates contemporary foreign policy debates, Americans might immediately ask, “What about 9/11?” Understandably, the September 11, 2001, attacks are deeply imprinted into our national consciousness and will remain an inflection point for the division of historical eras, similar to the “Cold War” and “post-Cold War” eras. Yet it is important to understand just how tragically lucky al-Qaeda was on 9/11 and why the attacks were such an anomaly. U.S. homeland security policies, intelligence cooperation, and commercial aviation security were hugely deficient, and this combined negligence made America needlessly vulnerable. As we will detail later, the United States is vastly safer today from such a mass-casualty terror attack. There are still terrorist groups seeking to kill Americans on American soil, yet they have been overwhelmingly unsuccessful in their efforts to do so. Since 9/11, 103 Americans have been killed within the United States by jihadist terrorists or affiliated terrorist actors, which is almost the same number of Americans killed in hate-crime attacks since 2002.44 Since 9/11, 402 U.S. citizens have died in terrorist incidents while living abroad, but nearly 75 percent of them died working as diplomats, contractors, aid workers, or journalists in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—the very places where the United States started wars and continues to conduct air strikes to destroy terrorist safe havens.45 It is tragic but unsurprising that individuals bravely serving in places where conflict is occurring face severely heightened risks to their personal safety, but that does not mean Americans should feel at increased risk of being killed by terrorists.46 Indeed, at the same time that Americans have become safer from terrorism, such attacks have increased globally. In 2002, there were fewer than 200 terror incidents worldwide, which killed a total of 725 people; in 2017, there were 8,584 incidents, which took the lives of 18,753 people, one-quarter of whom were the perpetrators.47 Yet seventy percent of all these fatalities occurred in just five countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria. The perpetrators are relatively weak, nonstate actors using violence to achieve their political objectives, while the victims are overwhelmingly civilians (who themselves are overwhelmingly Muslims) caught between government security forces that cannot protect them and terrorist armies willing to kill them. Even in these five countries, however, there have been notable improvements, especially within Pakistan, which has experienced a decline in civilian deaths from terrorism every year between 2012 and 2017, with 3,007 deaths in 2012 and 540 in 2017.48 Contrary to General Dempsey’s apocalyptic warnings, the world that existed on February 16, 2012, was far less dangerous than at any point since he had been alive—and it remains so today. In the years after the end of the Cold War, many foreign policy analysts predicted a very different world—a “coming chaos” of continuous ethnic conflicts and genocidal civil wars.49 The political scientist Samuel Huntington warned of a potential “clash of civilizations,” while John Mearsheimer wrote ominously in the pages of the Atlantic that we would soon miss the Cold War.50 The journalist Robert Kaplan predicted that the post-Cold War years would be defined by “anarchy” and regional wars sparked by ancient, tribal hatreds. U.S. senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned that renewed ethnic tensions could turn the planet into a “pandaemonium.”51 Contrary to this drumbeat of doomsaying, globalization failed to produce the xenophobia and unchecked ethnic and racial hatreds that were confidently predicted.52 If anything, the end of the Cold War led to a period of expanded global commerce, communications, and travel, as well as vastly higher living standards for the majority of people on earth. Global and regional cooperation, not competition, is the defining characteristic of international politics today. That includes national governments, corporations, industry associations, nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens. As we demonstrate in the following chapter, the world is not just safer and freer; it is a far better place to live now than at pretty much any point in the history of the human race. Healthier, Wealthier, Better Educated, and More Interconnected When you look at all the measures of well-being in the world, if you had a choice of when to be born and you didn't know ahead of time who you were going to be—what nationality, whether you were male or female. v/hat religion—but you had said. ‘When in human history would be the best time to be born?'” the time would be now. —President Barack Obama, September 7,201 a In 2013, a Swedish research firm wanted to know what the residents of the world's most powerful and influential nation knew about the world outside its borders.: What it found out is not pretty. That its survey showed the American people lacked detailed knowledge about global affairs was unsurprising. More interesting, however, is the way Americans are wrong. Eighty-three percent believed that less than half of the world's children had been vaccinated for measles. In fact. 85 percent of kids have received this life-saving vaccines. Americans underestimated the number of adults with basic literacy skills (a majority guessed 00 percent; it is actually 30 percent). Most telling, however, was the response to a question about the proportion of people in the world living in extreme poverty. Two-thirds said the global poverty rate had "almost doubled.\*’ 29 percent said it has •‘remained more or less the same,\* and a mere 5 percent picked what was then the correct answer—that it has been cut in half. This survey is an incomplete snapshot, but it is backed up by other data. When Americans were polled in the fall of 2017 about their perceptions of the world, just 10 percent agreed that “the world is getting better;" while nearly four times as marry (63 percent) thought it was getting worse.! A 2010 poll found that 92 percent of Americans believed that extreme poverty has either increased or stayed the same over the past two decades.! In short. Americans think the world is a pretty lousy place. That means they are missing the most important international story of any of our lifetimes—namely, that it has never been a better time to be a human being than right now. Today, the seven and a half billion people who reside on our planet live longer lives; are better educated; have greater access to health care, sanitation, and food; and are far less likely to live in extreme poverty. These improvements, most of which have occurred over the previous two to three decades, have reduced the potential for military conflict, created social and economic opportunities for women and girls that previously never existed, and improved the happiness and quality of life for billions of people. Indeed, these are the fastest and most extraordinary advances in human progress in the history of the species. Recognizing and celebrating this unprecedented improvement in the human experience does not mean that global development work has reached its conclusion. Neither does it diminish the obstacles facing those who continue to lack access to health services or live in countries where poverty eradication has stalled, which increasingly includes the United States. There are still hundreds of millions of people around the world who remain in dire need. However, to overlook positive social trendlines ignores the unquestioned successes of global development endeavors and further cements the pessimistic view that little can be done to improve the lives of others. If recent history teaches us anything, it is that the opposite is true—the power to enhance people's lives for the better is overwhelmingly within our grasp. These vast improvements in the health and well-being of people outside the United States—and the increased global interconnectivity among governments, markets, and people—matters a great deal for ordinary Americans. The United States has global interests that range from protecting treaty allies and preventing nuclear proliferation to expanding export markets. Those interests are far better secured when children across the world are in school learning, women are able to work and have greater control of their bodies and their lives, and people's time on earth is longer, happier, and more fulfilling. All of these factors are strongly correlated with greater political stability and lesser chances for conflict. Fewer states at war means reduced regional tensions that may otherwise compel a government to obtain weapons of mass destruction and more stable and prosperous economies to purchase American goods and services. When the world is a better place for more people, it is also a better place for the United States. How the World Became Far Better for Far More People Why has the world become such a wealthier, healthier, freer, and less violent place? It is no coincidence that it began to occur at the same time that the Cold War was winding down. As communism was cast into the ashbin of history, once-closed-off countries adopted policies that made them more economically dynamic and interdependent. At the same time, new information technologies became increasingly ubiquitous—even in some of the world’s poorest countries. Take the experience of China. Beginning in the early 1990s. Chinese leaders opened their country to foreign investment and global trade. Economic growth became a national priority, and while the reigning Communist Party stubbornly clung to one-party rule, it began to loosen the political, economic, and social restrictions that had impeded the country's development. Similar efforts at moving to a more-market-based economy began in India, the world's second-most-populous country. Between 1990 and 2010, GDP per capita increased by $7,300 in China and $1,350 in lndia.1 The success of the world's two most populous nations in raising living standards has been a critical driver of global social and economic change. But the advances in the human condition over the past several decades have hardly been restricted to these two nations. In practically every country on earth, there have been significant and notable improvements in reducing poverty, extending life expectancies, and improving health outcomes. TO chart that growth, a good place to start is the Millennium Development Coals (MDGs). The MDGs are an initiative that will be familiar to few Americans outside the world of global development. Indeed, even for most foreign policy professionals, the MDGs are not well understood or appreciated. But this landmark commitment—agreed to unanimously by all 193 countries in September 2000—has been translated into eight sweeping goals that have transformed the developing world and changed the lives of hundreds of millions of people for the better. Moreover, the MDGs offer a compelling lesson of how the international community can continue to work together for the common global good—which will be essential as world leaders face the growing and potentially calamitous threat of climate change. When the MDGs were initially proposed, development trend lines were already moving in a more positive direction, but their global adoption brought more sustained political focus and consolidated numerous governmental and nongovernmental resources. By definition, the creation of strategic goals only occurs when leaders and states agree that they want to accelerate progress. The MDGs represented concrete and actionable goals that every country in the world supported. Moreover, they created metrics that allow us to assess the trajectory of human development—and the results speak for themselves. The first and most essential MDG was aimed at eradicating extreme poverty and hunger—and for good reason. Reducing poverty, besides making life better, opens up innumerable economic opportunities: more food, more leisure, longer lives, and perhaps, above all else, lowers economic anxiety and stress. It means children in developing countries are more likely to live past their fifth birthday. It means they go to school, rather than toil infields or factories. And it means they will have access to healthcare that will ensure they will not be felled by preventable diseases and illnesses. Mothers who have confidence that their children will not just survive into adolescence and adulthood but have an opportunity for success will get pregnant less often. With fewer kids to care for, women are more likely to enter the workforce, which increases overall household wealth. Higher income means that even the smallest luxuries of life—which people in the devel- oped world take for granted, such as taking a vacation, buying a toy, or getting an ice cream cone as a treat for our children—suddenly become available. Quite simply, a life not lived in poverty means far greater happiness.L Since 1990. the reduction in global poverty rates has been astounding-Over the past twenty-eight years, the number of people in the developing world living on less than $1.25 a day (a traditional definition for extreme poverty) has been reduced by one billion! Back then, approximately half the developing world was mired in such crippling poverty; today, it is fewer than one in ten, and it continues to drop year after year, with further reductions challenging but likely.! China accounts for much of this decline, having seen its extreme poverty rate drop by 60 percent in just eighteen years. This means that by 2017 more than eight hundred million Chinese citizens had been lifted out of economic deprivation.. But China's evolution has been replicated in countries across the globe. Iran's poverty rate has gone from 17.6 percent in 1986 to under 1 percent in 2014!£ El Salvador's fell from 36 percent in 1989 to 1.9 percent in 20 IS. and Ethiopia went from 92 percent in 1981 to under 30 percent today.il The underlying cause for these rapid improvements has been the end of conflict: bloody civil wars in El Salvador and Ethiopia and. for Iran, the end to a brutal eight-year struggle with Iraq. It is yet another reminder that fewer wars and greater peace and stability bring enormous residual benefits. In other places, however, the story is simpler: countries liberalized their economies and removed trade barriers that prevented them from selling their products overseas. They attracted new investment and new businesses with the advantage of lower labor costs. They sent workers overseas to send back remittances to family members, and at home, they strengthened the social safety net to help give those who were mired in poverty a helping hand. And perhaps above all, as more countries became democratic, it put pressure on political leaders to keep the good economic times going—or face the potential prospect of losing their own jobs. We can see positive results from Brazil, where the poverty rate dropped from 20 percent in 1990 to just 4.3 percent in 201 5!! In Namibia, it went from 69 percent in 1993 to 27 percent in 201S!land in Bangladesh, it dropped from 44 percent in 1990 to 24.3 percent in 2016.11 While these countries still face serious social and economic challenges, their success in reducing poverty is staggering. As for hunger, the trend lines are similarly positive. In 1990, about one in five people in the developing world suffered from undernourishment. Since then, that number has been cut in half—i At one time, famine was one of the world's worst killers. In the 1960s alone, it took the lives of more than eighteen million people. Biafra. Bangladesh, North Korea, and Ethiopia had all been witness to famines that killed more than a million in each country. China is estimated to have lost thirty million people during the 19SOs and '60s in a famine caused, in part, by horribly misguided government policies. By contrast, from 2010 through 2016. the number of people killed in famine was around a quarter of a million—a tragedy, of course, but also an indication of how far the world has come in preventing such deaths!! The MDGs also established benchmarks for universal primary education and promoted greater gender equality b

y ensuring that young girls had the same opportunity to go to school as young boys. The benefits of such a strategy are self-evident: abetter-educated populace means that more people can read and write. When more people are literate, that translates into a workforce that is more highly skilled and innovative, less unequal, and more productive. But the benefits of education are particularly important when it comes to young women. Girls who are enrolled in school at a young age are more likely to get married later in life. They have fewer children and thus lower levels of poverty. They are at reduced danger of the most common and acute diseases that have long ravaged the developing world. And girls who are given the chance to attend school along with their male peers are more likely to grow up to be women who arc socially and per- sonally empowered to take control of their own destiny. Ask any development expert about the best way to lift up adeveloping economy, and virtually all of them will give you the same answer: make sure girls are going to school.il Increasingly that is exactly what is happening. Primary-education enrollment rates in the developing world have jumped from 33 percent in 2000 to 91 percent today.!! That might seem like a relatively small rise, but, in fact, it means that more than forty million more children spend their day in a classroom today than did fifteen years ago. In 1990. in sub-Saharan Africa, only 4 5 percent of the population received a basic education; today, 80 percent do.il The jump in South Asia and Southeast Asia has gone from 75 percent to 95 percent; and in the Middle East and North Africa, from 63 percent to 95 percent 11 Today, the global literacy rate stands at 91 percent among young people and 86 percent for adults; in 1990. just 61 percent of the world could read or write!l For young girls, the story is even more positive. In South Asia, in 1990, the girls' literacy rate was 49 percent, and an average of 74 girls compared to lOO boys were in primary school; today, the rate is 85 percent, and the enrollment ratio stands at 103 girls for every lOO boys!\* Across all developing countries, girls are less likely than boys to repeat grades or drop out of school. This has helped to promote steady advances in female labor-force participation (for both formal and informal work)!! Tt>day. a previously unimaginable percentage of young boys and girls around the world are being educated. This both improves lives and. once again, makes the world a safer place, since countries with higher education levels are less likely to find themselves mired in armed conflict.il Two MDGs were aimed at decreasing child mortality and improving maternal health. This has led to notable increases in vaccination rates that have reduced the number of children felled by preventable diseases by more than seven million This decline has helped cut the under-five child mortality rate in half since 1990. That means that every year, 2 72,000 children who two or three decades ago would have died are alive today !! Here, enhanced access to education has had an enormous impact, since increases in education levels for women strongly correlate with reduced levels of childhood mortality!! In the same period, maternal mortality rates have dropped globally by 45 percent, with the sharpest decline occurring from 2000 to 200S.il This means that in 2017, more than 136.000 mothers who would have died a couple of decades ago are alive and able to help raise their children. Finally, the increased availability of family planning op- tions cut the number of unintended pregnancies around the world by 44 percent between 1990 and 2014.21 An MDG focused on combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases has been similarly transformative. Since 2000. new HIV infections have dropped 45 percent around the world, and more than thirteen million AIDS-related deaths have been averted!: Additionally, tuberculosis prevention and treatment saved an estimated fifty-three million lives, increased measles immunizations prevented more than twenty million deaths between 2000 and 2016, and polio has largely been eradicated. There were just eleven active cases of the disease as of July 2018.11 An oral polio vaccine—delivered with just two drops—and the necessary funding to make it widely available had. as of 2014, saved the lives of more than 650,000 people over the previous twenty-five years!! In March 2018. South Sudan announced that it had eradicated guinea worm, a parasitic illness that causes agonizing and incapacitating pain. In 1986, the disease afflicted three and a half million people in the developing world. In 2017, the number had fallen to thirty, and by May 2018, there were just three reported casesll According to the Carter Center, which has been at the forefront of the guinea-worm eradication effort, close to eighty million cases of the illness have been averted over the past thirty Improved access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation has been another target of the MDGs. The expanded international commitment to these issues has helped more than a fifth of the current global population (1.3 billion people) gain access to sanitation since 200011 In addition to saving the lives of 340,000 children who used to die from diarrhea because they were exposed to dirty water, improved sanitation also keeps children in school instead of sick at home. Even better, children with access to clean drinking water are in better shape physically, cognitively, and even socially!! Nutritional advances have come so quickly and been so significant that public health officials now express concern over what is known as the 'double burden of malnutrition,'’ in which developing countries are simultaneously experiencing health perils generally associated with being overweight as well as those from undernourishment. Amazingly, obesity now poses greater harm globally than lack of adequate nutrition does, a phenomenon that would have been unimaginable even a quarter century ago.!! What is perhaps most remarkable about all this sweeping progress is that it was achieved at the same time that the planet's population grew by one and a half billion people, and global life expectancy increased by more than five full years since the MDGs were announced in 2000!! Yet for all of the success of the MDGs (and also the full panoply of public health and human development changes), they are rarely mentioned in current foreign policy debates. Long-term positive trends go largely unreported, with the focus instead, almost exclusively, on-hard" security issues, such as coercive “redlines," nuclear weapons, terrorism, and drone strikes. Highlighting polio eradication, for example, does not drive internet clicks, justify’ a larger Pentagon budget, or motivate voters to support a more interventionist foreign policy. In the United States, good news about the world has little political salience, and it is sim- ply not deemed newsworthy. The development scholar Laura Freschi pithily captured why this phenomenon matters. She observed in 2010 that more Americans believed that their president was a Muslim than had heard of the improvements in quality of life on our planet!! Global Interconnectivity While the global development community deserves enormous credit for many of the advances chronicled above, they drafted off of historic geopolitical changes. When the Cold War ended, the most resonant image was the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9. 1939. The pictures of Germans chipping away at the barrier that hid separated them for thirty-eight years—and the pictures of supposed enemies joyfully embracing—were poignant reminders of the universal desire for freedom. From that moment forward, hundreds of millions of people around the world—from Jakarta to Johannesburg and Managua to Minsk—began choosing their own leaders, holding them accountable, and voicing their opinions without the government interference they endured while living under dictatorship. Yet, in the nearly thirty years since that epoch-making event, it is the economic bonds built between peoples and countries that have played the leading role in changing the human experience for the better. Communism, by its very nature, was an overwhelmingly closed economic system that purposely avoided commercial and business ties with capitalist nations. Even countries outside the Soviet and Chinese orbits often pursued economic policies that protected failing native industries; suppressed talented entrepreneurs, investment, economic innovation, and development: and. more generally, shut the door to the outside world. But with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the gradual shift in China toward an export-driven economic strategy, all of that began to change. China transitioned along with its regional neighbors—Japan and South Korea and then Taiwan. Singapore, and Hong Kong. Even in noncommunist countries like India and Brazil, the end of the Cold War ushered out protectionist policies in favor of those seeking foreign investment, encouraging entrepreneurship, and creating new and vibrant trade links. Tariffs went down, and subsidies were slowly eased out, as countries worked to fashion themselves into more attractive investment destinations for global businesses. The results are overwhelming. Foreign direct investment in the developing world has gone from $20 billion a year in 1990 to Jo 53 billion in 2017, while private capital flaws went from $91 billion to $1.2 trillion during the same time.li Emerging economies are today deeply reliant on international trade not only as a means of development and job creation but also for attracting new capital investments and technical expertise. The result is stronger and more diversified economies, higher productivity, significant improvements in the welfare of women, and of course, reduced poverty.:\*® Recent trends, such as a decline inG-20 imports and new trade restrictions, suggest that this economic openness has slowed—the consequences of which have been hundreds of billions of dollars in lost global GDP.il In addition, while the process of globalization has contributed to higher living standards, it can contribute to greater income inequality and has given impetus to nativist and anti-immigrant movements in Europe and the United States. These are issues of serious concern, and if they go unaddressed in Western democracies, it could undermine the economic progress made over the past quarter century. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly true that far more people have benefited from globalization than have been harmed.42 From the perspective of global security, the benefits are even more clear-cut because when a country trades with other states, it significantly diminishes the likelihood of conflict. Doubling a country's international commerce can reduce its risk of interstate violence by up to 30 percent, while countries with no regional trade tics are more than twice as likely as their highly integrated neighbors to experience a civil war.43 Similarly, when a country experiences an increase in foreign direct investment, it significantly improves the welfare of women and reduces the likelihood that the country will participate in an armed conflict.44 Being an active participant in today's globalized economy does not eliminate the possibility of a country going to war, as is evinced by America's ongoing military operations in Afghanistan. Iraq, and Syria. However, it is a fact that countries with increased economic interconnectivity are less likely to find themselves mired in conflict. The Smartphone Story The foregoing numbers, while impressive, do not fully do justice to the impact of economic integration over the past few decades. Visualizing the spectrum of changes that global interdependence has wrought is as simple as reaching into your pocket and pulling out your phone. That device that you use to talk to and text with your friends and family, get news, watch soccer or basketball clips, find out what the president of the United States just tweeted, or play Words wick Friends offers one of the best possible explanations for how the world has become more connected, wealthier, and safer—and why it is likely to stay that way. Since there are many smartphones, let's pick the one that is perhaps most ubiquitous: Apple’s iPhone. Since its introduction in 2007, the iPhone has improved productivity, sped up communications, and allowed for more people to live and work remotely from their employers, customers, or clients. The iPhone is sold in more than 130 countries—a symbolic example of how the removal of trade barriers has spurred the rapid adoption of transformative technologies in both rich and poor countries. Some 725 million smartphones were sold in 2012, increasing to more than l.S billion by 2010, of which more than 000 million went to emerging-market customers from China. India, Brazil, and IndonesiaJi. Additionally, while mobile internet usage in Western countries is increasing fourfold annually, it is rising twenty-seven-fold in developing countries. There are 5.2 billion smartphone subscriptions globally, with 3.5 billion projected by 2023—and most of them will be in the developing world.iLIn many countries, there arc actually more cell phones than people. In places like Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, the landscape is defined by omnipresent cell towers that now provide mobile services to more than 80 percent of the population.47 The iPhone contains components that have been developed and manufactured in multiple countries, which exemplifies how patent protections, increased foreign investment, and globalized supply chains have spread economic development across the globe. Take, for example, the iPhone X, which was released in fall 2017. Its accelerometer comes from the German firm Bosch, the display screen from the South Korea-based giant Samsung, the electronic compass from the Japanese firm Alps Electronic Company, and various radio-frequency components from Sky works Solutions, a compary located in a suburb of Boston. Massachu- setts \_li The iPhone X was assembled at a Taiwanese-owned Foxconn plant in southern China, which is emblematic of the inflow of low-wage manufacturing jobs that have taken the world's most populous nation from impoverishment to becoming among the most dynamic and steadily growing economies in the world. The iPhone and the internet access it provides have further empowered hundreds of millions of people in developing nations. From Tunisia to Egypt's Tahrir Square and in multiple elections in fledgling democracies, ordinary citizens have used their cell phones to safeguard votes against electoral fraud and organize activists and pro-democracy demonstrators. Mobile technology and social media apps have made it possible for citizens to compile damning information about their governments, report abuses to news outlets outside their communities, and more easily publicize those abuses on a variety of social media plat- forms. This has even, ironically, become a problem for Apple itself- In 2012. after workers at the company's Foxconn factories in China documented and publicized poor working conditions there. Apple agreed to independent audits of the facilities by the Fair Labor Association. Here in America, cell-phone cameras have served as an invaluable tool for documenting and holding local police officers accountable for police shootings and gave critical impetus to the Black Lives Matter movement. Governments have also occasionally used mobile technology to expand democratic participation. In 2014, Libya's election commission worked with the firm Reboot to digitize the country's voter registration system, making it possible for voters (including diaspora Libyan citizens) to register for upcoming parliamentary elections on their phones. Considering that mobile penetration in Libya stood at nearly 150 percent, it was amove that made more sense than asking Libyans to register in person. More than l.l million citizens living in Libya and thirteen other countries were successfully signed up. and the system is still being used today to manage voter rolls. Libya remains fractured along ethnic and geographic lines, but the digital voting infrastructure remains in place if political leaders choose to reuse it in future elections. Communication technologies are, of course, a double-edged sword, and governments have leveraged internet and mobile-phone penetration to spy on, influence, track, and harass their citizens. Journalists, activists, opposition-party leaders, and others have found their phones unknowingly implanted with spyware—often with the assistance of Western cyber security firms—that allows security services to monitor political opponents. Governments have also, at times, blacked or limited access to social media networks on the whims of political leaders. Yet technologically savvy and creative citizens are constantly developing workarounds to such spying—with encrypted communications, like Tt leg ram and WhatsApp, as well as virtual private networks and other digital solutions that are not widely publicized. Government authorities have tried to control the flow of information and communications for centuries, and one should be under no il- lusion that this will not continue for the foreseeable future, ftt never before have so many people been more empowered to learn, connect, and collaborate in real time for relatively little cost. Moreover, one does not need a cutting-edge smartphone to take advantage of the mobile revolution. Basic mobile phones are increasingly essential in those places where citizens do not have access to brick-and-mortar banks or any credit history. Mobile banking is benefiting hundreds of millions of new individuals each year by allowing them to document and save money, safely transfer funds, and pay down loans±l In Kenya, 90 percent of households use mobile phones and mobile money, mostly through a text-message-based payment system called M-PESA.li Researchers found that mobile banking makes it easier for breadwinners to provide for their families or for friends and family to send emergency funds immediately to each other when feeing a health crisis. Between 2003 and 2014, more than 194,000 households were lifted out of poverty and 185,000 women were induced to enter the business world as a direct result of the soci- etal shift provided by M-PESA.1L Similarly, smartphones are empowering a wide range of entrepreneurs in all sectors, from small business owners to farmers. For example, a free mobile app called MandiTrades allows farmers in India to receive real-time market information to help manage their crops, upload information about their produce right from the field, and finally connect with markets for salesJ2 In India, where one of the biggest challenges to cell-phone proliferation is getting the devices in the hands of women, wider access to smartphones will make it easier for women to find and apply for jobs outside the home and. as a result, increase their partic- ipation in the workforce. Finally, that iPhone on which you pi a)1 Candy Crush Saga and Fortnitc is also saving lives. In Mozambique, for example, a free app alerts patients with HIV or tuberculosis when to take their medicine and reminds them of upcoming appointments.!! Other programs send text messages and voice mails to new and expectant mothers, with basic advice on nutrition, health, and immunization schedules. In Bangladesh, the Mobile Alliance for Maternal Action has reached more than five hundred thousand pregnant women and new moms” In Pakistan, targeted calls from provincial educational officials and local school council members increased the school enrollment rates for young girls by 12 percent-11 More broadly, in classrooms around the developing world, tablets and cell phones are increasingly replacing books and notepads, as students can now download reading assignments directly, helping to improve literacy and promote reading. There are hundreds, if not thousands, more stories that speak to the direct positive impact that mobile technology has had on global public health, the promotion of democracy, the improvement of educational outcomes, and the expansion of economic growth. But there is one behind-the-scenes component that makes all of this possible. What, for example, protects the patents used to develop the iPhone? The answer: international treaties (starting with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 18 84) that uphold patent rights and bolster international organizations (namely, the Patent Cooperation Treaty), which ensures that Apple's intellectual property rights are protected. What makes it possible for you to get on a plane, fly to China, anduseaphone as if you were in your home country? Answer: several international agreements (starting with the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, also of 1884) and industry groups (particularly the International Cable Protection Committee), which govern and share best practices for laying and maintaining undersea cables. This might seem minor, but keep in mind that these three hundred transoceanic cables stretching six hundred thousand miles are responsible for 95 percent of the world's internet, phone, and data traffic. This overlapping web of reciprocal agreements and international understandings is unknown to all but a few Americans. But the ability to connect people, ideas, and markets from every corner of the earth is the direct result of an international system that is specifically constructed to further global coopera- tion. That iPhone in your hand tells the story of an interdependent and interconnected world that would have been unimaginable just a generation ago. Why should Americans care that the world has become a far better place for far more people than ever before? Because a world that is more prosperous, healthier, better educated, and closely connected is a less chaotic and violent place—and more likely to stay that way22 Countries that are more democratic are also more politically stable and more open to trade and foreign investment that is likely to benefit American workers and consumers 1\_1 Yet, despite all of these remarkable gains, there is significant work to be done. Eight hundred million people still live in extreme poverty, 100 million children under age five do not get enough to eat, and 01 million are not attending school. Only half of the 30.7 million who are living with HIV in developing regions receive antiviral treatments, and 884 million people still lack adequate drinking water.!! These numbers are sobering, and they demand greater resources and a more concerted effort on the part of the international community.!! But the fact that sizable problems remain cannot take away from the sustained progress that has been made. Domestic politics, in part, explain why Americans remain unaware of these tremendous changes. Stating that the world is actually a pretty safe and much-better place to live is somehow a taboo, a sign of naivete, or deeply insensitive in light of the real harms experienced by Americans. Yet politicians should recognize and celebrate the positive accomplishments that have improved the lives of so man)' people, and U5 citizens should come to expect this from their elected leaders. All too rarely have U.S. '\*national interests" included advancing the health, well-being, and economic opportunities of humanity. But the top foreign pol- icy priority for whoever sits in the Oval Office or controls Congress should be precisely that—not just because it is the right thing do but also because it makes America safer.

### Else

#### Maoist insurgency fails in the US now

--ACS = American Corporate State

Flaherty, 5 USC BA in International Relations, researcher in political affairs (Kevin, “Militant Electronic Piracy: Non-Violent Insurgency Tactics Against the American Corporate State”, <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html>) s/o to little rock gl and westminster ab, we love you!

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail and will only serve to enhance the state's power. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, Black Panthers, Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could ever hope to attain.4 This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics. - Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are unimaginable to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have no idea of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement. Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

#### Violent revolutions result in atrocity by erasing the moral threshold for acceptable collateral damage – which is problematic for the same reasons as presumptively criminalizing all black people

--at: no innocents – even if no whites are innocent and all benefit from privilege – they are *not guilty to the same degree* – advocating *indiscriminate* violence is inherently *unjust* and inconsistent with the sanctity with which the NEG holds the lives of those criminalized, killed and incarcerated by anti-blackness

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5. The Utility of Violence¶ It must be acknowledged that, if the object of violence is to take control of the government, no attempted American revolution has ever been successful. The United States is the most powerful nation in the world, with the mightiest military force. It is reasonable to expect that any minority group that sought to overthrow it would be summarily crushed.¶ Our race rebels, however, have objectives more modest than a wholesale overthrow of the government. The end they seek is "only" the abolition of certain discriminatory laws. If H. Rap Brown's famous description of violence [\*754] as "as American as apple pie" n146 is correct, the rebels might be speaking a language that lawmakers understand. Some historians have attributed President Richard Nixon's progressive urban policies, and his embrace of affirmative action, to his fear of racial violence, based on the urban riots of the late 1960s. n147 More recently, in Cincinnati, African Americans successfully used civil disturbances to focus attention on their concerns. n148¶ Professor Alan Dershowitz predicts that "terrorism will persist because it often works, and success breeds repetition." n149 To know whether terrorism is successful, one must know what its goals are. Neither terrorists nor scholars speak with one voice on this issue. Professor Loren E. Lamasky has written about two possible goals of terrorism:¶ First, one can hypothesize that terrorists typically act with the intention of bringing about those political ends to which they declare allegiance; they are, however, in the grip of mistaken beliefs about political causation ... . Second, one can maintain that terrorists generally aim at expressing support for political outcomes without, however, intending thereby to bring about those outcomes. It is the second of these hypotheses that seems better to fit the data. n150 [\*755] ¶ Professor Lamasky's second thesis seems applicable to race rebels. It would be impractical to think that a legislature or court would act in favor of the rebels in response to a violent attack. To the extent that their violence was part of a larger campaign that included the old ways of lobbying and litigation, perhaps the violence would encourage the power brokers to act more quickly. n151 We would have to surmise, because no lawmaker is likely to admit that he was motivated by the threat of violence to reach a certain result.¶ Violence is certainly, for the cause of the race rebels, a high-risk undertaking. Even if they have the limited goal of supporting more traditional methods, the specter of a powerful political backlash seems likely.¶ Does the fact that race rebels might fail make their cause less morally justifiable? If, by contrast, the crit jurors are likely to succeed, is their cause more morally justifiable? In the next part I consider a construct of morality, based upon international human rights law, that suggests answers to these difficult questions. IV. Moral Limitations on Changing Unjust Law¶ A. Heroic Black Outlaws¶ Imagine that some racial critics are considering either subversion or violence to accomplish abolition of the death penalty and the end of the sentencing disparities in cocaine offenses. Should their exclusive concerns be utilitarian, or does morality matter? If morality does matter, how can it be determined?¶ It seems clear that the most formal expression of American social morality - the criminal law - is an insufficient guide, at least for minorities. After all, some of the most revered figures in African American history were outlaws, in the service of their vision of racial justice. Aboard the Amistad, Cinque and other Africans killed their kidnappers. n152 Harriet Tubman [\*756] helped slaves escape. n153 Rosa Parks violated the peace ordinances of Montgomery, Alabama. n154 Martin Luther King, Jr. led marches without legal permits. n155 Muhammad Ali refused to be conscripted to fight in the Vietnam War. n156¶ Some critical race theorists, the "racial realists," have urged minorities not to respect the values held by the majority, or its law. Racism, they argue, is deeply and inevitably embedded in every aspect of American culture, including law. n157 Racial realists believe that minorities, cognizant of their subordinate status, should have limited expectations of the law and of the majority. Racial realists would be suspicious of any shared precepts of morality between the majority and the minority. The tactics they recommend for minorities are absolutely instrumentalist. n158¶ Racial realism would empower racial critics to break the law by committing perjury or sedition because the only question realists ask about a law is whether it serves the interests of minorities. A criminal sanction has no independent moral force when it undermines minority interests, as it does when it prevents lying to thwart the racist application of a law.¶ [\*757] The problem, though, with such an instrumentalist approach is similar to its utility: Anything goes. n159 There are no moral limits. I think this concedes too much. All of the important, and successful, struggles for racial justice for African Americans have been inspired by strong moral claims. These claims were an important element in garnering the political support that was necessary to convert discriminatory laws. n160¶ So, what should an advocate for racist justice do, when instrumentalism provides the most diverse arsenal, but when morality also matters (for its own sake, and for utilitarian reasons)? The next part recommends that, to choose her weapons, the advocate consult the doctrine of just war. This theory, a construct from Judeo-Christian theology and international human rights law, allows governments to use extreme methods, but within moral limits. As I explain below, the doctrine is undertheorized with regard to the use of force by nongovernmental actors. I recommend a construct of the doctrine for insurgents, generally, and our crit jurors and race rebels, specifically.¶ B. The Doctrine of "Just War"¶ A moral theory exists to guide "citizens who must decide what is worth fighting for and how to fight for it - whatever others may think." n161 It is the doctrine of "just war." Its "principle intention ... is to serve as a source for guidelines in making relative moral decisions." n162 One reason that the doctrine may serve as a useful moral guide for race critics is that it is rooted in the same Judeo-Christian theology that inspired earlier race reformers, including abolitionists and twentieth-century civil rights protestors. n163¶ [\*758] Just war doctrine was the product of efforts by early Christians to reconcile their religion with their perceived need to go to war. n164 St. Augustine's theory was that "once the cause was just, any means to achieve the end was permissible." n165 This construct is identical to Malcolm X's formula of "any means necessary." The doctrine has evolved, however, so that, in addition to justifying war, it limits the ways it can be waged. The morality of war is judged in two ways: first by the reasons for fighting (jus ad bellum) and then by how the war is fought (jus in bello). The war is either just or unjust, and it is fought either justly or unjustly. n166¶ To determine whether the reasons for fighting the war are just, five criteria are employed: (1) whether war is the last resort; (2) whether the cause is just; (3) whether war is waged with the right intention; (4) whether success is reasonably likely; and (5) whether war is waged by a legitimate authority. For a war to be fought in a just manner, two conditions must be satisfied: The means must be proportionate, and the targets must be military, and not civilian.¶ Just war doctrine has been incorporated into international human rights law. n167 It provides a framework for analysis of the permissible use of force in international conflicts, including the need for humanitarian intervention when citizens within a country are being oppressed by their own government. The doctrine also serves as an analogy to evaluate conflicts outside of traditional warfare. Legal scholars have used the doctrine to analyze the morality of such disparate subjects as the "war" on drugs, n168 the death penalty, n169 and military intervention designed to avert an environmental disaster. n170¶ In this part I use the doctrine to evaluate the morally permissible range of tactics of racial critics in changing unjust criminal law. The two principal issues are these: Is the racial critics' cause - reforming the death penalty and [\*759] cocaine sentencing laws - just? Are their tactics - subversion and violence - just? Each question must be answered in the affirmative before we can say that the crits' extremism is morally justifiable.¶ First, however, we must confront the central problem of applying just war doctrine to the racial critics: They are not soldiers in the traditional sense; indeed, the war they would wage is against their own country. In the next part I recommend an application of just war doctrine to nonmilitary actors.¶ C. Just War and Insurgents¶ In the United States, the most notorious contemporary examples of insurgents are the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. To think of terrorists as moral agents may be difficult for anyone affected by the events of that day. The problem, though, is that our moral analysis of terrorism now seems inconsistent. We play favorites: We approve of anti-slavery rebels but not Palestinian suicide bombers. A coherent way of thinking about the morality of private actors who use violence to achieve political objectives seems key to understanding, and perhaps preventing, that violence. It may be naive to think that terrorists are concerned about the morality of their work, but it is morality - strong religious, spiritual, or political convictions - that inspires terrorism in the first place.¶ Traditionally just war doctrine applies to state and not private actors. This aspect of the doctrine seems undertheorized and likely to lead to anomalies. For example, if a state practices genocide against a minority group of its citizens, some just war theorists would allow "humanitarian intervention" by foreign nations. n171 The minority group itself, however, would not be permitted to use force on its own behalf, because it is not a state actor. This is a flaw in the doctrine, and in this part, I propose a corrective. n172¶ St. Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century theologian and philosopher, "expanded the 'defensive' just-war theory between states to include defensive action within the state. He allowed that, under some circumstances, action against the state was not sinful." n173 According to Aquinas, action against the state is not sinful where the government is tyrannical and not directed at the common good; in this case, action against the state is not [\*760] sedition unless it results in less common good than existed under the tyrannical government. n174 As one scholar has noted, however, in this context "tyranny" is hard to define. n175¶ Almost none of the legal scholarship on just war doctrine explores in detail the question of how the doctrine applies to insurgents. Michael Walzer, the leading scholarly expert on the doctrine, notes that "guerilla fighters" can occasionally be justified in using force, but with certain limits - for example, if they kill civilians, "they are able to make distinctions: they aim at well-known officials, notorious collaborators, and so on." n176 Walzer also notes that "to be eligible for the war rights of soldiers, guerrilla fighters must wear 'a fixed distinctive sign visible at a distance' and must 'carry their arms openly.'" n177¶ Professor Walzer's description of insurgents focuses more on the way they should fight than on how they should determine the justice of their cause. When is a state so oppressive that a minority of its citizens is entitled to go to war against it?¶ If we accept Aquinas's thesis that it is morally justifiable to use violence to remove a tyrannical government, we must face the difficulty of defining tyranny. In Part III, we looked to American criminal law doctrine for instruction on justifications of private violence. It permits an individual actor to use violence in some situations, including to defend herself or others from unlawful force. Private violence is also sometimes allowed to protect property or to prevent crimes. If we apply this view of morality to insurgents, they would be justified in acting whenever the state threatens the lives of its citizens on the basis of some impermissible criterion, including race, gender, or religion.¶ The concept of humanitarian intervention offers a more expansive approach to the issue of insurgents and just war, at least by analogy. Humanitarian intervention is "the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights." n178 Its supporters emphasize that such intervention is justified in limited contexts - for example, when a state threatens its own citizens with genocide or deprivations of basic human rights. n179¶ [\*761] By its very terms, the doctrine contemplates intervention only by state actors. If applied to insurgents, however, the standard for intervention could remain the same. In other words, insurgents would be permitted to use force to combat their "deprivation[] of internationally recognized human rights." The other conditions of just war would remain, including that the insurgents are legitimate representatives of the minority group and that they have a reasonable chance of success. n180 Just war doctrine, applied to insurgents, would limit violence more than it would authorize it. Jus in bello requires that there be no injury to civilians. If the usual definitions of "terrorism" and "civilians" are invoked, this requirement seems to rule out virtually all terrorism, for terrorism is commonly thought of as politically motivated violence against civilians. Sometimes terrorists argue that, in their particular conflict, there are no "noncombatants." An example of this argument is the claim that even nonmilitary citizens of Israel are permissible targets for Palestinian protestors because all Israelis benefit from and help maintain the subordination of Palestinians. n181¶ The problem with this argument is the same as the problem with most terrorism: It is indiscriminate. It grants insufficient weight to the value of human life when it does not acknowledge that there are degrees of culpability. Surely, for example, children are not as responsible as adults, and surely a poor laborer is not as responsible as a high government official.¶ On the other hand, it is possible to defend a construct of "combatants," that is, permissible targets of violence, that includes nonmilitary actors. The objective of just war is to change the regime, or the way that it operates. To attack the foot soldiers, but to ignore the authorities responsible for creating and implementing the oppressive policies, seems inefficient. The suggestion that insurgents should distinguish among civilians and limit their targets to "well-known officials, notorious collaborators, and so on," seems reasonable. n182 Thus, just war applied to insurgents would not eliminate the "combatant" restriction but would broaden the concept, in the manner described by Professor Walzer. "Combatant" could be defined as any person directly responsible for creating, administering, or defending the human rights violations, including genocide or race discrimination, that are the subject of the conflict. As discussed below, in the context of the "war" against race-based capital punishment, combatants would include those directly responsible for [\*762] creating and implementing it. These people are culpable in a way that the ordinary civilian is not. Even then, violence against them is not necessarily moral: The other conditions of just war must also be satisfied.¶ I want to emphasize the purpose of applying just war doctrine to insurgents, because I understand that any moral construct that tolerates political violence by nongovernmental entities is controversial. Just war doctrine accepts that violence - killing people - can be morally justified, if certain conditions are satisfied. One of the necessary conditions is that the targets must be military. This condition seems inconsistent with other common constructs of morality, including those found in criminal and international law, and in popular culture. The heroic status that many now accord those who led slave revolts is evidence of that view of morality. Yet definitions of combatants proffered by terrorists are overly broad when they include those who are not directly responsible for the oppression of others (even if they benefit from that oppression). This view of combatants discounts the sanctity of human life that must underlie any construct of morality (even if that construct allows for the taking of life in certain cases). The proposed application of just war doctrine to "terrorists" assumes that they, like nation-states, are open to persuasion about their methods. Their embrace of violence does not mean they have abandoned their claim to morality. If just war doctrine is to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, it should be applied to every actor - not just governments - that uses violence to accomplish political objectives. D. The Death Penalty and Cocaine Laws: Just Cause?¶ The first component of just war analysis - jus ad bellum - requires analysis of whether there is a moral reason for war. In this part I analyze whether, under the five criteria of jus ad bellum, the racial critic's causes - ending discriminatory administration of the death penalty and cocaine laws - justify extreme methods.¶ 1. Last Resort¶ The first requirement is that extreme tactics be the last resort. In the case of changing the death penalty and cocaine laws, the critical tactics come "last" in the sense that the old ways of changing the law have been tried and they have not (yet) worked. How much time should one give them, especially when the cost of that time is race-based incarceration and death? A requirement that "legal" methods be invoked first seems reasonable, but morality cannot require infinite patience (otherwise no war would ever be just, because there might always be a possibility that nonlethal [\*763] means would achieve the same objective). In the cases of both the death penalty and the cocaine sentencing disparity, both the courts and the legislatures have been petitioned for relief, and those bodies of government have failed to grant it. The critical tactics, then, are ones of last resort.¶ 2. Just Cause¶ The next factor requires consideration of the war's goal. What is the goal of the crits? The answer is simple, for unlike the wars on drugs or terrorism, this war has clear and attainable goals. The crit tactics will be halted - peace will be declared - when the discriminatory provisions in the complained-of laws are corrected, by equalizing the punishment for powder and crack cocaine offenses and by abolishing the death penalty (based on the presumption that it cannot be made nondiscriminatory). The racial critics act not out of personal aggrandizement, or anarchist sympathies, but rather from the good faith intention to repair the criminal justice system. If, in a democracy, dissent is an act of faith, the racial critics are true patriots. There is no reason to believe that their extremist tactics would persist when their complained-of racial inequities are repaired. Although the analogy is not perfect, the crit tactics are more like self-defense than acts of aggression.¶ 3. Right Intention¶ A just war can be fought only to redress a substantial injury. This should be an easy requirement for the race rebels to meet. The whole point of their battle is redress of discrimination. They are not waging "war" with grandiose goals of acquisition; they merely want African Americans to be free of certain official kinds of oppression from the government. "Self-defense" is the paradigmatic example of an injury that war can morally redress. Civil rights advocates, both moderate and radical, have often invoked this concept as a metaphor to justify the use of radical tactics in the struggle for racial justice. Their argument is that discrimination is a malign evil that is analogous to an attack by the discriminator. Just war doctrine allows a proportionate response.¶ 4. Reasonable Success¶ The next factor requires consideration of whether there is a realistic chance of success for the crit jurors and the race rebels. How optimistic should advocates for racial justice be about achieving their goals?¶ Whether optimism for racial justice - no matter what the tactics - is justified is an issue that has perplexed students of race in America for centuries. [\*764] Martin Luther King, Jr. was optimistic, but only in the long run, and mainly, apparently, for spiritual reasons. "The arm of the moral universe is long," he explained, "but it bends towards justice." n183 Derrick Bell, on the other hand, believes that racism is a permanent affliction of life in the United States, and that the law therefore is of limited efficacy in improving the lives of minorities. n184¶ Civil rights advocates have achieved the end of some kinds of de jure discrimination, most notably the Jim Crow laws that required "separate but equal" public accommodations for whites and Negroes. Professor Kimberle Crenshaw has observed that African Americans have successfully used the law "to their benefit against symbolic oppression through formal inequality and, to some extent, against material deprivation." n185 Crenshaw predicts, however, that civil rights discourse "will do little to alter the hierarchical relationship between Blacks and whites." n186¶ In this view, the law is more likely to require the removal of "White Only" signs than, say, to redistribute wealth. The discrimination that our racial critics are concerned about, however, is more akin to symbolic than material subordination. They are not so ambitious as to seek the end of racism in the United States. Rather the crits seek the conversion of two laws that they perceive as discriminatory.¶ The main legal hurdle the racial critics face is that their measure of discrimination is effects-based, as opposed to the intent-based standard endorsed by current Supreme Court jurisprudence. n187 Can the racial critics reform the law at least to the extent of eliminating the current death penalty and cocaine sentencing laws? There is, the evidence suggests, a reasonable chance that the answer is "yes."¶ An effects-based concept of discrimination is already contained in international law. n188 Thus, civil rights advocates have argued that the United States is in violation of international human rights law because of the death penalty and drug sentencing disparities. n189 Racial critics have had limited success in marketing an effects-based construct of discrimination even to [\*765] conservatives. President George W. Bush has described the cocaine sentencing disparity as "discrimination." n190 Illinois's former governor, a Republican, commuted the death sentence of every inmate on the state's death row, in part because of concerns about race discrimination in these cases. n191 These advances have not translated into systemic legal reform. They evidence, however, that the racial critics' goals, including their advocacy of a progressive construct of discrimination, are not so radical as to be unattainable, or even unlikely. n192¶ 5. Legitimate Authority¶ The final issue is whether crit jurors and race rebels are "legitimate authorities." The formal answer is "no." As usually interpreted, just war doctrine limits fighting to state actors, not insurgents. In Part IV.C, supra, I critiqued this aspect of the doctrine as undertheorized.¶ If just war doctrine is to apply to insurgent soldiers, one of the first tasks is to define what "legitimate" means in this context. At minimum, there should be a consensus, among members of the affected group, that the law is unjust. Such a consensus seems to exist among African Americans with regard to racial bias in the death penalty and the crack laws. Regarding the latter, every major civil rights organization that has spoken on the disparity opposes it; the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the "expert" on federal punishment issues, has also advised against it. n193 While public opinion polls indicate significant support for capital punishment among African Americans, it is doubtful that they are in favor of its discriminatory administration; the Racial Justice Act, for example, was supported by every member of the Congressional Black Caucus. n194¶ In summary, our racial critics probably have selected a just cause. n195 This is hardly a surprise, for few Americans would now suggest that race discrimination is just (the issue of how "discrimination" is defined is obviously more controversial, including in the cases of the death penalty and crack sentencing laws). The more difficult determination is whether the [\*766] tactics employed by the racial critics are just. The next part examines that issue.¶ E. The Rules of Engagement¶ The second component of just war doctrine - jus in bello - has two requirements: (1) proportionality and (2) noncombatant immunity.¶ 1. Proportionality¶ The first requirement is that the violence used in the war be proportionate to the injury suffered. Proportionality means that "even if the intended object of an attack is legitimate, the attack still may be unjust if its overall costs outweigh the benefits achieved by the attack." n196¶ Will radical tactics do more harm than good? The "good" each tactic seeks to achieve is the end of the discriminatory cocaine and death penalty laws. Are subversion and violence permissible, if they will lead to the abolition of race discrimination in the death penalty and cocaine sentencing laws?¶ 2. The Costs and Benefits of Subversion¶ The crit jurors risk two harms in lying to get on juries: (1) punishment for breaking the law and (2) white backlash. The harm of breaking the law, in turn, has both a private and a public component. The private harm is that the crit jurors may be punished (indeed, they may even invite punishment, as do other practitioners of civil disobedience). Because no one would be forced to be a crit juror, anyone who engaged in this form of protest must have decided that for her the benefit of the protest is worth the risk of punishment. The public harm of the critical jurors is that their willful violations of the law may breed disrespect for it. I do not think that this harm outweighs the good, because it is too vague (most theories of criminal law assume, for example, that people obey it not out of respect, but to avoid punishment). Moreover, crit jurors could take care to emphasize the justice of their cause, and their willingness to suffer punishment for violating the law. n197 They would demonstrate that they reject only a part of the law, not the rule of law wholesale. This may lessen the net effect of public disapproval [\*767] for breaking specific laws (one does not hear credible arguments, for example, that the tactics employed by civil rights protestors of the 1950s and 1960s encouraged disrespect for the law).¶ The harm of white backlash is much less speculative; indeed, it is likely that crit jurors would provoke some kind of negative reaction. The problem of white backlash is a persistent one in African American history. n198 There is backlash to virtually every minority demand for rights. In this context, the backlash could range from prosecutors attempting to exclude African Americans from juries, to other actors in the trial process, including witnesses and judges, also using subversion to achieve outcomes in criminal trials that they desire. The prospect of crit jurors probably would encourage prosecutors to strike African Americans from jury pools (the prosecutors would use blackness as a proxy for being a crit juror, although nonblacks could be crit jurors as well). There is, however, considerable evidence that many prosecutors already attempt to remove blacks from juries. n199¶ It is impossible to know whether crit jurors would encourage more of other kinds of false testimony than already exists in criminal trials. While the harm of backlash is real, Professor Randall Kennedy has noted that "given the apparent inevitability of white resistance and the uncertain efficacy of containment, proponents of racial justice should be wary of allowing fear of white backlash to limit the range of reforms pursued." n200¶ 3. The Costs and Benefits of Violence¶ Whether violence is a proportionate response to discrimination depends on the kind of discrimination. Just war doctrine, as codified in international human rights law, allows the use of violence to end or to deter greater violence. The use of military force to prevent the carnage in the Nazi concentration camps is a prototypical example of a just war.¶ According to the Baldus study, the state of Georgia kills some of its citizens on the basis of their race. Is violence an appropriate response to this race-based discrimination if the violence would help end the discrimination? Under cost-benefit analysis, the answer might be "yes," if the killing takes the same or fewer lives than it saves. As a practical matter, this requirement would rule out indiscriminate terrorist attacks by race rebels, because they could not limit their destruction. If the race rebels can carefully calibrate [\*768] their violence in such a way that it did not exceed the number of race-based executions, and if the violence reasonably could facilitate the end of capital punishment, then the race rebels' violence would be moral.¶ What about violence to end the disparate punishment for cocaine offenses? It cannot be persuasively argued that the taking of life, even the lives of those responsible for the discriminatory law, is proportionate to the injury. Race-based incarceration is horrible, but it is not a horror that warrants the death penalty for its perpetrators. Just war doctrine would not allow the use of violence to end the crack sentencing regime.¶ In summary, lying is a proportionate response to race discrimination. Violence can be either a proportionate or a disproportionate response, depending on the discrimination. If the discrimination is "only" race-based incarceration, violence is disproportionate. If the discrimination is race-based killing, limited violence is a proportionate response.¶ 4. Noncombatants¶ The second rule of engagement is that an attack cannot intentionally target noncombatants. n201 Those waging war must try to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. Civilian deaths are justified only if they are the unavoidable consequence of destroying an offensive military target, not a means to an end.¶ Who are the combatants in the metaphorical war on discrimination? The people who discriminate seems the obvious answer. This group could include legislators and law enforcement officials. The criminal justice system writ large is a combatant in a different sense. To the extent that extreme tactics are viewed as an attack on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, the system itself is an appropriate enemy. The tactic of lying to get on a jury may injure the system in some sense, but war is, after all, hell. As long as it is only a combatant who is intentionally injured, the war may still be considered just.¶ Is it possible for race rebels to employ forms of violence that limit intended injuries to the "soldiers" on the other side? For this analysis, re-consider the hypothetical introduced earlier in this Article. Some racial critics "read" the Baldus study to mean that the government, through its use of capital punishment, kills some criminals because they are black (these criminals are not killed because they committed crimes, because white criminals guilty of the same crimes are not sentenced to death). Imagine that, in response, race rebels announce that for every two black people who are executed when a nonblack would not have been executed, they will kill [\*769] one responsible government actor, for example an executioner or a lawmaker who supports the death penalty, in the same state. The race rebels will continue their campaign of violence until the death penalty is abolished in that state.¶ Under the theory of just war explained in this Article, this crit tactic is morally justified. The cause, the end of race-based killing by the government, is just. The violence is proportionate and directed exclusively at combatants. It is an ugly prospect, but it is not as ugly as race-based killing by the state.¶ F. Summary¶ The crit jurors and the race rebels have selected just causes - ending the race-based punishment regimes inherent in the crack cocaine and death penalty laws. The radical tactics of the crit jurors - subversive jury service - is morally justified as well. Violence is an immoral response to discrimination if it harms those who are not directly responsible. Violence is also outside the rules of engagement if its objective is to change the cocaine sentencing laws; it is a disproportionate remedy. Violence directed against the people who implement race-based capital punishment is justified under the just war construct, if the violence does not take more lives than it saves, and if it is reasonably likely to help end discriminatory killing by the government.¶ V. Radical Tactics Versus the "Politics of Respectability"¶ In Race, Crime, and the Law, n202 Professor Randall Kennedy advises African Americans who wish to reform the criminal justice system to practice "the politics of respectability." n203 The basic tenet of this politics is that it is important for blacks to prove that they "are capable of meeting the established moral standards of white middle-class Americans." n204 Kennedy notes that "for a stigmatized racial minority, successful efforts to move upward in society must be accompanied at every step by a keen attentiveness to the morality of means, the reputation of the group, and the need to be extra-careful in order to avoid the derogatory charges lying in wait in a hostile environment." n205 Race, Crime, and the Law recounts how the politics of respectability have been practiced by a number of mainstream civil rights organizations, [\*770] and credits the politics with the political successes of those organizations.¶ A practitioner of the politics of respectability would counsel a minority group against radical methods, based on the fear that these methods would harm the racial reputation of the group and encourage white backlash. As a descriptive matter, this counsel is entirely accurate. Racial reputation exists, and African Americans, among others, have a bad one. n206 White backlash exists, and minorities, especially blacks, have experienced its full brunt.¶ The prescriptive part of Kennedy's scholarship - the proposal that concern about their racial reputation and white backlash should constrain the political activities of minorities - is less persuasive. Do racial reputation and white backlash matter enough that people of color should avoid radical tactics based on concern for how whites will react?¶ The answer, based on African American history, must be "no." The reason is that the reputation of blacks has seldom been based on reality, as opposed to stereotypes and racism. Because the actual conduct of Negroes has only tangentially been related to their reputation, it is naive to think that different conduct could improve their reputation. Indeed, if racial reputation were based on facts, African Americans, given their history and triumphs in the United States of America, would presumably have one of the best of any group.¶ White backlash, similarly, has shown little relationship to reason. It ignites in response to almost every effort by blacks to make progress, whether the progress be desegregation of the public schools, or the quest for affirmative action in employment. In a review of Kennedy's book, I noted that "if African Americans adapted their political and self-help strategies in order to avert white backlash, they would scarcely achieve any progress at all." n207 Likewise, in an earlier writing, Professor Kennedy himself observed that "given the apparent inevitability of white resistance and the uncertain efficacy of containment, proponents of racial justice should be wary of allowing fear of white backlash to limit the range of reforms pursued." n208¶ The radical tactics that this Article describes do not court the sympathy of the white majority and are not likely to inspire it. They are designed to move the majority, but probably more through inspiring fear (for self and for country) than sympathy. [\*771] ¶ Conclusion¶ The issue is not whether people will suffer and die. African Americans suffer and die now, because of race-based punishment. The issues, then, are whether and how that discrimination should end, and whether it matters if others suffer and die, in the service of ending the discrimination. If subversion and violence can alleviate "legal" race discrimination, are those tactics worth engaging, if the injury they cause is less than the injury they defeat?¶ In this Article I have considered two radical tactics that could help change discriminatory laws in the United States. My conclusion is that the politics of respectability should not limit the tactics that minorities choose in their quest for racial justice, but morality should. Because morality matters, people of color, in seeking reform of the law, should not deploy all of the weapons in their arsenal. Malcolm X's famous proposal of justice "by any means necessary" is immoral.¶ Thus, under the "just war" construct, people who believe that some criminals in the United States are executed on the basis of their race should not attempt to overthrow the government. They would almost certainly lose, and this makes their radical method immoral. They should not commit random acts of terrorism, even if these acts might be successful at persuading legislators to end the death penalty. The fact that innocent people would be harmed means that this kind of indiscriminate violence is immoral.¶ For the same reasons, racial critics of the federal cocaine sentencing laws must not engage in rebellion against the government or commit terrorist acts that risk injury to innocent civilians. Critics of the cocaine laws must observe the additional limitation that they may not use any tactic that would cause physical harm or death.¶ Just war doctrine allows the use of some radical tactics that minorities now do not commonly employ. In death penalty and crack cocaine cases, racial critics may lie to get on juries so that they can thwart the discriminatory application of those laws. In death cases exclusively, just war doctrine would allow racial critics to use targeted violence against officials who implement race-based capital punishment. Although any construct of morality that allows violence may strike some as odd, the objective of just war doctrine is to identify those cases in which violence is permissible to accomplish an important end. n209¶ [\*772] The application of just war doctrine to the problem of race discrimination in the United States results in a construct of morality that is apt to trouble both moderates and extremists. Moderates will be concerned about the radical tactics that the just war doctrine allows, and extremists will protest the restraints imposed on "any means necessary." Moderates will claim that I am exaggerating the injury to people of color because it is black criminals, and not law-abiding African Americans, who are benefited most directly by the critical tactics I endorse. To extremists, on the other hand, I may seem a victim of white hegemony because I accept that some blacks are punished and killed for racial reasons, but even so I impose limits on what can be done to remedy this discrimination.¶ Here is the imperfect compromise I have drawn. Every life matters, including the life of every African American who has been convicted of a crime. Every life, and especially every African American life, is diminished when some blacks - even the "least" among us - are incarcerated or killed because they are black. The situation is desperate. It has not, however, reached the state that Michael Walzer describes as "the supreme emergency," in which any means necessary is morally justified to defeat extreme subordination. n210 I believe that slavery was a supreme emergency. The incarceration of the majority of African Americans would be another. We have not gone back to the former, and we have not yet reached the latter. In either of these events, Malcolm X's formula would be morally justified. I hope that it never is.¶ The result of pursuing justice in a moral way is that minorities must tolerate some race-based discrimination. Even when their cause is just, they are not allowed to achieve it by any means necessary. They must be patient, even when impatience might win them quicker relief. This is a high cost. One wonders whether any construct of morality that counsels minorities to tolerate discrimination is too majoritarian. Would whites ever adhere to a philosophy that required, even in the short term, their subordination to people of color? Perhaps not.¶ The moral aspirations of people of color, however, can be higher than the standard set by the majority. Why their aspirations should be higher is a difficult question. Perhaps virtue is its own reward. Perhaps the obligation to act morally is based more on spiritual than on human-made laws. At any rate, morality does not require that minorities tolerate discrimination with infinite patience. It does not even require that people of color respond to discrimination with moderation.¶ [\*773] Race-based discrimination is evil. There is no overestimating the hardship it causes. As long as racial subordination exists, its victims will be tempted to seek relief in any way they can. In this sense, the protestor's familiar chant "no justice, no peace" is not a threat. It is just a description of the world. Understanding this should inspire us to end all race-based discrimination quickly, and through the simplest means. War, even when it is just, is hell.

# 2NC

**Frames K**

**Link/ Framing Wall**

**A -- The Aff deploys the terminology that equates knowledge with visual acuity. That entrenches modes of ableist privilege. It also violently exports, transforms, and dislocates the lived experiences of those living with visual challenges.**

**May & Ferri ‘5**

(Vivian M, Beth A, Syracuse Feminism and Disability studies Professors, “Fixated on Ability: Questioning Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Theories of Resistance,” 2005, Prose Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1&2 April-August 2005, pp. 120-140, modified for language that may offend - <http://syr.academia.edu/BethFerri/Papers/160692/Fixated_on_Ability_Questioning_Ableist_Metaphors_in_Feminist_Theories_of_Resistance>, Date Accessed: 7/5, JS)

Equating **visual acuity** with **knowing** is one common way to place disability in opposition to knowledge. But many others are equally as frequent, including dualisms between mental illness and rationality and/or characterizations of faulty knowledge models as “pathologies” or “illnesses.” For example, because Frederic Jameson relies heavily on ableist notions of schizophrenia and pathological illness in his critique of the postmodern subject, these ideas inﬁltrate Chela Sandoval’s reading and critique of Jameson. Sandoval writes that for Jameson, the “euphoria” of the postmodern subject“ marks the onset of a new form of mass cultural pathology. It is ‘schizophrenic’ innature— charged with hallucinogenic intensity” (21). Similarly, June Jordan (in Collins, Fighting 150) describes constructivist approaches to identity as a “delusional disease.” In asserting her own social theory, Patricia Hill Collins writes that deconstructivist theory can be “crippling” because it “runs in circles” and fosters nihilism ( Fighting 189). Once again, disability is enlisted to represent ~~foolishness~~ (mistakenness) and despair. Similarily, Susan Stanford Friedman, in querying whether a doctoral education in an interdisciplinary ﬁeld such as Women’s Studies is even viable, asserts “that way, madness lies” (318). Other scholars refer to those occupying opposing sides of theoretical or political debates as “mad heads” (Jamila 390), as “crazy,” or as “wingnuts”(Be´rube´). As these examples illustrate, schizophrenia and madness more generally are often placed in opposition to more reasoned approaches, arguments, or positions. Disability as a state of unknowing, or irrationality, is invoked **in order to be deplored.** Reading our own works, we found that Vivian discusses the “crazed” and troubled state ambiguity can elicit (May 366) and Beth discusses the “paranoia” about differential birthrates that Eugenicists tried to evoke (Ferri and Connor). Schizophrenia can also be used rather romantically, as a potentially liberating state of mind that allows us to think beyond given categories and binaries,to free ourselves from modernist impulses of mind or from “autistic” egocentrism! As Felix Guattari writes, “in a certain sense people who are operating on the level of social sciences or on the level of politics ought to ‘make themselves schizophrenic.’ And I’m not speaking of that illusory image of schizophrenics, caught in the grip of a repression, which would have us believe that they are ‘autistic,’ turned inward on themselves, and so forth. I mean that we should have the schizophrenic’s capacity to range across ﬁelds . . . of study” (Guattari, 83).Obviously, Guattari is not alone in this rhetorical strategy. If we were to tell the “origin story” for wanting to write this paper, it would begin with a talk given by Judith Butler in New York City reﬂecting on the events of September 11th in which she made an analogy between post-9/11 experiences and schizophrenia. 7 Because she was using schizophrenia to highlight the beneﬁts of destabilization, Butler could not fully grasp why her use of schizophrenia could be problematic. 8 Yet the trouble with this kind of **“borrowing” of disability,** whether it is seemingly positive or negative, is that in these instances schizophrenia becomes, primarily, a rhetorical device. Schizophrenia as **an embodied lived experience**, a social and political history, **an ontology with meaning in its own right**, **disappears**. Instead, it is **transformed** into an imagined state of dis/order available for using , for deepening the audience’s understandings of their own (able-bodied) lives and their own modes of rationality.

**It’s a mode of dislocation that’s violent to the people that actually experienced it. This means we win within their framework.**

**Sanyal ‘2**

Debarati Sanyal is Associate Professor of French at the University of California, Berkeley. She received her PhD in Romance Languages from Princeton University. The author of The Violence of Modernity: Baudelaire, Irony and the Politics of Form (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), she has also published articles on Baudelaire, Holocaust Studies, World War Two and postwar commitment. Representations –Summer 2002, DOI 10.1525/rep.2002.79.1.1

One of the most disquieting uses of this logic in literary criticism is found in Shoshana Felman’s book, co-authored with Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History. In a seductive reflection on the ruptures and silences that hover over autobiographical, literary, and critical representations of the Holocaust, Felman, like Agamben, weaves a series of structural analogies between the concentration camp and civilian life, between ‘‘them’’ and ‘‘us,’’ ‘‘then’’ and ‘‘now,’’ and between literal and metaphorical forms of complicity, victimization, and survival. She does so by viewing history through the lens of trauma, that is to say, by viewing history as repetition (in this case the infinitely renewed wound of the Holocaust) and as contamination (in which the self and other are circulating positions).The trauma of the concentration camps is thus presented as a historical wound whose trace is to be found in the gaps and silences of testimonies by survivors, primary witnesses, and secondary witnesses, in this case, Primo Levi, Albert Camus, and Paul de Man. Yet this silence, significantly, is sounded and made to reverberate identically in distinct, if not incommensurable, contexts. Such conflations of historically bound occurrences with an ongoing and universalizable condition (or of ‘‘fact’’ with ‘‘concept’’) can be discerned in Felman’s discussion of the betrayal of testimony. Camus’s protagonist, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, keeps on walking when he hears a splash, followed by cries for help. While this betrayal resonates with the Allies’ (or Sartre’s) betrayal, for Felman, the historical betrayal is also an inevitable epistemological and ethical condition. Since the Holocaust collapses the very possibility of witnessing, any attempt to understand and transmit the event will necessarily fall short of—and betray—the experience. Even those ‘‘inside the event’’ (to use Dori Laub’s expression) were robbed of any independent frame of reference outside of the radical dehumanization of the camps.24 In Felman’s account, then, ‘‘betrayal’’ functions both as a historical fact (the failure to see or understand evidence of the camps) and as an immutable and inherent condition (the impossibility of seeing or understanding the camps): In bearing witness to the witness’s inability to witness—to the narrating subject’s inability to cross the bridge towards the Other’s death or life—The Fall inscribes the Holocaust as the impossible historical narrative of an event without a witness, an event eliminating its own witness. Narrative has thus become the very writing of the impossibility of writing history.25 At stake in this view of the impossible or betrayed testimony is an implicit, but important, claim for a post-Shoah literary ethics, one founded on the impossibility of representing historical trauma. In Felman’s reading, the Holocaust forces us to rearticulate the relationship between language, narrative, and history and to recognize the literary as a realm for recovering a history that has been erased. Felman suggests that the testimonial power of literature and its ethical function lie in its uncanny ability to access—through falterings and ambiguities—a reality that defies our habitual historical and psychic frames of reference. With Agamben, she views language and history as caught in a new configuration, in which the ellipses, silences, and aporia in narrative (or speech) capture that which has occurred historically as a vanishing point. With Caruth, she perceives literary language as a point of access to ‘‘unclaimed experience,’’ since both literature and trauma are inscriptions (in the text, in the psyche) of indirect forms of knowledge that at once solicit and defy our witness.26 The Fall and its enigmatic allegory of a failure or betrayal of witnessing, attests to this new ethical imperative by laying bare how ‘‘the cryptic forms of modern narrative and modern art always—whether consciously or not— partake of that historical impossibility of writing a historical narration of the Holocaust, by bearing testimony, through their very cryptic form, to the radical historical crisis in witnessing that the Holocaust has opened up’’ (Testimony, 201). In Felman’s account, it is the obliqueness, or indeterminacy—if not evacuation—of a text’s referential context that is taken as signs of its historicity. History, paradoxically, becomes the knowledge bodied forth by the ‘‘cryptic forms’’ of a representation that continually attests to the crisis of representation inaugurated by the Holocaust. The troubling consequences of this bid for an ethics of interpretive instability are starkly revealed in Felman’s discussion of Paul de Man’s anti-Semitic writings for the Belgian journal Le soir. Felman proposes The Fall’s allegory of the betrayal of witnessing (Clamence’s inability to turn back and save the woman) as de Man’s unspoken autobiographical story, his belated confession of the trauma caused by the Holocaust’s legacy. Felman argues that deMan’s silence over his wartime writings (like Clamence’s own silence in the aftermath of the drowning), cannot be judged by us for three main reasons: first, we cannot put ourselves in his place; second, his silence is exemplary because silence is the only way of bearing witness to an event as unspeakable as the Holocaust; and, finally, this silence implicates us all in the traumatic legacy of the Holocaust: ‘‘In reality, we are all implicated—and in more than one way—in de Man’s forgetting, and in his silence’’ (Testimony, 123). Significantly, Primo Levi’s gray zone is instrumental to the formulation of these claims. Felman suggests that de Man’s predicament as a journalist in occupied Belgium was somehow comparable to that of the Sonderkommando. If, as Levi warns us, we cannot put ourselves in the place of the Sonderkommandos in the concentration camps, and therefore cannot pass judgement on their actions, then—Felman suggests— a similar perspective must be cast on de Man’s position as a journalist in occupied Belgium: ‘‘The crucial ethical dimensions of a historical experience like de Man’s need to be probed by being measured up against the incommensurability of that experience’’ (Testimony, 123). Here, Felman argues for the singularity of de Man’s experience, paradoxically, by making it analogous to the equally singular experience of the Sonderkommando. In other words, the analogy between these two incommensurate figures—a Belgian gentile who dabbled in Nazi collaborationist prose and a Jewish prisoner working in the crematorium—is drawn precisely in the name of a concept: the incommensurability of their experience. Yet Felman, in a gesture similar to Agamben’s treatment of the soccer match, makes that incommensurability commensurate by assimilating conditions peculiar to the camps’ moral life to life outside the camps. Indeed, when Felman invokes ‘‘our’’ implication in an ethical terrain that forbids reductive representations of people as ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’ one comparable to the gray zone, she is effectively transforming a product of the concentration camp’s moral and physical apparatus (the gray zone) into a metaphor for her readers’ moral landscape. The extension of the concentration camp, from fact to concept, leads to the erasure of the very real differences between victims, executioners, and witnesses. The gray zone again provides a metaphor for the continued unreadability of the Holocaust, investing this unreadability with an ethical weight. Felman, like Agamben, thus literally dislocates the gray zone, transforming it into a new ethical ground in which ‘‘we’’ are uniformly embedded. Invoking Levi in her warning against the temptation to judge de Man from an external vantage point and thus succumb to the mystification of ‘‘a self-righteous bipartition of ‘the good guys’ and ‘the bad guys’ ’’ (Testimony, 122), Felman suggests that the only responsible engagement with history’s traumatic legacy is a Camusian ‘‘fall’’ into lucid culpability, a perpetual reckoning with one’s painful complicity with and victimization by an event that lies beyond the reach of words: As far as we as readers are concerned, the ethical question with respect to the information that has come forth therefore resides . . . in an attempt at understanding how precisely de Man’s writings do in fact relate to the moral implications of contemporary history . . . how de Man articulates our silence; how today we are all implicated in de Man’s ordeal and in his incapacity to tell us more about it; how, having faced what he faced, de Man chose an inevitable syntax and an inevitable (silent) language. The question that should be addressed in light of de Man’s history is . . . how both de Man’s silence and his speech articulate, and thus help us understand, the ways in which we are still wounded by the Holocaust, and the ways in which we harbor the unfinished business of this recent history within us. (123–24). This blurring of subject positions (in which de Man, the Sonderkommando, Primo Levi and ourselves circulate on the metaphorical playing  fields of the gray zone) occurs by privileging silence as the only adequate mode of apprehending a historical reality that confounds representation. If, as Felman claims, ‘‘de Man could borrow Primo Levi’s words,’’ it is only because both de Man and Levi ‘‘fall silent’’ before the trauma of the Holocaust. Silence, then, is essentialized into a trope that functions identically across contexts and genres. De Man’s silence over his wartime writings is somehow analogous to the silences found in the writings of survivors such as Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel. His later writings, like the muffled historical references of Camus’s novels, are faltering testimonies to the impossibility of bearing witness to an unspeakable history. Just as the soccer game played in Auschwitz staged a convergence between victims, perpetrators, and witnesses, Felman’s reading suggests a parallel convergence between collaborator, survivor, witness, and proxy-witness. The abstract specter of universal implication (‘‘we are all implicated,’’ ‘‘our silence’’) shades into shared victimhood. The inexpressible trauma of the Holocaust binds us all and equally into a general legacy of wounded complicity. The obviously untenable assimilation of de Man’s silence and trauma to that of Primo Levi (survivor), Albert Camus (writer and secondary witness), and Clamence (fictional character) has already been critiqued at length by Dominick LaCapra and I shall not belabor the point here.27 My main objective has been to point out how some of the assumptions underlying a theorization of history as trauma—that is to say, history as a dislocation both of the event and of an experiencing subject— may replicate the violence of the traumatic event itself. I have addressed this theoretical violence as the ‘‘logic of the soccer match’’ because its metaphorical recycling of culpability and victimization replicates the circulation of innocence and guilt that we see in the soccer match between the SS and SK at the gates of the Auschwitz crematorium.

**Our K is valuable because ableism’s represented in every identity formation – including racialized, gender-based, and intersectional identifications.**

**Jennie ‘16**

Writes under the name “IsaJennie”, but post are labelled by the author as Jennie. IsaJennie is a Creator, activist, and writer. Openly posts a bio that shares that experiences are formed, in part, from living with several chronic illnesses, including Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, gastroparesis, dysautonomia, hypersomnia, and mental illnesses - “9 Everyday Phrases to Understand Ableism” -Journey of IsaJennie - JUNE 29, 2016 - #E&F - https://journeyofisajennie.wordpress.com/2016/06/29/ableistphrases/

Whenever I discuss ableism and ableist language, **even within social justice circles**, I’m often accused of: a) attempting to be “**p**olitically **c**orrect,” b) making up a new term so I can be oppressed, or c) trying to find any reason to be upset.

People are partially right. GASP! Ableism is a fairly new term, but the oppression predates modern history. If you’re not familiar with ableism, check out my blog post: What is Ableism?

Now…making up a term so I can be oppressed? I’m not the only one oppressed by ableism (**Disabled people are represented in every other marginalized group**) and ableism isn’t the only oppression I experience. I feel no need to add another oppression badge to my Social JustVest. I also don’t care about political correctness**.** I care about kindness, centering marginalized people, and I actually deplore most so-called politically-correct terminology (it’s developed by people in Ivory Towers with no lived experience and no attempt at consensus). And trying to find a reason to be upset? No thanks. My doctors have told me I’m not allowed to do that any more.

Basically, ableism (and its most encountered form, ableist language) is real and I have no desire or inclination to make it up. I don’t benefit from its creation, its existence, I’m actively harmed by it.

**Use of the term “Blind” violently entrenches ableist privilege.**

**Kali ‘10**

Self-identified disabled blogger - Brilliant Mind Broken Body: Living with Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, “I am not your Metaphor,” October 17, 2010, <http://brilliantmindbrokenbody.wordpress.com/2010/10/17/i-am-not-your-metaphor/>, Accessed:7/6/12, LPS

**Blind** - I bet you can’t count the number of times you’ve heard this one –  **blinded by viewpoints, blind to miss facts, blind to misunderstand intentions, blind to misread things, so on.** It’s definitely a favorite metaphor.  I count short-sighted in the same category, as short-sighted originally means nearsighted (as in, someone who can only see the shorter distances, not the longer ones).  Similarly, long-sighted originally means farsighted (as in, someone who can see things at greater distances, but not up close – someone who needs reading glasses).  We use sight metaphors **to a ridiculous extent** in **our** lexicon.And through **all** of these,we imply that people who are blind **or nearsighted** are incapable **of planning,** unable **to comprehend the information available, so** naive **as to misunderstand the motives of others,** and similar issues that have NOTHING to do with sight!

**CASE**

**This isn’t 1950s Cuba – the government has F-15s, drones, and bombs they wouldn’t hesitate to use**

**DeBoer ’16** [Fredrik; March 15th; Ph.D. from Purdue University; Fredrikdeboer, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/; GR]

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will **actually work** to secure a **better world?** In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in **today’s America** they will essentially never break on the side of **armed opposition** against **the state**. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence. Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could **rally** as many people as the **Bolsheviks** had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of **F-15s**, **drones**, and **cluster bombs**. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t **1950s Cuba**, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology **effectively lowers** the odds of **armed political revolution** in a country like the United States to **zero**, and so much the worse for us. This **isn’t fatalism**. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is **little alternative** to organization, to changing minds through **committed political action** and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions? Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. Not incrementally, either, but with the kind of sweeping and transformative change that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But seriously: **none of us** are ever going to take to **the barricades**. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of **the NSA** and **military robots**, it’s really, **really hard**. “Should we condone **revolutionary violence?”** is **dorm room**, pass-the-bong **conversation fodder**, of precisely the moral and intellectual weight of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on absurd hypotheticals, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to no **practical political end**. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions and asking people to climb on board.

**B---Presuming success means individual actors do not see themselves as part of the revolution – that prevents future unity**

**Thompson 05** – (Paul Thompson, Professor and Head of the Department of Human Resource Management at the University of Strathclyde, and co-editor of the Oxford Handbook on Work and Organization, “Foundation and Empire: A critique of Hardt and Negri,” 7-1-2005, Capital & Class, Vol. 29, Iss. 2, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/030981680508600105)kab>

Even within these terms, the multitude—‘all the subjugated and exploited’—is not a meaningful political subject. **Instead of the difficult task of actually mobilising labour, we are presented with a picture of a multitude already formed and victorious.** **When faced with the reality** that **potential revolutionaries** in various struggles **did not recognise either themselves or others as part of an expanding chain of revolt**, Hardt and Negri **can only take refuge** in the **banal argument** **that this was a failure of communication** (p. 54-5). Which leaves us, finally, with their own conclusion. For all the talk of postmodern republicanism, the underlying logic of Empire is an **infantile vanguardism**. The labour, whether immaterial or multitudinous, in whose name the book speaks is labour to which the communist militant, lauded in the postscript, imputes motives, labels struggles, allocates roles, and proclaims unity of purpose and outcome. Intellectual militants become the means of communication, except that what they are communicating is a **fantasy that exists only in their own heads**. This is absolutely consistent with the history of Negri and Italian workerism. For all its earlier insights, from its inception this current was distinctive for its view that what labour actually thought was secondary to its position as a particular category of labour (the mass worker, the social worker, immaterial labour, and so on). As Negri remarked of the social worker, ‘At the political and social level, this subject presents a complete materialization of consciousness within the structure of its own existence. Class consciousness, in other words, comes neither from outside nor from afar: it must be seen as completely internal to, a fact, a thing of class composition’ (1982: 14).15 In 1981, Negri wrote that the new political generation was more revolutionary because it was without memory (see Wright, 2002: 174-5). Furnished with a partly new language and context, Empire is Negri’s (and Hardt’s) offering to yet another new generation. This paper has been a contribution to the recovery of memory about a flawed and failed doctrine.

**C---Online surveillance prevents movements from even organizing in the first place**

**Aziz and Beydoun, 20**—Professor of Law, Chancellor’s Social Justice Scholar, founding Director of the Center for Security, Race and Rights, Rutgers University School of Law AND Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law (Sahar and Khaled, “Fear of a Black and Brown Internet: Policing Online Activism,” 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1153, 2020, dml)

As noted in Part I, activism and advocacy are as **robust online** as they are in traditional public forums. This is especially true for the **BLM** and **ancillary movements**, which fueled the popularity of online activism in the United States over the past decade.168 By describing “a broad and disparate group of [Black] organizations with concerns about the criminal justice system [as a] movement with a unifying ideology,”169 BIE policing **threatens online activism** in a myriad of ways. The **speech published** and **activism performed** on social media platforms **invites** BIE **surveillance** and **suspicion**.170 In part, the FBI introduced BIE policing as a response to the success of online advocacy addressing (anti-Black) police violence,171 and it **created new mechanisms** for the **virtual dragnet** that descends upon the profiles and pages of online activists. **Largely unaware** that their online activism is being monitored—and even more unaware of the existence of BIE policing—users **freely post content** and **avail their unfiltered views** about police violence and more to suspecting FBI eyes. And, in doing so, they make the **once-difficult** task of collecting data about subjects of interest **very easy** for the FBI and their virtual interlocutors.172 BIE surveillance has spawned FBI prosecutions. **Rakem Balogun**, a Black activist from Dallas, Texas, was **arrested** and **prosecuted for domestic terrorism** in December 2017.173 The IT professional and Second Amendment advocate was arrested shortly after **publishing posts on Facebook** stating that he saw signs at a rally with the words “the only good pig is a pig [police officer] that’s dead” and expressing his belief that “[t]hey deserve what they got”174 with regard to the killing of a Dallas police officer.175 Balogun claims that he was “venting” online about his frustration with the wave of police killing unarmed Black women and men.176 Despite their distasteful nature, Balogun’s statements presented no evidence of any inclination on his part to attack a member of law enforcement. Nor did his statements indicate a direct connection with any organization or outfit that set out to attack police officers. In short, Balogun was punished because of his **online speech** and **community-organizing work**, which called into question the recurring incidence of police killing Black people.177 His Blackness **activated the perceived menace** of his online content and spurred the FBI to label him a BIE.178 Balogun’s experiences illustrate the **perils online activists face** in the form of **intensified surveillance** and BIE prosecution. However, in addition to online activism attracting the attention of FBI agents, the looming fear of BIE surveillance also **chills online advocacy**. At the extreme, it may even spur Black activists to **completely divest** from online advocacy. In an essay critiquing how the First Amendment right to assembly is unequally extended and oftentimes denied to Black activists, Hansford observes, “Perhaps **even more effective** than curbing freedom of assembly on the streets is **destroying these** civil society **organizations from the inside** so that **no one is organized enough to take to the streets to begin with**.”179 Although concerned with assembly within traditional public forums, Hansford makes two observations salient to this Article’s focus on speech within private virtual forums: First, intensified policing of Black activists online erodes their speech by **chilling virtual activism** and pushing users to **divest wholly** from it.180 Second, BIE policing online aspires to **breed mistrust** and **division** within Black activist organizations and communities.181 Mirroring sentiments within the Muslim community regarding CVE, Black activists contend that BIE policing’s genuine objective is to “**monitor**, **disrupt**, and **divide**” advocacy communities and organizations.182 Past surveillance programs, like **COINTELPRO**,183 wielded phone tapping and wire surveillance to collect data on subjects of interest to advance criminal cases, but they also **stirred up dissension** and **discord** within Black organizations and communities. These aims, history reveals, are **not separate** but **entwined** objectives intended to **stifle movements that challenge the state** and **punishing individuals** who are **materially connected** to the movements or **voicing support** for overlapping demands for justice **online**.184 C. Vulnerable Targets Online activists within the Black and Muslim communities are a heterogeneous population. Twenty-five percent of the Muslim population in the United States identify as Black,185 comprising the largest plurality of the broader faith group. Thus, Black Muslims comprise one of the most vulnerable targets of online surveillance. Black Muslim online activists occupy an intersection where they are simultaneously susceptible to CVE and BIE surveillance186 and to the monitoring of FBI agents and informants deployed by each program.187 Furthermore, today’s political activism reflects the unique challenges faced by Black Muslims and illustrates how Islamophobia shapes anti-Black racism inflicted by state actors (including the police) and private citizens.188 **Youth** and young adults who engage in online activism are another **disproportionately vulnerable** group.189 As examined in Part I, younger generations are **more entrenched** in the culture of online activism and have been **instrumental in spearheading online political campaigns** and **movements**. Despite their online acumen, young activists are **especially vulnerable** to the virtual traps of CVE and BIE surveillance for two reasons. First, although young activists may be **broadly aware** of the phenomenon of online surveillance, they are **largely unaware** of the existence and **architecture** of CVE and BIE policing. This ignorance can be **especially dangerous** on several fronts of the online landscape. It **disarms young activists** when engaging with unknown elements online, particularly within the “direct messages” feature of social media platforms, where clandestine FBI agents or informants can fluidly discuss topics that **entrap** or **incriminate**. Young activists unaware of CVE and BIE surveillance are **naturally ignorant** of the “**triggers**” that induce FBI suspicion,190 and thus they **freely post** without strategically filtering out language in their public content. Second, young activists are more inclined to engage in **more zealous online activism**. For younger generations, the internet and social media platforms are not necessarily realms for escape but **extensions** of their **on-the-ground daily experience** and **daily lives**.191 Young activists use social media platforms, like Facebook and Twitter, as **vehicles for political venting** and **catharsis**, which often manifests in **overzealous content** that, for Black and Muslim youth, can **attract** the **watchful eyes** of FBI agents. While political and popular debates about online speech rage forward, the prevailing reality for young Black and Muslim activists is that unfiltered online advocacy can and does spur CVE and BIE investigations.

**D---White supremacists would coopt the movement – they’ve stormed the capital once, they’ll do it again**

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The more radical variant of this argument is that “the people” need guns to wage an eventual revolution and liberate themselves from the shackles of the state and corporate America. Gun control need not dampen the spirit of those still hoping for a revolution, even if such a revolution is highly unlikely to happen in our lifetimes. What stands in the way of such leftist dreams are the vast majority of current gun owners. Over-represented among current gun owners are **white reactionary men**, the types who regularly expresses their desire to shoot on sight the “Muslim socialist” president of the United States, and who “muster” along the U.S.-Mexico boarder with their weaponry to defend the nation against “alien” immigrants. As it stands, toxic gun culture would **coopt** any new American revolution with a lethal cocktail of **supercharged masculinity, racism, and provincialism** fantasized about in post-apocalyptic scenes. If the United States ever comes to another civil war, the first thing to die under a barrage of lead will be our hope for a more just and democratic society; guns would empower warlords with petty political agendas, not egalitarian-minded freedom fighters. The most likely cultural shift away from reactionary gun ownership will not happen in cooperation with the Right and their politics, but against it. Gun control is the best place to start. Disarming the Right will do more to advance goals toward a revolutionary democratic transformation of America than trying to beat the Right-wingers (and the U.S. government!) in an arms race. Of course Left insurrectionists who advocate the right to bear arms are more focused on the U.S. Government as the singular impediment to their variant of utopia. This dream is sadly a classic example of radical posturing done in the name of some distant hypothetical moment, and it ignores the actual harm that guns cause each and every day. In the real world, guns kill upwards of 30,000 Americans every year, virtually all of these deaths serving absolutely no political purpose in the fight for a more democratic society. Most of these deaths are just tragic accidents or suicides, many of which would not end in death if guns were not in the mix. Left fantasies about armed struggle are the same **half-baked ideas** as those held by the secessionist Right. What varies for Leftists is the template of decolonial struggles; yet a leftist revolution in the United States would not kick out a small minority of foreign occupiers, as happened in India and Vietnam, but would be a fight amongst settler colonialists for political authoristy. This is why the worn “Zapatistas defense” touted by the radical left is a bad analogy for the United States context – the Zapatistas started a peasant rebellion that kicked outsiders off their landbase, a task for which wooden cutouts of guns turned out to be more effective than the real thing.

**Violent tactics turn struggles for freedom into unethical sacrifice. Nonviolence is comparatively more effective.**

Jose-Antonio **OROSCO** Philosophy @ Oregon St. **‘8** *Cesar Chavez and the Commonsense of Nonviolence* p. 58-63

Chavez and the Pragmatics of Social Protest Chavez, like other absolute pacifists such as Gandhi or King, would certainly insist that the question about the use of violence in civil disobedience is not merely about strategy. Moral principles, they would all argue, are always at the center of social struggles against injustice, and it is misleading to think that one can completely abstract them away. Neumann, the ACME Collective, and Jose Bove hope that by making distinctions between different types of violence and property the moral arguments against property destruction will appear illegitimate and, in fact, conservative justifications of an unjust status quo. The pacifist will seem to value all property rights more so than human life and well-being. Yet this argument is disingenuous, for it too relies on a moral principle, namely, that one ought to value human life and well-being over things. Chavez thinks that it is important for social justice movements to acknowledge the moral principles at their core. Otherwise, strategic thinking can overwhelm the movement and begin to foster habits that negatively transform the character of a movement. Chavez dedicated most of his adult life to the struggle against the dehumanization of farmworkers by California agribusiness. He knew the history of farmworker struggles over the past century and understood all too well that growers were willing to rely on violence to maintain their power and keep farmworkers in subordinate positions. The United Farm Workers (UFW) was created to stop the misery of farm work and alleviate the workers' poverty by forcing agribusiness to respect their dignity as human beings. At the center of La Causa, therefore, was a conception of human beings as autonomous and rational agents, capable of planning and making their own life choices. The growers commit injustice by maintaining a system that treats workers as "agricultural implements or rented slaves" instead of rational agents.' 4 Chavez believed that a violent response on the part of the workers would undermine La Causa by weakening their commitment to this ethical ideal of humanity: If I were to tell the workers: "All right, we're going to be violent; we're going to burn the sheds and we're going to dynamite the grower's homes and we're going to burn the vineyards," provided we could get away with it, the growers would sign a contract. But you see that that victory came at the expense of violence; it came at the expense of injuring. I think once that happens it would have a tremendous impact on us. We would lose our perspective and we would lose the regard we have for human beings-and then the struggle would become a mechanical thing.'s In this passage, Chavez worries that considering any property damage as an option leaves open the possibility that people could be injured or killed. This option permits a kind of utilitarian calculus to pervade the movement, one that weighs the cost of violence against the possible benefits for the movement. Such strategic thinking allows individual human beings to be treated as disposable pieces in the struggle toward a noble end. Chavez was concerned about this kind of mentality seeping into the farmworker struggle precisely because it is the mind-set with which the growers conceived of the farmworkers. To agribusiness, farmworkers were fungible resources that had to be accounted for in calculating profit, not individual human beings who deserved proper treatment, dignity, and respect. Chavez reminded both his supporters and detractors in the "Good Friday Letter" of the moral principles underlying La Causa-"If to build our union require[s] the deliberate taking of life ... then I choose not to see this union built"-because it was the attitude that separated the UFW from agribusiness.'6 Without this foundation, the UFW would simply become another business union, "mechanically" concerned with its own power, stability, and prestige, and not a movement dedicated to upholding the dignity of farmworkers. Therefore, in Chavez's mind, acknowledging moral principles as constraints to political strategy prevents instrumental thinking from compromising a social movement and corrupting its commitments into power politics. Neumann and Zinn could concede that ethical evaluation might be called for when considering violence toward people but still hold that ethical restrictions are inappropriate when dealing with the issue of property damage. Objects do not deserve moral treatment. The real issue for the strategists is how best to target property and damage it in such a way as to halt injustice. Chavez would respond that the idea of relying on criteria to limit property destruction is unrealistic because it fails to understand the dynamics of power and violence. Violence is not a force that, once unleashed, can be neatly controlled. Even if a revolutionary or insurrectionist group can limit its own violence and surgically apply it toward targets of oppression, it cannot control the wake of violent retaliation and state repression that may follow. A group might control its own actions, but it cannot control the whole social situation, which includes the reactions of other agents, that its actions engender. Chavez believed that the use of violent protest, including property damage, by the farm workers in their struggle for collective bargaining contracts would only increase the overall violence from the growers. Here Chavez's ideas resonate with Kenneth Boulding's theory of power dynamics.'7 According to Boulding, in a situation in which there is a power imbalance between two parties, a subordinate group is unlikely to cause a more powerful group to submit through the use of threats or violence. Such tactics, even if they do cause the dominant party to make some changes, usually result in a "backlash effect." The dominant group may change grudgingly because of a threat or use of violence, but it will usually look for ways to undermine the agreement with the subordinate group or to get back at the subordinates who threatened it. Property destruction, in Chavez's view, would only bring about a backlash effect rather than shift the balance of power in favor of the workers: "The important thing is that for poor people to be able to get a clean victory is something you don't often see. If we get it through violence, then the employers will just wait long enough until they can get even with you-and then the workers will respond, and then .. .. "'8 Indeed, even when the UFW was finally able to sign its first collective bargaining contracts in 1970, many growers did exactly what Boulding might have expected. They quickly moved to thwart the farmworkers by signing exclusive contracts with the Teamsters instead, thereby preventing the UFW from achieving any sizable representation in the fields.'9 This undermining backlash led to competition between the UFW and the Teamsters that frequently erupted into bloody confrontations between members of the two unions. While the two groups clashed in the fields, the growers were able to forestall making any real improvements for the farmworkers. Chavez knew that any deliberate property destruction by the UFW would bring about an even more cruel backlash on the farmworkers than the one they were already experiencing with principled nonviolent direct action. Zinn acknowledges that violent protest may lead to backlash and repression. But, as he and Jose Bove suggest, history also shows that violence can sometimes shift the balance of power away from dominant groups. Nonviolence in the farm workers' struggle might very well be the appropriate tactic, given the willingness of the growers to react brutally. However, that judgment would be based on the history and conditions of that particular situation. Zinn would caution that we should not generalize from the farmworker experience and decide that violence is never appropriate, under any circumstances, because of the possibility of backlash. Chavez thinks that, even from a strategic point of view, the likelihood of repression should make the call for use of violence by subordinate groups dubious. This is because if and when the powerful do backlash, it is usually the poorest and most vulnerable members of the subordinate group who suffer. Chavez remarks: "Examine history. Who gets killed in the case of violent revolution? The poor, the workers. The people of the land are the ones who give their bodies and don't really gain that much for it. ... Those who espouse violence exploit people To call men to arms with many promises, to ask them to give up their lives for a cause and then not produce for them afterwards, is the most vicious type of oppression."2° Chavez cites the example of revolutions in Mexico and the rest of Latin America where the poorest members of society are the ones to suffer tremendous loss, with little improvement in the institutions that directly affect their lives. 21 For Chavez, the idea that such vulnerable groups are most likely the ones to endure the brunt of state retaliation should make activists who espouse violence question its effectiveness as a means of social justice. If by social justice, we mean a social and political condition that provides respect, fairness, and equity for all members of society, especially the most disadvantaged, then a situation that provokes or encourages powerful groups to further harm, marginalize, or constrict the vulnerable and the disadvantaged is clearly not desirable as a tactic and, in fact, may contribute further to their oppression. One, therefore, ought to question the commitment to social justice of those groups that are cavalier about others caught in the web of repression, such as ACME, which brags about being able to escape the police while other demonstrators were pepper sprayed, teargassed, and shot with rubber bullets.22 Nonetheless, Chavez is willing to concede to Zinn that violence can sometimes alter society. Subordinate groups may be able to shift the balance of power in society using violence. However, as I argued in the previous chapter, such a change, for Chavez, is not the same thing as creating more fair, democratic, or equitable conditions that will alleviate the suffering of the subordinate group. Indeed, Chavez maintains that victory won through violence validates the use of force and creates a precedent for its use in any new social arrangement, which can hinder the development of stable democratic politics: "If we were to become violent and we won the strike, as an example, then what would prevent us from turning violence against the opponents in the movement who wanted to displace us? Say they felt they had more leadership and they wanted to be leaders. What would prevent us from turning violence against them? Nothing. Because we had already experienced that violence awarded us victory."23 Violence, then, is not a substitute for the development of persuasive and reasonable activists or for the hard work of organizing people into self-managing groups that can protect their own interests in coalition with other communities. Violence can change who the people in power are, but it is not in itself conducive to the formation of the kinds of social habits, political skills, and expectations that create a democratic civic space. In Chavez's estimation, only nonviolent organizing can rouse the disadvantaged and provide them the opportunity to become agents empowered to control the processes that directly affect their own lives: The burdens of generations of poverty and powerlessness lie heavy in the fields of America. If we fail, there are those who will see violence as the shortcut to change. It is precisely to overcome these frustrations that we have involved masses of people in their own struggle throughout the movement. Freedom is best experienced through participation and self-determination, and free men and women instinctively prefer democratic change to any other means. Thus, demonstrations and marches, strikes and boycotts are not only weapons against the growers, but our way of avoiding the senseless violence that brings no honor to any class or community.24

**Revolutionary suicide demands policy analysis and political engagement**

**Lloyd 15** (Dr. Vincent W. Lloyd, Assistant Professor of Religion, Syracuse University, specializes in political theology and African American religious thought, former Visiting Scholar, James Weldon Johnson Institute for the Study of Race and Difference, Emory University, former Exchange Scholar, Divinity School, University of Chicago, Ph.D., M.A. Rhetoric, University of California, B.A. Religion, Princeton University, “Theology and Real Politics: On Huey P. Newton,” in Renegotiating Power, Theology, and Politics, eds. Joshua Daniel & Rick Elgendy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, http://www09.homepage.villanova.edu/vincent.lloyd/theology-real-politics.pdf)

There are three main approaches to studying religion in the black power movement, emanating from black theology, black pragmatism, and black humanism, respectively. Black theology emerged contemporaneously with the black power movement, and it was similarly (though implicitly) positioned as a step beyond the religious thought of the Civil Rights Movement, as exemplified by figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Howard Thurman. James Cone famously wrote that black theology is black power, and black theologians more generally crafted their theological reflections in a way that would support the political conclusions of the black power movement.16 As for the Black Panthers in particular, at times they sound strikingly similar to black theologians: “The Black Panthers have never intended to turn Black people away from religion. We want to encourage them to change their consciousness of themselves and to be less accepting of the white man’s version of God – the God of the downtrodden, the weak, and the undeserving.”17 Like SNCC in the late 60s and its iconic leader, Stokely Carmichael, black theology as a movement leaned on fiery rhetoric and celebrity rather than on grassroots organizing. There is **strikingly little reflection** in the writings of black theologians in the early 1970s on the **theological significance of political organizing**, a **major shortcoming** for black theology as **a lens through which to examine Huey P. Newton**. The hegemonic force in the academic study of black religion and politics today is black pragmatism. In large part this is due to the charisma and intellect of Cornel West, the African American religious thinker who positions himself in a trajectory of American pragmatists stretching from William James and John Dewey through Reinhold Neibuhr and Richard Rorty to himself. West’s former colleagues at the Princeton Religion Department Eddie Glaude and Jeffrey Stout have analyzed black nationalism through the lens of black pragmatism, concluding that black nationalism is a form of piety.18 Understood as a naturalized religious concept, piety connotes loyalty to one’s forbearers. But black pragmatists take issue with black nationalism for its excessive piety, which they suggest turns into patriarchy and the worship of power. Black nationalists need to recognize the “multiple traditions of American life” and to situate black culture as part of one among those multiple traditions.19 When this approach is applied to Huey P. Newton, it does not seem particularly productive. The Black Panthers were explicitly opposed to uncritical piety directed at African heritage, although they also did not embrace the “multiple traditions of American life.” The black pragmatist’s suspicion of robust religious ideas and practices prevents her from encountering the religious ideas of Newton and the Panthers on their own terms. Black humanism is the third major current of African American religious thought today, and some black humanists have embraced Newton as one of their own. Anthony Pinn has included Newton in his canon of black humanist thought because Newton affirms the inherent worth and dignity of every human being, and because Newton locates ultimate worth in the human, rather than in the divine.20 Indeed, Newton does seem to embrace such a Feuerbachian reversal, inverting an all-powerful God with his embrace of “power to the people.” As Newton writes, “My opinion is that the term ‘God’ belongs to the realm of concepts, that it is dependent upon man for its existence.”21 Elsewhere, Newton adds, “the greater man becomes, the less his God will be.”22 In his later, more speculative writings, Newton is even more explicit, describing a progression of mankind towards a “higher state”: “‘godliness’, where man will know the secrets of the beginning and the end and will have full control of the universe.”23 The Panthers’ criticism of the Christian church could be pointed, even crude. When Panther leader David Hilliard addressed the National Committee of Black Churchmen in 1970, he angrily called them “a bunch of bootlicking pimps and motherfuckers,” and he threated that the Panthers would “off” some of the preachers if they disagreed with the Panthers.24 On the black humanists’ reading, the culmination of the Panthers’ relationship with religion was their establishment of the Son of Man Temple in Oakland in the mid-1970s. It featured lectures and arts events on Sundays, at which it took collection, there were Temple committees to organize its work, bake sales and car washes for fundraising, and other familiar accoutrements of a religious organization. The Temple described itself as a “place in which we come together to express our humanity,” and it was not a place to “honor one God or one reverend.” “This does not mean that we negate any religion; we all have different philosophies and views of our world. We are all part of everything and it is part of each of us…. We want our belief in the beauty of life to spread to freedom-loving people everywhere.”25 Over time, the Son of Man Temple’s resemblance to a religious institution faded and it became a more conventional cultural center. While the black humanist’s approach to Newton seems plausible, it **misses the opportunity to more deeply engage with the religious ideas and practices employed by Newton**. The black humanist’s Feuerbachian premises commit her to religion as viewed through the eyes of the secularist: religion as personal misdirected belief. But religious ideas and practices cannot be so easily reduced with repression, distortion, and fantasy. The black theologian’s approach fares little better, ignoring the Panther’s focus on community organizing, while the black pragmatist conflates several flavors of black nationalism, boiling them all down to a flaccid account of piety. What follows is **an alternative approach, reading together narrative, aesthetics, political struggles, and political practice**. Although Newton and the early Panthers’ sometimes present seemingly discordant approaches to religion, this is an indication of a rich theological imagination **closely tied with engagement in real politics**, politics that critiques ideology/idolatry while exalting the skills of political judgment. Newton’s political self-identity was constituted through struggle that exemplified such political judgment. The founding of the Panthers was propelled by Newton’s dissatisfaction with, on the one hand, black nationalist organizations, because their ideas were **too detached from the black community**, and, on the other hand, non-profits organizations intended to serve the black community. Because of their funding sources and structure, these non-profits created a class of program administrators more interested in preserving their jobs and careers than in the wellbeing of the communities they ostensibly served. Newton’s intuition was that political organizations ought to be by and for a community, not created by others to serve them and not propelled by ideas distant from their lived realities. Newton’s political struggles continued within the Panthers. He sought to tack away from Carmichael’s turn to “African ideology,” with its concomitant rejection of everything associated with Marxism (the Panthers would critically appropriate Marxist ideas). He also distanced himself from SNCC’s reliance on college students as its core; college students were prima facie distanced from the mainstream black community. At the same time, Newton sought to tack away from fellow Panther Eldridge Cleaver’s focus on violent struggle and his hyperbolically proletarian ethos. Cleaver’s salty language and distaste for religion also created distance from the mainstream black community, and when Newton was released from prison he attempted to pull back the Panthers who had drifted in Cleaver’s direction. **Refusing the pre-packaged ideologies of** both **black nationalists** and Marxists, and refusing to privilege either the authority of higher education or the authority of street culture, Newton took **attunement to concrete realities** as the **essential** component to his own “ideology.” As Seale describes it, “Our ideology is to be constantly moving, doing, solving, and attacking the real problems and the oppressive conditions we live under, while educating the masses of the people. This is what we try to, and this is how we move to make the basic political desires and needs of the people realized.”26 Furthermore, rather than fetishizing revolution as messianic or deflating it to everyday political progress, Newton discerns an alternative. He writes that “revolution is a process rather than a conclusion or a set of principles,” but he also refuses to associate revolution with any particular aspect of a process that could be named. “Any conclusion or particular action that we think is revolution is really reaction.”27 According to Newton, revolution gives the subject (“~~man~~”) **agency** as ~~he~~ **understands more** about the world and “**gains more control** over ~~himself~~.” Paradoxically, this control over oneself is also what Newton names, significantly, “**revolutionary suicide**.” This is also the title of his autobiography, associating himself with the figure of the revolutionary suicide. Newton asserts that black people in America are already condemned to death, and the only way to reclaim agency is through struggle. Struggle gives life, gives freedom, even if it inevitably results in death. The Christological resonance is obvious. According to Newton, the only alternative is reactionary suicide: death without struggle, death without life, death without freedom. Revolutionary Suicide opens with a dedication to Newton’s parents “who have given me strength and made me unafraid of death and therefore unafraid of life.”28 His father, we learn, was a pastor, and the whole family was very involved in church life. Newton sang in the choir, attended Sunday School, and served as a youth deacon. Participating in church life “gave us a feeling of importance unequaled anywhere else in our lives.”29 In the face of humiliations he endured at school, church life opened an alternative: Even though I did not want to spend my life there, I enjoyed a good sermon and shouting session. I even experienced sensations of holiness, of security, and of deliverance. They were strange feelings, hard to describe, but involving a tremendous emotional release. Though I never shouted, the emotion of others was contagious. One person stimulated another, and together we shared an ecstasy and believed our problems would be solved, although we never knew how… Once you experience this feeling, it never leaves you.30 Newton reflects, “One of the most long-lasting influences on my life was religion.”31 Indeed, Newton contemplated becoming a minister until he took philosophy classes in college. Despite the apparent significance of this religious upbringing, and of his father in particular, Newton follows the dedication of Revolutionary Suicide with an epigraph, authored by “Huey P. Newton,” seemingly disclaiming his parentage. “By having no family, / I inherited the family of humanity. / By having no possessions, / I have possessed all. / By rejecting the love of one, / I received the love of all. / By surrendering my life to the revolution, / I found eternal life. Revolutionary Suicide.”32 The religion of his childhood has clearly transformed, but it has not been abandoned. Both author and symbol, whose wisdom is worthy of citation as epigraph, Newton demonstrates a self-awareness of his political theological status as simultaneously earthly body and divine. The Christomorphic form that Newton’s autobiography sometimes takes echoes the sanctification, and sometimes deification, of Newton as part of an orchestrated campaign to both have Newton freed from jail and to use the struggle for Newton’s freedom as an organization-building opportunity. In the last years of the 1960s there were “Free Huey” rallies held around the country, including one that brought more than 5000 people to Oakland Auditorium to hear from Movement superstars Stokely Carmichael, James Forman, and H. Rap Brown. Images of a Newton speaking, or preaching, to the masses were disseminated. So, too, was the most famous image of Newton, seated in a wicker chair, wearing the Panther uniform of black leather jacket and black beret. In his left hand is a spear and in his right hand is a rifle; to his side are two African shields. Less discussed in the large wicker chair in which Newton sits. The chair forms a giant circular halo around Newton’s head, complete with ribbing along the edges. Newton became Huey P. Newton, with the middle initial always included elevating his name beyond the realm of human signifiers. Panther co-founder Bobby Seale published his hagiography of Newton in 1970 using Newton’s full name frequently throughout, as the words and wisdom of the founder are conveyed to Seale’s readers. For example, “Huey P. Newton wanted that light there on the corner, and worked to see that the light was there”; “The cultural nationalists … wanted to sit down and articulate bullshit, while Huey P. Newton wanted to go out and implement stuff”; “For that reason Huey P. Newton wrote Executive Mandate Number Three, concerning Gestapo cops busting down our doors.” In fact the enterprise of writing a Huey P. Newton biography, according to Seale, was prompted by an explicitly Christomorphic remark by Eldridge Cleaver: “Eldridge said that Huey P. Newton followed Malcolm X like Jesus Christ followed John the Baptist. That made a heck of a lot of sense to me. So Eldridge got some tapes and a recorder and a typewriter and took me down to Carmel to a little cabin to work on the book.”33 In the lore of the Black Panthers, recorded by Seale, Newton himself, and others, religious parables are re-told with new meaning. For example, after a discussion of “how brainwashed the society was,” a white liberal friend of the Panthers asked his girlfriend to get him an apple. Eldridge Cleaver noted: [Y]ou let the omnipotent administrator send down a pig angel. His name was Chief Gain or any chief of police in the country. You let him come down with a flaming sword. With a weapon, you let him drive you out of the Garden of Eden. And you didn’t defend it, you and your woman… But if it had been Huey Newton in the middle of the Garden of Eden and the pig angel came down after the omnipotent administrator had told Huey to go forth and exercise his constitutional rights and replenish the earth – if it had been Huey P. Newton and this pig had been swinging the flaming sword at him, Huey would have jumped back and said, “No, I’m defending myself. If you swing that sword at me, I’m shooting back.”34 In this riff, retold by Bobby Seale, Genesis is understood as a common point of reference, and it is re-narrated for the Black Panther context. The black humanist would read Cleaver’s renarration as, again, Feuerbachian, showing that the human – Newton being the greatest of humans – is capable of asserting his own will, and ultimately replacing God. (Note how Newton ascends in the narration from “Huey Newton” to the pure icon, “Huey P. Newton,” when he asserts himself). But in light of the Christomorphic imagery so often used to describe Newton – this story is told one paragraph after Newton is explicitly described as Christ – it seems more reasonable to read Cleaver’s new narration as a New Testament, the Christ-Newton, armed with gun instead of sword, capable of retaining his place in the Garden, overcoming the Fall. It is, after all, Huey P. Newton who can defeat the angel, not just any ordinary man. By following Newton, it is possible to challenge those who would hold the wisdom of the world for themselves, prohibiting access by others – those who would set themselves up as gods. Unlike other early Black Panthers, Huey P. Newton likes to talk about love. While love is largely absent from Bobby Seale’s writings, and perhaps the closest Eldridge Cleaver comes to talking about love is his infamous remarks on “rape as an insurrectionary act,” love is a natural part of Newton’s vocabulary. The Panthers, following Malcolm X, were highly critical of Martin Luther King’s love language, and Newton’s usage is quite distinct from King’s. For Newton, love is not universal but particular: directed as a specific person or group of people. At the funeral of George Jackson, the great symbol of prison injustice, Newton spoke of how Jackson “bequeathed us his spirit and his love.”35 By “us,” Newton meant something quite specific: the Panthers, not humanity. Similarly, at the funeral of Bobby Hutton, an early Panther killed by police at age 17, Newton eulogized: “Like a bright ray of light moving across the sky, Li’l Bobby came into our lives and showed us the beauty of our people. He was a living example of infinite love for his people and for freedom.”36 Newton describes his initial exposure to a (secular) conception of “nonpossessive love” before his days with the Black Panthers. A friend of his was an advocate of free love, arguing that “nonpossessive love did not enslave or constrain the love object” as does the possessive love of the bourgeoisie. According to this friend, “Nonpossessive love is based upon shared experiences and friendship; it is the kind of love we have for our bodies, for our thumb or foot.”37 For a time Newton attempted to put nonpossessive love into practice, but with poor results. Newton encountered another pathology of love when he was in prison. On his account, sex was used, indirectly, as a mechanism of control by the prison authorities. Once the prisoners “became addicted to sex,” “Love and vulnerability and tenderness were distorted into functions of power, competition, and control.”38 It was not homosexuality that Newton decried (in fact, he spoke in support of the gay rights movement39); rather, it was the way that power can distort love by relying on the wrong kind of vulnerability, forced vulnerability that precludes tenderness. In other words, Newton refused both love that was ostensibly nonpossessive and love that was excessively possessive: both, he seems to conclude, are at the service of the powerful. What remains is the difficult work of navigating what might be in between – work that requires virtue, not rules. What Huey P. Newton presents is less black humanism than **black political theology grounded in real politics**, black political theology as critique of idolatry. Newton explicitly refuses the reduction of his religious views to humanism, writing: “I’m a very religious person. I have my own definition of what religion is about, and what I think of God.”40 On the other hand, when an interviewer asks Newton about his religion, he responds that in all religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) God is “the unknown, the unknowable.”41 But this God of Newton’s is not hidden; this God’s erasure is what animates the political theological vision of Newton and the Panthers. Their commitment is to achieve the unknown, to struggle against those who would name it – who would name God, or who would name revolution. They struggle together: **they organize. And they learn the law**. **Understanding the normative context is the prerequisite for political intervention. In organizing and learning law they gain agency**. **Agency is lost when actions are dictated by ideology**, or idolatry; it is gained in the struggle against ideology, against idolatry - a struggle without end. It is a struggle complemented by virtue, and by love. But what of Newton’s Christomorphic presentation, sometimes self-presentation? Is Newton not dangerously close to becoming the God he refuses to name? Huey P. Newton had a stutter, was perpetually nervous, and was a remarkably poor public speaker. Unlike the smoother talking King or Carmichael, or Bob Moses, who went so far as to change his name so as to disidentify with his charismatic alter ego, Newton did not fit the part. And that, perhaps, is precisely why the Christomorphic imagery is appropriate: because it is so clearly a performative contradiction. As such, the critique of idolatry is located right in the center of Black Panther political theology. The very body of the redemptive man, whose home is Eden, continually refuses the seat of authority which is thrust upon it, dramatizing the shortcomings of all ideology, the dangers of all idolatry. Reflection on the haloed image of Huey P. Newton is preparation for critique, training in virtue – training in love. As Newton says of himself, “I’m not a leader, I’m an organizer.”42

**At the top – all of their claims depend on advanced tech to solve central planning – we’re blue**

**1AC Nieto & Mateo 20** [Maxi Nieto is a PhD is sociology from the University of Elche and writer for Ciber Comunismo and Juan Pablo Mateo is a visiting scholar in the department of Economics at The New School, New York and economics professor at the University of Valladolid (Spain). January 2020, “Dynamic Efficiency in a Planned Economy: Innovation and Entrepreneurship Without Markets”, Science & Society, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276\_Dynamic\_Efficiency\_in\_a\_Planned\_Economy\_Innovation\_and\_Entrepreneurship\_Without\_Markets //](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276_Dynamic_Efficiency_in_a_Planned_Economy_Innovation_and_Entrepreneurship_Without_Markets%20//)gbs jacobs & majeed]

4.1. Innovation and social property. Innovation occurs as a result of a long and complex accumulation process of knowledge and creativity, where very rarely is a single individual solely responsible. This is an essentially social process in which a plurality of actors and institutions contribute in very different spheres and circumstances. The Austrian School presents an idealized image of innovation in capitalist economies, attributing it exclusively to the figure of the enterprising entrepreneur — whether in a disruptive sense (Schumpeter), or in a strictly coordinating sense (Kirzner). In fact, the entrepreneurial function develops within specific institutional frameworks and organized structures, both at the micro and macro levels. In this sense, **a socialist economy has significant advantages for** developing technological and business **innovation**, as opposed to a capitalist economy: i) socialism allows for greater and **more efficient** allocation of resources to **R&D**&I activities, **thanks to centralized control** of the surplus **and the absence of sumptuous consumption** and a rentier population; ii) there are **no obstacles** (property rights) **to** the free **dissemination of new products and techniques**; iii) the **equal distribution of resources** (which guarantees that no basic needs go unmet) allows for discovery **and fuller development of talent**, which likewise occurs when work is undertaken through tasks that are more balanced for the majority and less routine; iv) in allocating investment, more information is available and the **criteria** are **more varied than** mere expectation of **profit**; v) **social ownership is more** inclusive and **participatory** than capitalist enterprise **in** terms of **generating and mobilizing knowledge** (tacit or not) and encouraging innovation; vi) socialism does **no**t impose **short-term innovation cycles** looking **to** generate products that can **be commercialized** in, say, four to six months, as is typical in capitalist economies. Under these favorable general conditions, the development of innovation in a socialist economy would unfold inthree fundamental areas: i) **Strategic planning**: this traces the main lines of scientific, technological, **and** innovation research. Here would enter programs for the development of **new tech**nologies and infrastructures, as well as visionary projects **that explore** eventualities and **future scenarios**. This sort of research is carried out in universities, scientific academies, technological institutes, and other specialized centers in coordination with the business world. The process would consist in testing different alternative productive projects or techniques in order to verify results, in connection with the companies and sectors being served. ii) Companies: research, design, and innovation departments. iii) Business entrepreneurship: individuals and teams put forward proposals in hopes of securing financing. For any of these three areas, material **incentives** would exist that **reward the degree to which** the freely programmed **objectives are achieved**, in addition to purely social or moral incentives such as social recognition or professional and personal fulfilment. In the next section, we focus on how socialist entrepreneurship — something that the Austrian School considers impossible — would ostensibly work. 4.2. Ecosystems for innovation and entrepreneurship. In today’s most dynamic capitalist economies, entrepreneurship and business innovation are developed mainly in the so-called innovation ecosystems, which are institutional environments dedicated to promoting symbiotic interaction among the different actors involved in the process of creating and transforming companies and industries. This sort of institutional framework represents the antithesis of the liberal mythology where the individual capitalist–entrepreneur operates in a purely commercial environment, since these ecosystems are based on public institutions and resources as well as procedures that are not strictly mercantile.9 An efficient and dynamic socialist economy needs institutional environments capable of fostering and channeling the initiative of individuals with special talents to translate innovative ideas into business projects. It must be clear that an ecosystem of socialist innovation does not substitute for, but instead complements, the innovations developed by particular state institutions and programs (such as the transition to a new source of energy, new materials, etc.) as well 9 In the case of Spain, think tanks and capitalist consultants openly admit that “there is not enough private capital to invest in new companies, either through individual investment or through venture capital funds” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2015, 32). as innovations taking place in the industrial design departments of businesses. The actors involved in such an ecosystem are essentially the same as those participating in the equivalent ecosystems of the current capitalist economies. Principal **differences would lie in the** form of interaction among them (in the absence of mercantile links), their **decision-making capacity** (since no private property rights adhere), **and** the types of **rules in force** (including the incentive system). Among the main actors would be the following:

**[GBS’S CARD ENDS HERE]**

• Entrepreneurs: individuals or teams who launch ideas in the form of business projects around new products and technologies. • Platforms for innovation: business incubators and accelerators. • Financing institutions: in the form of ICs, constituted through public convocation, which manage the funds provided by the planning authority. • Companies: productive apparatus that receive new ideas. • Knowledge-generating institutions: universities, technological institutes, Scientific Councils, etc. • Government and planning authority: the former provides the regulatory framework at the different levels, while the latter ensures the technical coherence of the detailed economic plan. The challenge for a dynamic socialist economy will be to design an institutional formula that effectively relates the different actors, defining in a precise way the functions and responsibilities of each and establishing an adequate system of incentives. In what follows, we propose certain basic ideas and principles for such an institutional design. 1. First, as mentioned, specific platforms for the development of business innovation would be quite similar to those found in current economies; these are basically of two types: Incubators: these accept projects in the gestation phase (transformation of knowledge into a product) and provide specialized advice, training, and basic infrastructure (spaces, services, etc.) in order to evaluate technical feasibility, relevance to the needs of industry or consumers, the professional caliber of team members, etc. Accelerators: institutions to develop projects or start-ups (emerging companies linked to technological fields) that evaluate their insertion in the productive apparatus. They offer resources, knowledge, and support to entrepreneurs through patronage and facilitation of contact with investors. 2. In the process of the gestation, development, and insertion of a given business project into the productive apparatus (i.e., its incorporation into the detailed economic plan), three types of actors contribute specific functions, skills, and incentives: i) Entrepreneurs: individuals and teams present their proposals to the incubators through public calls. Once selected for funding, they move to the accelerator (development and experimentation) stage. The incentives can be material, in the form of bonuses depending on the success of the project, or in the possibility of developing and directing a personal business project, receiving compensation when that project is definitively integrated into the plan. 10 ii) Investment Councils (ICs): responsible for financing business projects from funds provided by the plan. There would be a plurality of ICs (representing sectorial branches, clusters, consumers, etc.) that would be constituted by way of public calls, competing to capture the best ideas. The incentive for these ICs are premiums depending on the success of the selected projects once they are integrated into the plan. Thus if an IC proves successful in the projects it has financed, in addition to the corresponding premium, it would in the following year receive an additional allocation of funds to manage; and the opposite would occur in the case of an IC showing poor results, eventually causing its dissolution if minimum goals are not attained. iii) Planning Bodies (central or territorial): these have two essential functions — on the one hand, to allocate funds to the ICs (through public calls or auctions) and, on the other hand, to process the technical aspects of the incorporation of projects chosen by the ICs into the detailed economic plan. The incentive to act diligently derives from their nature as elected bodies, in such a way that those teams or members that manage badly may be replaced in periodic elections. In the process described, two fundamental features are worth highlighting. On the one hand, the Planning Body is part of a pluralist structure of actors, instances, and practices meant to foster rivalry within the framework of social ownership. On the other hand, these bodies (at their corresponding levels) are merely technical– administrative agencies for coordination, without the power to decide on the projects to be undertaken; instead they channel information and coordinate the decentralized decisions of entrepreneurs and ICs. Through this structure, the aim is to achieve greater dynamism, efficiency, and the assumption of responsibility in the process of selecting, financing, and developing innovative ideas, and to involve the greatest number and widest variety of agents in decision-making, all within a well-established framework of competencies and incentives. 3. In order to guide entrepreneurial activity toward the objectives proposed in the plan, as well as to improve business activity, two sorts of practices may be undertaken: i) Open innovation: companies, sectors and branches, industrial clusters, and ministries reveal their concerns and the challenges they face; a competition or open contest is promoted to an Investment Council for the presentation of solutions; investors hire the best entrepreneurs to devise and launch prototypes. ii) Spin-offs: these are business initiatives promoted by members of the scientific community, who base their activity on new processes and products generated from knowledge developed in the academic field. In this way, scientific research is more closely linked with the business world through an improvement in transfer routes (with technology transfer centers located at universities). 4. The institutional formula described in this section seeks to present the clear rules and sufficient incentives that would provide positive results in terms of business innovation. If the quantity and quality of innovation were still found to be unsatisfactory, then more aggressive formulas could be enabled as regards incentives and risk. In our proposal, we have assumed that the funds managed by the ICs would be entirely public, corresponding to amounts determined by the overall plan; however, if deemed appropriate, investment funds could alternatively be established by way of private participation, as from private savings where interest or a premium is paid. Such an alternative formula could of course introduce elements of risk, uncertainty, and income inequality among certain groups of citizens, but we expect that this alone would not have the capacity to alter the general economic operation, and it would not be incompatible with the principles and values of a socialist economy, for the following reasons: 1) The democratic and planned functioning of the economy would not be compromised, since the essential social control over the investment would remain in place (albeit through a less centralized decision-making structure), and social ownership of the means of production would be maintained at all times. 2) Such a variant would not introduce instability into the system, because the private funds received or borrowed would not have the capacity to create economic fluctuations, much less generalized overcapacity or crises. 3) No exploitation would emerge, since only a single factor of income inequality and dispersion would be introduced (insofar as someone would be gaining income not earned through work); but limitations would be set and, in any case, these would not necessarily be higher than those established to incentivize undesirable work (as marked by physical difficulty, monotony, location in remote areas, etc.). The disadvantages of this alternate approach in terms of a certain erosion of equity and cooperation might be a reasonable price to pay in order to further stimulate innovation and the efficiency of investments. But even then, should the final result prove less favorable than that registered in capitalist economies (a mere conjecture), we expect that this would not constitute a serious objection by which to reject an entire alternative economic and social order based on desired principles and values such as democracy, freedom, equity, efficiency, and stability. Conclusion In this text we have aimed to prove that the Austrian theorem on the impossibility of the dynamic efficiency in socialism is not consistent. The alleged issues on subjective and dispersed information in planned economy are either based on tautological grounds that presuppose a market framework, where by definition the information for economic coordination is dispersed among the different private owners of resources, or on **problems that can be solved technically by the state-of-the-art technology (telecommunications, AI and big data).** We have explained that planning does not mean that a “single will’’ decides everything, since it is absolutely compatible with diverse means of decentralization at the decision-making stage. To materialize this idea, we have proposed an institutional formula that allows fostering decentralized corporate innovation and entrepreneurship in a framework of social ownership of resources. The key aspect is that a part of the national economy investment — complementary to the strategic centralized component — is assigned by Investment Councils in the different branches (with funds established by the general plan, according to their priorities). These Councils would be responsible for selecting the new entrepreneurship projects among all the proposals received from the entrepreneurs — who have transitory material incentives. Having demonstrated the possibility of dynamic efficiency in a planned economy, we are acknowledging to socialism all its potential to achieve its ultimate goal, that of the free and full development of human capacities.

**That’s impossible – the processing power of even the top 500 supercomputers combined takes 2.6 million years to direct only 100 goods across the US**

**Engelhardt 13** – (Lucas Engelhardt, Assistant Professor of Economics at Kent State University, “Central Planning’s Computation Problem,” 2013, The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 227-246, <https://cdn.mises.org/qjae16_2_5.pdf)kab>

NOTE: TOP500 = combination of the processing power of the top 500 supercomputers at the time of writing

INTRODUCTION Austrian economists have long recognized central planning’s impossibility, especially because of the economic calculation problem (as demonstrated by Ludwig von Mises in many of his writings)1 and the information problem (as demonstrated by Friedrich Hayek, most famously in his 1945 paper “The Use of Knowledge in Society”). These problems have demonstrated that rational economic planning is impossible without a market system with meaningful, informative prices. As Mises describes, when all property is controlled by a central authority, there can be no exchange and therefore no meaningful prices, which makes cost accounting impossible. In Mises’s words: Separate accounts for a single branch of one and the same undertaking are possible only when prices for all kinds of goods and services are established in the market and furnish a basis of reckoning. Where there is no market there is no price system, and where there is no price system there can be no economic calculation. (Mises, 1981) In short, without true exchanges of private property, there are no prices that can be used for cost accounting. This lack of cost accounting makes it impossible to evaluate whether a particular method of production is economical or wasteful. Hayek describes the heart of the information problem in these terms: Fundamentally, in a system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan… Only to a mind to which all these facts were simultaneously known would the answer necessarily follow from the facts given to it. The practical problem, however, arises precisely because these facts are never so given to a single mind, and because, in consequence, it is necessary that in the solution of the problem knowledge should be used that is dispersed among many people. (Hayek, 1945) Put another way, we can imagine a solution to the problem of central planning if all of the information regarding preferences, production, and available resources were given to a single mind. However, from a practical standpoint, all the facts never are given to a single mind. These two problems make rational economic planning impossible if a central authority attempts large-scale planning. However, **the rise of** increased **computing power** since the late 1950s has led some to **suggest that the calculation** problem **and information problem can be overcome by computers**.2 As early as 1967, Oscar Lange ventured the claim “Were I to rewrite my essay [refuting Hayek and Robbins’s criticisms of central planning] today my task would be much simpler. My answer to Hayek and Robbins would be: so what’s the trouble? Let us put the simultaneous equations on an electronic computer and we shall obtain the solution in less than a second.” Such a claim **overestimates the ability of computers to process information**. This paper establishes that **a “computation problem”** would make largescale, consumer-oriented **central planning impossible**, even in the absence of the calculation and information problems. DODGING MISES’S AND HAYEK’S CRITICISMS Throughout history, advocates of central planning have underestimated its difficulty. These advocates ignore or dodge the problems presented by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, and modern day advocates3 of a computerized form of central planning have continued this tradition. For example, Cottrell and Cockshott (1993) revive Lange’s earlier market socialism arguments, and argue that computation in labor costs is a rational basis for economic calculation that is computationally feasible with modern technology. Thus, they sidestep Misesian calculation problems by providing a method of calculation using non-monetary units. They admit that calculating costs is insufficient without some measure of consumer preferences. To solve that problem, they suggest (following Marx) that consumers will allocate “labor certificates” among the various goods that they may purchase. Thus, the Hayekian information problem is sidestepped by allowing consumers a market-style means to express their preferences, and through the revelaton of labor costs through observation. All that remains is to use computers to determine the proper allocation of labor time. However, by incorporating modern “happiness research” (as described, for example, by Frey and Stutzer [2002]), one could speculate about eliminating the “labor certificate” method and instead use individual “utilities” drawn from happiness studies. Through this method, one could eliminate the need for adjusting the “labor certificate price” of consumer goods, and instead distribute goods so that they will create the maximum total social utility. In a world where computers are pervasive, gathering the needed information seems possible. This paper seeks to address a system in which computers have replaced markets. In such a system, Mises’s and Hayek’s economic problems will appear, but a third independent, technological problem would appear as well: the computation problem.4 The computation problem attempts to meet those that advocate computerized, automated central planning, as far as possible, on their own terms. In exposing the computation problem, we will allow for a number of unreasonable assumptions. The computation problem will show that, as long as we hold to a few touchstones with reality, computers will be unable to run an economy, as long as they consider individual preferences. THE UNREASONABLE ASSUMPTIONS Some of the following assumptions are necessary to allow the possibility of an economy run by computers. Others are an attempt to speak to the advocates of computerized central planning on their own terms. In short, this paper attempts to give computerized central planning the best chance it can, so that when it is proven impossible in a simplified case, it will clearly be impossible in a more complicated, realistic case. Assumption 1: Utility can be compared interpersonally. If the computer is going to determine the distribution of scarce resources, utility must be interpersonally comparable, as resources can be distributed among people in a number of possible ways. For the computer to determine whether a particular resource should go to Person A or Person B requires an interpersonal comparison of utility.5 This assumption will allow for a simple maximization of social utility, as long as one additional assumption is made. Assumption 2: Utility has a simple, cardinal, functional representation. Mises has argued that preferences are strictly and inescapably ordinal.6 However, ordinal preferences do not allow for any possibility for interpersonal comparisons of utility, nor for a computation of total social utility. If a computer is going to determine the distribution of scarce goods, then it must be able to compare utility interpersonally, and that requires a cardinal representation for utility. To keep the computational problem as manageable as possible, the form chosen must be simple as well. In this case, utility functions will be assuming a quadratic form, with some interaction among goods being allowed (so the utility of consuming one good may be affected by the quantity of another good consumed). However, this interaction is restricted to be through simple multiplication. Under these strict mathematical assumptions, the maximization problem will simplify to solving a system of linear equations—the type of problem that computers are fastest at solving. This is also a problem for which there is a well-known formula for how many floating point operations, and therefore how much time, such a problem requires to solve.7 Assumption 3: A computer with perfect information about utilities and available resources. The computer must have complete knowledge of each individual’s utility function,8 and of the resources that are available to satisfy consumer wants. To maximize social utility, constrained by available resources, the computer must have information regarding resource constraints and the utility to be maximized. Assumption 4: No production. This assumption is included for reasons of computational simplicity. Allowing for production requires making assumptions regarding the form and stability of production functions. While no advocate of computerized central planning would suggest that such an assumption is even close to reasonable, it is computationally easier to solve a distribution problem alone than to simultaneously solve a distribution problem and a production problem. This assumption also sets aside the objections posed by Murphy (2006). Murphy attacks the argument that a socialized economy can set aside the direct computation problem and simply do what the market does—have a vector of prices that the planners adjust until equilibrium is achieved.9 Murphy notes that such a system would require that the planners have a set of prices not just for all existing goods, but for all conceivable goods—and such a list is uncountably infinite. The computation problem, however, exists even when there is no production—so that the number of goods being dealt with is finite. At this point, it is worth noting that Hayek’s and Mises’s objections to central planning have been assumed away. Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, when combined, eliminate the Hayekian information problem. Assumption 4 eliminates the Misesian calculation problem. TOUCHSTONES WITH REALITY Touchstone 1: Preferences are heterogeneous. Without this assumption, the problem of distribution would vanish immediately. If each person is identical in his preferences, then to find how much of each good a consumer should receive, one simply has to divide the quantity of the consumer good by the number of consumers. This computation would require very little time. For any computation problem to arise in the absence of production, heterogeneous preferences must exist – as we know they do in reality. This touchstone prevents us from being able to use the assumption of a “representative agent”. Assuming heterogeneous preferences is also fair, as advocates of central planning typically want to allow for consumer individuality. (Thus the mock consumer markets advocated by Cottrell and Cockshott (1993).) Touchstone 2: Consumer goods are heterogeneous. Like individual preferences, consumer goods are heterogeneous. This is also recognized by advocates of central planning. This heterogeneity increases the size of the computational problem by expanding the number of distribution problems that must be solved. Touchstone 3: Current limits on processing power The final touchstone with reality is the simple fact that computer processing power is limited. While we rarely notice the limitations of processing power on the low-powered personal computers that most of us use, the reason is that we rarely ask computers to solve difficult problems. The process of typing in a word processing program is computationally straightforward: the computer receives input from the keyboard, stores appropriate data to memory, and sends appropriate signals to the monitor to make letters appear. Even so, nearly anyone who has used a computer for long has experienced a computer “lagging.” This phenomenon occurs when a computer is asked to perform enough operations in a short enough time frame that the computer processor is a bottleneck. This anecdotal experience demonstrates a simple fact: when we ask computers to perform a large number of computations, it takes them time—and sometimes a noticeable amount of time—to perform them. As we frame the computation problem, then, we have to account for the fact that processing takes time. To provide a limiting case, this paper assumes that processing speed is limited by the combined processing power of the TOP500 supercomputers—the 500 fastest supercomputers in the world.10 Supercomputers’ processing speed is measured in “FLOPS” (floating point operations per second). The combined power of the TOP500 supercomputers as of June 2013 can perform 233 petaflops (that is 233 x 1015 FLOPS, or 233 quadrillion FLOPS) (www.top500.org). By combining the formula for the number of floating point operations required to solve the problem with the processing speed of the TOP500, we can arrive at a reasonable lower limit on the processing time required to solve the computation problem.11 RESULTS Scenario 1: A small community with few goods. To begin, consider a small community of just 1,000 people with 1,000 different consumer goods that they are trying to distribute among them. When compared to a real economy, this one is quite small. However, the system of equations required to solve the problem involves 1,001,000 equations,12 which will require approximately 669 quadrillion floating point operations to solve. Using the TOP500 supercomputers working in parallel, this problem is solved quickly: in just over 3 seconds. To most people, a 3 second wait for an important answer is not unreasonable. Yet, Lange’s claim of obtaining the solution “in less than a second” is false, even for this small-scale problem. Scenario 2: **The population of the US with few goods.** Suppose now that we have a much larger population—300 million, which is a bit less than the United States’ current population. To keep the problem simple, assume that the population only has 100 different goods available to them (a drastic simplification). The computation to distribute these goods requires just over 30 billion equations. If the relationship among floating point operations and the number of equations were proportional, then this computation would require about 38 days. However, the relationship among the number of equations and the number of operations is not proportional—each new equation interacts with all the others to change the solution. These interactions require additional operations. As a result, **the computation for this scenario requires 2.6 million years, a clearly impractical length of time.** Scenario 3: Global economy with many goods. Scenario 2 has shown that a computer-managed economy runs into difficulties, even if the population is a small fraction of that of the globe and even if the number of goods is less than any person probably has in eyesight. To fully appreciate the full scale of the problem, we should size it up to a more realistic level. Suppose that there are 6 billion people on Earth (approximately a billion less than there are) and that there are 80,000 different consumer goods (the number tracked for calculating the Consumer Price Index in the United States). This system requires 480 trillion equations to solve.13 To solve these equations, **it would take the TOP500 supercomputers 10.5 quintillion years**.14 According to recent estimates by cosmologists, the Big Bang happened approximately 14 billion years ago. So, a computer that started this computation in the moment of the Big Bang would be approximately 0.00000013% of the way done with the calculation. Even if computers are asked to solve a simple economic problem—determining the distribution of a fixed set of consumer goods—**the problem is insurmountable** if we try to account for heterogeneous goods and heterogeneous preferences in a large economy.

**Even assuming 10 BILLION times current processing power, it still takes 1 BILLION YEARS to calculate where goods go**

**Engelhardt 13** – (Lucas Engelhardt, Assistant Professor of Economics at Kent State University, “Central Planning’s Computation Problem,” 2013, The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 227-246, <https://cdn.mises.org/qjae16_2_5.pdf)kab>

NOTE: TOP500 = combination of the processing power of the top 500 supercomputers at the time of writing

Theoretical Maximum on Processing Power One possible objection to the argument thus far is that it does not account for “Moore’s Law.” Moore’s Law, first proposed by Gordon Moore in 1965, suggests that the number of transistors that can fit on a microchip will double approximately every 18 months. This trend had been observed starting in 1958 and continued until about 2010. Since that time, the trend has slowed somewhat, but current forecasts suggest that the doubling will happen about every three years. This suggests that our processing speeds will continue to improve indefinitely. So, at some point in the future, even the global economy problem may be solved in a reasonable amount of time.15 However, physics informs us that **there is a theoretical limit** on the processing power of computers. A quantum computer processes information by changing the quantum state of the processor’s components. However, **there is a limit to how fast quantum states can evolve.** Using these insights, physicists have found that the fundamental limit is approximately 10 billion times faster than most contemporary computers (Levitin and Toffoli, 2009). Supposing that computer processing is 10 billion times faster than the TOP500 (still ruled out by the research done by Levitin and Toffoli, as the TOP500 are far from representative) allows for the time in Scenario 3 to decline from 10.5 quintillion years to just **1.05 billion years**—taking us from long before the Big Bang to a time approximately when multicellular organisms were beginning to form on Earth. So, even allowing for more than the maximum theoretical improvement in processing speed, **the computation problem is still insurmountable.**

1. **Warming won’t be catastrophic**

Dr. Benjamin **Zycher 21**, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Doctorate in Economics from UCLA, Master in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, and Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from UCLA, Former Senior Economist at the RAND Corporation, Former Adjunct Professor of Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and at the California State University Channel Islands, and Former Senior Economist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, “The Case for Climate Change Realism”, 6/21/2021, https://www.aei.org/articles/the-case-for-climate-change-realism/

Unable to demonstrate that observed climate trends are due to anthropogenic climate change — or even that these events are particularly unusual or concerning — **climate catastrophists** will often **turn to dire predictions** about prospective climate phenomena. **The problem** with such predictions **is** that **they are almost always generated by climate models driven by highly complex sets of assumptions about which there is significant dispute. Worse, these models are notorious for failing to accurately predict already documented changes in climate**. As climatologist Patrick Michaels of the Competitive Enterprise Institute notes:

**During all periods** from 10 years (2006-2015) to 65 (1951-2015) years in length, **the observed temperature trend lies in the lower half of** the collection of **climate model simulations, and for several periods it lies very close** (or even below) **the 2.5th percentile of all the model runs**. Over shorter periods, such as the last two decades, a plethora of mechanisms have been put forth to explain the observed/modeled divergence, but none do so completely and many of the explanations are inconsistent with each other.

Similarly, climatologist John Christy of the University of Alabama in Huntsville observes that **almost all of the 102 climate models** incorporated into the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) — a tracking effort conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory — **overstate past and current temperature trends by a factor of two to three, and at times even more**. It seems axiomatic to say **we should not rely on climate models** that are unable to predict the past or the present to make predictions about the distant future.

The overall temperature trend is not the only parameter the models predict poorly. As an example, **every** CMIP **climate model predicts that increases in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas should create an enhanced heating effect in** the mid-troposphere **over the tropics** — that is, at an altitude over the tropics of about 30,000-40,000 feet. The underlying climatology is simple: Most of the tropics is ocean, and as increases in greenhouse-gas concentrations warm the Earth slightly, there should be an increase in the evaporation of ocean water in this region. When the water vapor rises into the mid-troposphere, it condenses, releasing heat. And **yet** the **satellites cannot find this heating effect — a reality suggesting that our understanding of climate and atmospheric phenomena is not as robust as many seem to assume**.

**The poor predictive record of mainstream climate models is exacerbated by the tendency of the IPCC and U.S. government agencies to assume highly unrealistic future increases in greenhouse-gas concentrations**. The IPCC’s 2014 Fifth Assessment Report, for example, uses four alternative “representative concentration pathways” to outline scenarios of increased greenhouse-gas concentrations yielding anthropogenic warming. These scenarios are known as RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, and RCP8.5. Since 1950, the average annual increase in greenhouse-gas concentrations has been about 1.6 parts per million. The average annual increase from 1985 to 2019 was about 1.9 parts per million, and from 2000 to 2019, it was about 2.2 parts per million. The largest increase that occurred was about 3.4 parts per million in 2016. But the assumed average annual increases in greenhouse-gas concentrations through 2100 under the four RCPs are 1.1, 3.0, 5.5, and an astounding 11.9 parts per million, respectively.

The studies generating the most alarmist predictions are the IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C and the U.S. government’s Fourth National Climate Assessment, both of which were published in 2018. Both assume RCP8.5 as the scenario most relevant for policy planning. **The average** annual **g**reen**h**ouse-**g**as **increase** under RCP8.5 **is over five times the annual average** for 2000-2019 **and almost four times the single biggest increase on record**. Climatologist Judith Curry, formerly of the Georgia Institute of Technology, describes such a scenario as **“borderline impossible.”**

RCP6 is certainly more realistic. It predicts a temperature increase of 3 degrees Celsius by 2100 in the average of the CMIP models. But on average, those CMIP models overstate the documented temperature record by a factor of at least two. **Ultimately, models with a poor record of successfully accounting for past data and highly unrealistic future greenhouse-gas concentrations should not be considered a reasonable basis for future policy formulation**.

1. **Warming doesn’t cause extinction – new studies**

**Nordhaus 20** – Ted, an American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts. “Ignore the Fake Climate Debate”, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816>, 01-23-2020

**Beyond** the **headlines and social media**, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate **“alarmists” and “deniers”** do battle, **there is a real climate debate** bubbling along **in scientific journals**, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. **It gets** a lot **less attention** than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But **most pessimists do not believe** that **runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent**. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. **A richer world will** also likely **be more technologically advanced, which means** that **energy** consumption **should be less carbon-intensive** than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. **New research** published in the journal Global Environmental Change **finds** that **global economic growth** over the last decade **has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five**, with the greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations. In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But **recent forecasts** also **suggest** that many of **the worst-case climate scenarios** produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, **are** also **very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about** how sensitive global **temperatures** will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But **the best estimates** now **suggest** that **the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming** by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The **energy intensity** of the global economy **continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas** has **displaced coal** as the primary source of new fossil energy. The **falling cost of wind and solar energy** has begun to **have an effect on** the growth of **fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy** has **made a modest comeback** in Asia.

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## Civil Penalties CP

Concede the perm, but their answer is a reason to reject the team

#### prison preservation --- which the aff explicitly endorses --- require a pedagogical participation in genocide management --- This tolerates and sustains land conquest, slavery, racial colonialism, and imperialist war — it outweighs and turns case.

**Rodríguez 10** — Dylan Rodríguez, Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at the University of California-Riverside, Founding Member of Critical Resistance—a grassroots organization that works to build a mass movement to dismantle the prison-industrial complex, holds a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from the University of California-Berkeley, 2010 (“The Disorientation of the Teaching Act: Abolition as Pedagogical Position,” *Radical Teacher*, Number 88, Summer, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 15-17)

Abolitionist Position and Praxis

Given the historical context I have briefly outlined, and the practical-theoretical need for situating an abolitionist praxis within a longer tradition of freedom struggle, I contend that there can be no liberatory teaching act, nor can there be an adequately critical pedagogical practice, that does not also attempt to become an abolitionist one. Provisionally, I am conceptualizing abolition as **a praxis of liberation** that is creative and experimental rather than formulaic and rigidly programmatic. Abolition is a “radical” political position, as well as a perpetually creative and experimental pedagogy, because formulaic approaches cannot adequately apprehend the biopolitics, dynamic statecraft, and internalized violence of genocidal and proto-genocidal systems of human domination.

As a productive and creative praxis, this conception of abolition posits the **material possibility** and **historical necessity** of a social capacity for human freedom based on a cultural-economic infrastructure that supports **the transformation of oppressive relations** that are the legacy of **genocidal conquest**, **settler colonialism**, **racial slavery/capitalism**,19 **compulsory hetero-patriarchies**, and **global white supremacy**. In this sense, abolitionist praxis does **not** singularly concern itself with the “abolition of the prison industrial complex,” although it fundamentally and **strategically prioritizes** the prison as a central site for catalyzing **broader, radical social transformations**. In significant part, this suggests envisioning and ultimately constructing “a constellation of alternative strategies and institutions, with the ultimate aim of removing the prison from the social and ideological landscape of our society.”20 In locating abolitionist praxis within a longer political genealogy that anticipates the task of **remaking the world under transformed material circumstances**, this position refracts the most radical and revolutionary dimensions of a historical Black freedom struggle that positioned the abolition of “slavery” as the condition of possibility for Black—hence “human”—freedom.

To situate contemporary abolitionism as such is also to recall the U.S. racist state’s (and its liberal allies’) displacement and effective political criminalization of Black radical abolitionism through the 13th Amendment’s 1865 recodification of the slave relation through the juridical re-invention of a racial-carceral relation:

Amendment XIII

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.21 [emphasis added]

Given the institutional elaborations of racial criminalization, policing, and massive imprisonment that have prevailed on the 13th Amendment’s essential authorization to replace a regime of racist chattel slavery with racist carceral state violence, it is incumbent on the radical teacher to assess the density of her/his entanglement in this historically layered condition of [end page 15] violence, immobilization, and capture. **Prior** to the work of formulating an effective curriculum and teaching strategy for critically engaging the prison industrial complex, in other words, is the even more difficult work of examining the **assumptive limitations** of any “radical pedagogy” that does not attempt to displace an **epistemological and cultural common sense** in which the relative order and peace of the classroom is **perpetually reproduced** by the systemic disorder and deep violence of the prison regime.

In relation to the radical challenging of common sense discussed above, another critical analytical tool for building an abolitionist pedagogy entails the **rigorous, scholarly dismantling** of the **“presentist” and deeply ahistorical understanding** of policing and prisons. Students (and many teachers) frequently enter such dialogues with an utterly mystified conception of the policing and prison apparatus, and do not generally understand that 1) these apparatuses in their current form are very recent creations, and have not been around “forever”; and 2) the rise of these institutional forms of criminalization, domestic war, and mass-scale imprisonment forms **one link in a historical chain of genocidal and proto-genocidal mobilizations of the racist state** that regularly take place as part of the deadly global process of U.S. nation-building. In other words, not only is the prison regime a very recent invention of the state (and therefore is neither a “permanent” nor indestructible institutional assemblage), but it is **institutionally and historically inseparable** from the precedent and contemporaneous structures of **large-scale racist state violence**. Asserting the above as part of the core analytical framework of the pedagogical structure can greatly enable a discussion of abolitionist possibility that thinks of the critical dialogue as a **necessary continuation of long historical struggles** against **land conquest**, **slavery**, **racial colonialism**, and **imperialist war**. This also means that our discussions take place within a longer temporal community with those liberation struggles, such that we are neither “crazy” nor “isolated.” I have seen students and teachers speak radical truth to power under difficult and vulnerable circumstances based on this understanding that they are part of a historical record.

I have had little trouble “convincing” most students—across distinctions of race, class, gender, age, sexuality, and geography—of the gravity and emergency of our historical moment. It is the analytical, political, and practical move toward an abolitionist positionality that is (perhaps predictably) far more challenging. This is in part due to the **fraudulent and stubborn default position** of centrist-to-progressive liberalism/reformism (including assertions of “civil” and “human” rights) as the only feasible or legible response to reactionary, violent, racist forms of state power. Perhaps more troublesome, however, is that this resistance to engaging with abolitionist praxis seems to also derive from a deep and broad **epistemological and cultural disciplining of the political imagination** that makes liberationist dreams **unspeakable**. This disciplining is most overtly produced through **hegemonic state and cultural apparatuses and their representatives** (including elected officials, popular political pundits and public intellectuals, schools, family units, religious institutions, etc.), but is also compounded through the pragmatic imperatives of many liberal and progressive nonprofit organizations and social movements that **reproduce the political limitations of the** [end page 16] **nonprofit industrial complex**.22 In this context, the liberationist historical identifications hailed by an abolitionist social imagination also require that such repression of political-intellectual imagination be **fought**, **demystified**, and **displaced**.

Perhaps, then, there is **no viable or defensible pedagogical position** other than an abolitionist one. To live and work, learn and teach, and survive and thrive in a time defined by the capacity and political willingness to eliminate and neutralize populations through a culturally valorized, state sanctioned nexus of institutional violence, is to better understand why abolitionist praxis in this historical moment is **primarily pedagogical**, within and against the “system” in which it occurs. While it is conceivable that in future moments, abolitionist praxis can focus more centrally on matters of (creating and not simply opposing) public policy, infrastructure building, and economic reorganization, the present moment clearly demands a convening of **radical pedagogical energies** that can build the **collective human power, epistemic and knowledge apparatuses, and material sites of learning** that are the **precondition** of authentic and liberatory social transformations.

The prison regime is the institutionalization and systemic expansion of massive human misery. It is the production of bodily and psychic disarticulation on multiple scales, across different physiological capacities. The prison industrial complex is, in its logic of organization and its production of common sense, **at least proto-genocidal**. Finally, the prison regime is **inseparable** from—that is, present in—the schooling regime in which teachers are entangled. Prison is not simply a place to which one is displaced and where one’s physiological being is disarticulated, at the rule and whim of the state and its designated representatives (police, parole officers, school teachers). The prison regime is **the assumptive premise of classroom teaching generally**. While many of us must live in labored denial of this fact in order to teach as we must about “American democracy,” “freedom,” and “(civil) rights,” there are opportune moments in which it is useful to come clean: the vast majority of what occurs in U.S. classrooms—from preschool to graduate school—cannot accommodate the bare truth of the proto-genocidal prison regime as a violent ordering of the world, a primary component of civil society/school, and a material presence in our everyday teaching acts.

As teachers, we are **institutionally hailed to the service of genocide management**, in which our pedagogical labor is variously engaged in mitigating, valorizing, critiquing, redeeming, justifying, lamenting, and otherwise reproducing or tolerating the profound and systemic violence of the global-historical U.S. nation building project. As “radical” teachers, we are politically hailed to **betray genocide management** in order to embrace **the urgent challenge of genocide abolition**. The **short-term survival of those populations** rendered most immediately vulnerable to **the mundane and spectacular violence** of this system, and **the long-term survival of most of the planet’s human population** (particularly those descended from survivors of enslavement, colonization, conquest, and economic exploitation), is **significantly dependent** on our willingness to embrace this form of **pedagogical audacity**.

## Sustainability

1. **Try or die for sustainable growth**– prefer new IPCC report

**King and Lichtenstein 21** (David King, Founder and Chair, Centre for Climate Repair at Cambridge, University of Cambridge; and Jane Lichtenstein, Associate, Centre for Climate Repair at Cambridge, University of Cambridge; “Surviving the next 50 years is an existential crisis – 3 things we must do now,” The Print, 8-14-2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/surviving-the-next-50-years-is-an-existential-crisis-3-things-we-must-do-now/715069/)

The challenge of **surviving** the **next 50 years** is now seen as a **planet-wide existential crisis**; we need to work together urgently, just to secure a **short-term future** for human civilisation. Global weather patterns are violently disrupted: Greece burns; the south of England floods; Texas has had its coldest weather ever, while California and Australia suffer apocalyptic wild fires. All of these violent, record-breaking events are a direct result of rapid heating in the Arctic – occurring faster than in the rest of the world. A warm Arctic triggers new ocean and air currents that change the weather for everyone. The **only way** to **reverse** some of these catastrophic patterns, and to regain a kind of **stability** in climate and weather systems, is “**climate repair**” – a strategy we call “reduce, remove, repair” – which demands that we make **very rapid** progress to net zero global emissions; that there is **massive, active removal** of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere; and, in the first instance, that we **refreeze** the Earth’s poles and glaciers to correct the wild weather patterns, slow down ice-melt, stabilise sea level, and **break** the **feedback loops** that relentlessly accelerate global warming. There are **no either/or options**. Reducing emissions About 70% of world economies have **net zero emissions commitments** over varying timescales, but this has come **too late** to restore climate stability. The **IPCC** has asked for accelerated progress on this trajectory, but whatever happens, current emission rates of atmospheric greenhouse gases imply global warming of 1.5℃ by 2030 and well over 2℃ above pre-industrial level by the end of the century – a devastating outcome. In particular, **melting ice** and **thawing permafrost** are **considered inevitable** **even if rapid and deep CO2 emissions reductions are achieved**, with sea-level rise to **continue for centuries** as a result. **In every area of the world**, climate events will become **more severe** and **more frequent**, whether flooding, heating, coastal erosion or fires. There are definitely important steps that can still reduce the scale of this devastation, including **faster and deeper emissions reductions**. However, this is **not enough** on its own to **avert the worst**. Together there is **real evidence** that the **massive removal** of **g**reen**h**ouse **g**ases from the atmosphere and solutions such as **repairing** the Earth’s poles and glaciers could help humanity find a **surviv**able way out of this crisis. Removing greenhouse gases Taking CO2 and equivalent greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere, with the aim of getting back to 350ppm (parts per million) by 2100, involves creating new CO2 “sinks” – long-term stores from which CO2 cannot escape. Sinks operate at many scales, with forest planting, mangrove restoration, wetland and peat preservation all crucially important. **Very large projects**, such as the restoration of the Loess Plateau in China demonstrate **scalable** CO2 removal, with multiple add-on benefits of **food production**, **bio-d**iversity **enhancement** and **weather stabilisation**. **Habitat restoration** can also make economic sense. In the Philippines, mangrove is the focus of a cost-benefit analysis. Mangrove captures four times more carbon than the same area of rainforest, provides numerous ecosystem services and protects against flooding, conferring socio-economic benefits and significantly reducing the cost of dealing with extreme weather events. **Big new carbon sinks must be created** wherever safely possible, including in the oceans. Interventions that mimic natural processes, known to operate safely “in the wild”, are a workable starting point. Promotion of ocean pastures to restore ocean diversity and fish and whale stocks to the levels last seen 300 years ago is one such possibility – offering new sustainable food sources for humans, as well as contributing to climate ecosystem services and carbon sinks. In nature, sprinklings of iron-rich dust blow from deserts or volcanic eruptions, onto the surface of deep oceans, generating – in a matter of months – rich ocean pastures, teeming fish stocks and an array of marine wildlife. **Studies** of ocean kelp regeneration show the full range of real-life impacts, from increased protein sources for human consumption, to **restoration of pre-industrial levels** of ocean biodiversity and productivity, and extensive **carbon sequestration**. Extending the scale and number of ocean pastures could be achieved by systematically **scattering iron-rich dust** onto target areas in oceans around the world. The approach is intuitively scalable, and could sequester perhaps 30 billion tons per year of CO2 if 3% or so of the world’s deep oceans were to be treated annually. **Large-scale carbon-sink** creation of this kind is **pivotal** if the atmosphere is to return to pre-industrial CO2 levels. A **billion tons per year** of sequestration is the **minimum** threshold coordinated by the Centre for Climate Repair at Cambridge given the intensity of the climate crisis. While the scale of intervention is sometimes called “geoengineering”, the approach is closer to forest planting or mangrove restoration. The aim is to remove CO2 from the atmosphere using natural means, to return us to pre-industrial levels within a single generation. Repairing the planet The **immediate** challenge is to stabilise the planet, achieving a manageable equilibrium that gives a last chance to **shift** to renewable energy and towards a **circular global economy**, with new norms in urban, rural and ocean management. “Repairing” systematically seeks to **draw** the Earth **back** from climate **tipping points** (which, by definition, **cannot happen without direct effort**), providing a supporting framework in which “reduce” and “restore” can happen. Political and societal will is needed. The most urgent effort is to refreeze the Arctic, interrupting a bleak spiral of accelerating ice loss, sea-level rise – and the acceleration of climate change and violent global weather changes that they cause. Arctic temperatures have risen much faster (and increasingly so) than global average temperatures, when compared with pre-industrial levels. Figure 1 shows this clearly from 1850 to the present day. Melting Arctic ice embodies a powerful feedback force in climate change. White ice reflects the Sun’s energy away from the Earth before it can heat the surface. This is known as the albedo effect. As ice melts, dark-blue seawater absorbs increasing amounts of the Sun’s energy, warming increases, and ever-larger areas of ice disappear each summer, expanding the acceleration. Arctic temperatures govern winds, ocean currents and weather systems across the globe. A tipping point is passing: sea-ice loss is becoming permanent and accelerating; Greenland ice will follow and will eventually raise global sea-levels by over seven metres. Total loss may take centuries but, decade by decade, there will be relentless incremental impacts. By mid-century the melting will be irreversible, and sea-level rise alone will leave low-lying countries like Vietnam in desperate circumstances, with reductions to global rice production a certainty, many millions of climate refugees and no obvious pathway forward for such nations. Figure 1: comparison between average global temperature change, and change in the Arctic region from 1850 to present day. Provided by Nerilie Abram using IPCC data, ANU, Australia, 2021 The rapid Arctic temperature increase is matched by the rapid and accelerating loss in minimum (summer) sea-ice volume (Figure 2), which further accelerates the temperature rise in a spiral of reinforcing feedback loops. Figure 2: decline in annual minimum Arctic Sea ice volume 1980-2020. Provided by Nerilie Abram using IPCC data, ANU, Australia, 2021 It is **vital** to pivot the world back from this ice-melt **tipping point**, and to **repair** the Arctic **as rapidly as possible**. **Marine cloud brightening** in which floating solar-powered pumps spray salt upwards to brighten clouds and create a reflective barrier between the Sun and the ocean, is known to cool ocean surfaces and is a promising way to promote Arctic summer cooling. It mimics nature, and can be scaled up or down in a flexible way. Studies of marine cloud brightening, its climate impacts and interactions with human systems, are underway. As with promotion of ocean pastures, such solutions **must be critically analysed**, **but** there is **no longer any doubt** of their **crucial importance**. What we do in **the next five years determines the viability of humanity’s future**. Even if we narrow our aspirations to “survival”, fixing on a timescale of 50 years or so, the challenges are daunting. Humanity deserves better. We know what to do to be able to imagine thousands of years of human civilisation ahead, as well as behind us.

#### Cap is sustainable---by every metric cap causes improvements

Schrager **‘**20 [Allison; Winter 2020; Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia University, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute; "Why Socialism Won't Work," https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/15/socialism-wont-work-capitalism-still-best/]

WITH INCREASINGLY UBIQUITOUS IPHONES, internet, central air conditioning, flat-screen TVs, and indoor plumbing, few in the developed world would want to go back to life 100, 30, or even 10 years ago. Indeed, around the world, the last two centuries have brought vast improvements in material living standards; billions of people have been lifted from poverty, and life expectancy across income levels has broadly risen. Most of that progress came from capitalist economies.

Yet those economies are not without their problems. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the gap between the rich and poor has become intolerably large as business owners and highly educated workers in urban areas have become richer while workers' wages in rural areas have stagnated. In most rich countries, more trade has brought a bigger, better variety of goods, but it has also displaced many jobs.

With social instability in the form of mass protests, Brexit, the rise of populism, and deep polarization knocking at the capitalist economies' doors, much of the progress of the last several decades is in peril. For some pundits and policymakers, the solution is clear: socialism, which tends to be cited as a method for addressing everything from inequality and injustice to climate change.

Yet the very ills that socialists identify are best addressed through innovation, productivity gains, and better rationing of risk. And capitalism is still far and away the best, if not only, way to generate those outcomes.

TODAY'S SOCIALISM IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE. Traditionally, the term meant total state ownership of capital, as in the Soviet Union, North Korea, or Maoist China. Nowadays, most people don't take such an extreme view. In Europe, social democracy means the nationalization of many industries and very generous welfare states. And today's rising socialists are rebranding the idea to mean an economic system that delivers all the best parts of capitalism (growth and rising living standards) without the bad (inequality, economic cycles).

But no perfect economic system exists; there are always trade-offs--in the most extreme form between total state ownership of capital and unfettered markets without any regulation or welfare state. Today, few would opt for either pole; what modern socialists and capitalists really disagree on is the right level of government intervention.

Modern socialists want more, but not complete, state ownership. They'd like to nationalize certain industries. In the United States, that's health care--a plan supported by Democratic presidential candidates Elizabeth Warren (who does not call herself a socialist) and Bernie Sanders (who wears the label proudly). In the United Kingdom, Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, who was trounced at the polls in mid-December, has set his sights on a longer list of industries, including the water, energy, and internet providers.

Other items on the socialist wish list may include allowing the government to be the primary investor in the economy through massive infrastructure projects that aim to replace fossil fuels with renewables, as Green New Deal socialists have proposed. They've also floated plans that would make the government the employer of a majority of Americans by offering guaranteed well-paid jobs that people can't be fired from. And then there are more limited proposals, including installing more workers on the boards of private companies and instituting national rent controls and high minimum wages.

For their part, modern capitalists want some, but less, state intervention. They are skeptical of nationalization and price controls; they argue that today's economic problems are best addressed by harnessing private enterprise. In the United States, they've argued for more regulation and progressive taxation to help ease inequality, incentives to encourage private firms to use less carbon, and a more robust welfare state through tax credits. Over the past 15 years, meanwhile, capitalist Europeans have instituted reforms to improve labor market flexibility by making it easier to hire and fire people, and there have been attempts to reduce the size of pensions.

No economic system is perfect, and the exact right balance between markets and the state may never be found. But there are good reasons to believe that keeping capital in the hands of the private sector, and empowering its owners to make decisions in the pursuit of profit, is the best we've got.

ONE REASON TO TRUST MARKETS is that they are better at setting prices than people. If you set prices too high, many a socialist government has found, citizens will be needlessly deprived of goods. Set them too low, and there will be excessive demand and ensuing shortages. This is true for all goods, including health care and labor. And there is little reason to believe that the next batch of socialists in Washington or London would be any better at setting prices than their predecessors. In fact, government-run health care systems in Canada and European countries are plagued by long wait times. A 2018 Fraser Institute study cites a median wait time of 19.8 weeks to see a specialist physician in Canada. Socialists may argue that is a small price to pay for universal access, but a market-based approach can deliver both coverage and responsive service. A full government takeover isn't the only option, nor is it the best one.

Beyond that, markets are also good at rationing risk. Fundamentally, socialists would like to reduce risk--protect workers from any personal or economywide shock. That is a noble goal, and some reduction through better functioning safety nets is desirable. But getting rid of all uncertainty--as state ownership of most industries would imply--is a bad idea. Risk is what fuels growth. People who take more chances tend to reap bigger rewards; that's why the top nine names on the Forbes 400 list of the richest Americans are not heirs to family dynasties but are self-made entrepreneurs who took a leap to build new products and created many jobs in the process.

Some leftist economists like Mariana Mazzucato argue that governments might be able to step in and become laboratories for innovation. But that would be a historical anomaly; socialist-leaning governments have typically been less innovative than others. After all, bureaucrats and worker-corporate boards have little incentive to upset the status quo or compete to build a better widget. And even when government programs have spurred innovation--as in the case of the internet--it took the private sector to recognize the value and create a market.

And that brings us to a third reason to believe in markets; productivity. Some economists, such as Robert Gordon, have looked to today's economic problems and suggested that productivity growth--the engine that fueled so much of the progress of the last several decades--is over. In this telling, the resources, products, and systems that underpin the world's economy are all optimized, and little further progress is possible.

But that is hard to square with reality. Innovation helps economies do more with fewer resources--increasingly critical to addressing climate change, for example--which is a form of productivity growth. And likewise, many of the products and technologies people rely on every day did not exist a few years ago. These goods make inaccessible services more available and are changing the nature of work, often for the better. Such gains are made possible by capitalist systems that encourage invention and growing the pie, not by socialist systems that are more concerned with how the existing pie is cut. It is far too soon, in other words, to write off productivity.

Here, it is worth considering the lessons of a previous productivity boom: the Industrial Revolution. As the economist Joel Mokyr has shown, it took new innovations like the steam engine more than 100 years to appear in productivity estimates. The same could be happening today with smartphones and the internet. Meanwhile, even as that upheaval transformed the human experience, creating a more comfortable existence for most everyone, it was also messy and disruptive. The early part of that innovative cycle--like others since--displaced existing workers while the gains flowed to the owners of capital first, causing social instability.

#### Cap is environmentally sustainable

Westergård 18 – Rune Westergård. Entrepreneur, Engineer and Author, founder of the technical consulting company CITEC. 2018. “Real and Imagined Threats.” One Planet Is Enough, Springer International Publishing, pp. 71–80. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60913-3\_7.

Threatening reports about our ability to create disasters and even exterminate ourselves are not a new idea. A standard example is the British national economist Thomas Malthus in the early 19th century, who predicted that population growth would come to a halt because of starvation. Malthus calculated that the available food in the world couldn’t feed more than one billion people. He extrapolated the development from a still picture of his own time and couldn’t fathom that food production would increase tremendously thanks to new knowledge and technology. Our present food production is sufficient for seven times as many. Malthus didn’t pay attention to the fact that we live in a continuously changing civilisation, and the same kind of miscalculations are still made today. There are people who have even achieved the status of media superstars by presenting various dystopias and catastrophe scenarios. As early as 1968, Professor Paul Erlichs at Stanford University published the bestseller The Population Bomb, where he predicted that an imminent population explosion would result in hundreds of millions of deaths by starvation in the 1970s and 80s. Basically, he made the same mistake as Malthus, i.e. he treated knowledge and technology as if they were static phenomena. The most widely read environment report in the world, State of the World, was a loud whistle-blower when it was first published in the early 1980s. The Swedish version, Tillståndet i världen, was published yearly from 1984 and some years into the 2000s by the Worldwatch Institute Norden; I still have some of the early issues left. This report contains many valuable observations and suggestions, but also several basic analytical mistakes. In other words, it acts as an eye-opener, but it suffers from being tainted by political ideology. Its main weakness is that it doesn’t take the intrinsic driving forces of progress into account. State of the World was translated into most major languages and is, as already mentioned, the world’s most widely read environmental report. It has affected us all, directly or indirectly, through school and media. Even if the Swedish version I refer to was written some years ago, it is still worthy of discussion, firstly because it maintains an appearance of scientific validity, and secondly because it has served as a trendsetter for the general ideology which has been adopted by many later books and reports on the subject at hand. It still lives on as an engraved pattern in our conception of the world. In the report we can, for instance, read the following: A world where human desires and needs are fulfilled without the destruction of natural systems demands an entirely new economic order, founded on the insight that a high consumption level, population growth, and poverty are the powers behind the devastation of the environment. The rich have to reduce their consumption of resources so that the poor can increase their standard of living. The global economy simply works against the attempts to reduce poverty and protect the environment. We stubbornly insist to regard economic growth as synonymous with development, even though it makes the poor even poorer. Even if we up to this point have mainly described the environment revolution in economic terms, it is, in its most fundamental meaning, a social revolution: to change our values. Massive threat scenarios are still presented, for instance in the British scientist Tim Jackson’s book Prosperity Without Growth from 2009, which is one of the most widely read and frequently quoted works in this area. Tim Jackson, who is an economist and professor in sustainable development, explains how we humans are indulging in a ruthless pursuit of new-fangled gadgets in a consumption society running at full speed towards its doom. He also claims that material things in themselves cannot help us to flourish; on the contrary, they may even restrain our welfare. In other words, we cannot build our hopes that the economy, technology or science can help us to escape from the trap of Anthropocene, which has brought us to the brink of an ecological disaster. There are hundreds on books on this theme, and they all agree that the general state of the world is pure misery; everything is getting worse, the resources are being depleted, and that man will soon have destroyed the entire planet. The apparent reason for this, of course, is due to the consumption culture and the present financial system—which exposes man as a greedy, ruthless and ultimately weak creature. This attitude may serve a purpose as an eye-opener. But it is not very credible, and it may even be counterproductive. Of course, we can see a lot of problems ahead of us; but to solve them, we need the correct diagnostics instead of dubious doomsday prophesies. Focus: The Problem Since the focus of attention is so profoundly fixated on the problems in the climate and environmental debate, the progress already made—and the opportunities at hand—are often overshadowed. The example below will help to illustrate this point: In the year 2014, the Nobel Prize in physics was awarded to three scientists who had invented blue light emitting diodes—a technology that has made high-bright and energy-efficient LED lighting possible. As lighting accounts for 20% of the world’s total electrical consumption, this invention has the potential to radically reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. In an interview made by the major Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter, one of the prize winners, Hiroshi Amano, says the following about energy-efficient, inexpensive and high-bright LED lights: “They are now being used all over the world. Even children in the developing countries can use this lighting to read books and study in the evenings. This makes me very very happy”. Shortly after this announcement, the news headlines declared that LED lighting was a threat to the environment. This statement was based on a report showing that LED lighting could be hazardous to flies and moths, which in turn might disturb the eco system. This is a typical example of how progress pessimists and, not least the media, think and act. In this case, they focused on a potential problem associated with LED lighting, and ignored the tremendous possibilities that the new technology offered to dramatically reduce greenhouse gases and thus spare the eco system (not to mention all the other advantages). Books and reports of the kind mentioned above tell us repeatedly about disasters, threats, problems, collapses and famines. On the other hand, they are notoriously silent about the great improvements actually made—the reduction of extreme poverty (not only as a percentage but also in absolute numbers), longer lifespans, dramatic global progress in education and healthcare, etc. The lack of positive media coverage on the environment means that many people believe that too little is being done, which is quite understandable considering the one-sided nature of the information they are presented with. Alarmist reporting almost always reminds me of pirates: they are unreliable and half their vision is blocked by their eye patches. It is vital that the media not only one-sidedly focus on the misery without presenting the progress made and suggesting constructive courses of action. The quality of our decisions in all respects depends on our knowledge, insight and attitude. Real and Imagined Threats Many people are convinced that the climate and environmental problems are growing. It is certainly true that our planet has its limitations, but many of the predictions from alarmist literature have been proven false. In the 1980s, the forest dieback was a frequently discussed subject. To quote the well-known German news magazine Der Spiegel, an “ecological Hiroshima” was imminent. Most experts at the time claimed that a wide-spread forest death seemed unavoidable. Additionally, the general mood of impending doom was augmented by the threat of a nuclear disaster during the cold war. I remember the pessimistic discussions among friends and how frequently the gloomy reports appeared in Swedish and Finnish television. The future of humankind appeared to be depressingly bleak. But the forest dieback never happened. On the contrary, the forest area has been constantly expanding in Europe, even during the entire period when the forest was believed to be dying. Today, only two thirds of the yearly accretion in Europe are cut down, according to the Natural Resource Institute in Finland. There are different opinions as to why the large-scale forest dieback didn’t occur. One theory is that the researchers’ evidence and conclusions had been incomplete and too hasty; the forest was actually never in danger. Others suggest that the emission limitations implemented prevented the disaster. My point is that the environmental catastrophe did not happen. Some other environmental problems, exaggerated or not, that have concerned us during the last decades have also disappeared from the immediate agenda: overpopulation, DDT, the ozone hole, heavy metals, lead poisoning, soot particles, the waste mountain, and the acidification of our lakes. Unfortunately, some environmental problems, like soot particles and waste, still remain in some areas, especially in poorer countries, where there are other, even worse problems that have yet to be resolved. The conclusion is, however, that we and our society in most cases have handled threatening situations quite well. When alarming symptoms are noted, scientists and other experts are summoned, and we act according to their diagnoses. It is no big deal that the diagnoses are sometimes wrong, as long as the side effects are not too severe. The main thing is that we do our best to avoid disasters, and on the whole, humankind has succeeded rather well this far. As individuals, we react very differently to various kinds of threats. The closer and more tangible the threat is, the more violent are the reactions—while distant and invisible symptoms, like the depletion of the ozone layer, concern us less. In the latter cases, we have to trust the scientists’ and later the politicians’ reactions. Does this mean that disasters are avoided thanks to war headlines, threats, and anxiety? I don’t think that this is the most important explanation; rather, it is factual and science-based information that produces effective results. But if exaggerated threat scenarios and reports of misery are needed to inspire the necessary political opinion, acquire research funding and create behavioural changes, we will have to live with that. The most important thing to remember in this context is that the actions shouldn’t cause more harm than the original problem itself. The risk with exaggerated threat and misery reporting is that it may inspire an over-reaction based on misleading diagnoses, or the opposite—a paralysing feeling of helplessness. It is necessary to take threats against the climate and the environment seriously, but not to a degree where our ability to reason and act is blocked by fear or anxiety. Many environmental debaters claim that the fall of the Inca and Roman empires were caused by the same causes that are now threatening our present civilisation—a short-sighted over-exploitation and rape of nature. Easter Island is another popular example. However, in my opinion it is both worthless and irresponsible to judge the world situation of today by copying the outcome of earlier cultural endeavours in history. The inhabitants of the Inca empire and Easter Island didn’t have anything even remotely comparable with the organisations, technology, medicine or general knowledge of today. It would be like comparing a case of appendicitis in the past to a case today. In pre-modern times, it was a fatal condition. In this day and age, it is cured by a simple routine operation. Today, humankind is conscious of the climate changes and other ecological challenges. And we also have the knowledge and resources needed to act. Facts, Propaganda and Hidden Messages During all the years I have followed the development of technology and society, I have repeatedly observed how a mishmash of serious research, political propaganda, and the hidden agendas of individuals have been distributed more or less randomly by the media. There are of course many different kinds of alarmism— everything from well-founded research reports to exaggerated prophesies of doom. It is far from simple to separate the wheat from the chaff. The actions taken against ozone depletion, lead emissions and the toxic chemical, dioxin, are all examples of how research has shown the way to successful results. Today, greenhouse gas emissions top the list of issues deserving our gravest attention, as it is a global phenomenon—just as the depletion of the ozone layer once was. There are also a considerable number of local environmental problems, such as drought, air pollution, forest depletion and overfishing. All of these are real threats that have to be acted upon, even though they are not global. However, I am always disturbed when a single global environmental issue is bundled with an assortment of several local issues, rather like a simplified trademark advertisement for the negative consequences of civilisation. This makes the information abstract and inaccurate, ignoring the fact that different locales require different solutions. Fear and alarmism are natural reactions that once protected us when we were living at the mercy of nature—they are evolutionary relics from our life in the savanna. Today, the same properties can be significant drawbacks. The transition from a primitive, animal-like state to the society we have today must, on the whole, be counted as a great success. But many people regard the same world as over-exploited, depleted, unjust, war-ridden and balancing on the brink of destruction. How can people living in the same epoch have so entirely different views of the world? In the sustainability debate, there is one faction dealing with the natural resources and ecosystems, and another focusing on the redistribution of wealth. There is even a third faction discussing a minimalistic lifestyle; for example, downshifting, with less work and less material welfare. When all these ingredients are mixed without discretion, the result is an anxiety soup that many have choked on. In a situation like that, we cannot expect any constructive initiatives to materialise. Instead, it would be far better to explore, research and discuss each dimension separately. What Is the Real State of the Planet? It is easy to generalise and say that we over-exploit the planet’s resources and pollute the world with our waste. But how many care to examine these statements in detail and ask exactly which resources are over-exploited? • Are fish becoming extinct? It is true that overfishing occurs in many places, which is, of course, unsustainable. However, this is not an unavoidable threat to the world’s total food resources. Fortunately, there are several examples of fish stocks that have either recovered or started to replenish once the fishing effort has been eased. • Is the air being poisoned? Many are convinced that the air we breathe is becoming dirtier all the time. But that isn’t true, at least not in the Western world. From the year 1990, emissions of sulphur dioxide have been reduced by 80%, nitrogen oxides by 44%, volatile organic substances by 55%, and carbon monoxide by 62%. Despite these dramatic improvements, 64% of Europeans believe that pollution is increasing. • Are the forests dying? It is a general belief that the forests in the developed countries are dwindling. But that isn’t true; on the contrary, the wooded areas are expanding. However, the forests are decreasing in the poor countries, where forestry and farming are still major sources of income, as they once were in the industrialised countries. • Are we drowning in waste? There are many who believe that we are surrounded by constantly growing mountains of waste. In the developed countries, the truth is that increasing amounts of waste are being recycled and the landfills are decreasing. • Will there be enough phosphorus? Phosphorus is an important nutrient in farming, extracted from phosphate ore. Many scientists fear that the finite natural resource of phosphate ore will become depleted in the future, which may jeopardise the world’s food supply. But there are already working solutions for this problem, such as by reclaiming phosphorus through digestion residues and sewage sludge. There are also technological solutions for the chemical extraction of phosphorus from polluted water—the remediation of lakes and rainwater by removing phosphorus is already a common procedure. Here we achieve a win-win situation—phosphorus is collected while preventing the eutrophication of lakes. • Will there be enough energy to go around? A common statement is that the earth’s population is too large, and that we consume too much energy with respect to the climate. This is one of those issues where we have to think in terms of symptoms, diagnoses, and medication. The symptoms are there for all to see: climate change. On the other hand, the diagnosis that we consume too much energy is wrong. The correct diagnosis is that we are not using the right technology; i.e. energy efficient power production without harmful emissions. Consequently, the correct statement would be that we consume energy that is produced by technologies that are harmful to the climate. The difference in wording is important. As the first diagnosis is “too high energy consumption”, the remedy will be to use a different medication than a diagnosis based on “the wrong technology”. Alarmist reporting can inspire bad decisions if the statements aren’t systematically reviewed and evaluated. It can also be misguiding to express environmental threats in general terms. Actions must be based on precise specific symptoms with corresponding diagnoses. If the doctor discovers that the patient is lame and suffers from a high fever, it doesn’t help to predict imminent death. Maybe the lameness and the fever have different causes altogether! A successful cure would probably include two different diagnoses with separate medications. Several recent surveys of the general conception of the world have been made— one is Project Ignorance by Gapminder and Novus in Sweden. One of the questions asked was whether CO2 emissions per capita and year had increased or decreased in the world during the last 40 years. The surveyed group was large and representative in order to give a fairly accurate picture of the common opinion. No less than 90% believed that CO2 emissions had increased. The truth is that they haven’t increased at all. It is important that decision makers on all levels learn how to see the wood from the trees. Decisions based on false preconditions can halt technological development, and thus also the development of the economy, welfare, and a healthier environment. The flow of innovations in the climate and environmental areas is accelerating rapidly. This can be seen in the number of improvements that have occurred in recent years, which can be counted in the thousands. Such improvements have to be weighted on the same scale as the problems in this area. That is not to say the problems should be ignored—they need to be acted upon. But they should not be allowed to occupy our brains to the extent that our power to act is paralysed. Is the Notion of Sustainable Technology-Driven Growth Over-Optimistic? The development of a technological society has always been questioned. In the 19th century, critics claimed that the technological revolution would create poverty. In the 1970s, it was generally believed that the forest dieback would cause a disaster. In the 1980s, the acidification of lakes and throwaway mentality of society were regarded as manifestations of the devastating properties of growth and industrialisation. Today, many fear the environmental effects of air travel and the production of electronic devices. There are people who seriously wish to halt economic growth and wind back the clock to the society of the 1960s. They recall this time period as small-scaled and down-to-earth, stress-free and idyllic. But they tend to forget that the refrigerators of that time required 90% more electricity than today, and that our teeth were repaired with mercury fillings instead of plastic. There were no X-ray CT scanners and no medicines against ulcers. In addition, there were many more people living without electricity. There was also more widespread malnutrition, a higher infant mortality, and, in fact, more wars. Cars were fuelled by leaded petrol, and sulphur emissions were 90% higher than today. The acidification of lakes, as well as polluted streams and fields, were serious concerns. Since then, technological innovations have reduced sulphur emissions and removed the lead from car fuel. At any given point in history, there have been critics claiming that this was the time when we had reached the optimal point in the development of the modern society. But we hadn’t, not then and not now. And the more our countries are modernised, the greater our possibilities to care for animals and nature become. In the mid-1800s, the killing of large animals like sperm whales didn’t concern people to any significant degree, despite the cruel hunting methods using harpoons. The benefits of the whale fat, mainly used for lamp oil to facilitate reading in the evenings, overshadowed any empathic impulses. In the 1850s more than 70,000 people were employed by the American whaling industry. There were 900 ships in the world hunting whales, and during one of the most active years, 8000 whales were butchered, which provided more than 300,000 barrels of oil. The oil extracted from the head of the sperm whale, the so-called spermaceti oil, was especially sought-after. It was of very high quality and sold for 1.50 US dollars per litre in today’s monetary value. As a consequence, the number of sperm whales in the world rapidly dwindled. However, when oil drilling started in Pennsylvania in the year 1859, the price of whale oil began to fall. The fast transition to petroleum products for lighting and other applications is considered to have saved the last of the sperm whales. Thus, new technology can both contribute to the protection of threatened animal species and provide the wealth to make it affordable for us to even save predators. Imagine what would happen if we were able to bring back someone from the 19th century and tell them that today we move wolves though the air by helicopter in order to save the species and expand its habitat; our ancestor would probably rather go back to sleep than listen to such apparent stupidity. Pessimism Does not Support a Sustainable Development There is a lot of progress going on in the world today, but not without negative side effects. When improving the world and dealing with the side effects, an optimistic attitude provides us with a much better chance of success than a pessimistic view. The optimist carries a positive inner beacon to follow, while the pessimist is always looking for potential traps and drawbacks. As visions and conceptions of ideas often become self-fulfilling, it isn’t difficult to realise what’s most constructive. All decisions—big or small, conscious or not—are affected and guided by our inner beacon. When solving a problem, such as developing a new product for example, it is necessary to have a conception of a working solution in mind. As a product developer, it is of course necessary to review every minute step in the process and question the choices made. You have to ask yourself if there may be a better material or a smarter design. Strange as it seems, this continuous struggle in the mind of the developer may appear to be a kind of pessimism, as it is all about looking for weaknesses in the imagined solution. It is not dissimilar from the process a doctor follows when selecting a diagnosis and a remedy. You start with certain hypotheses, examine, exclude, test, question and verify until you are satisfied that you have made the correct diagnosis. Then the choice of medication becomes much simpler. It would be fatal if the doctor was pessimistic from the start and worked in the belief that it would be impossible to find a reason for the illness, or a working remedy. This could then be the conclusion that such a doctor would unconsciously try to verify. Would you like to have a doctor like that? The same is true for climate and environmental problems—we need optimists armed with critical thinking to solve them. There are also so-called climate change deniers, who believe that man hasn’t really affected the planet and its ecosystems to any significant degree. Some of them claim that the influence of the sun and other natural phenomena are so enormous that human activities have no bearing on global warming. Perhaps these deniers are so deeply pessimistic that they cannot imagine any possible solutions. For ages, man has harboured a certain distrust of his own species. Throughout history, various religions have emphasised human shortcomings and presented assorted consequential threats. During the last 30 years, such prophesies have increasingly often been introduced by environmental activists and some political groups, whose messages have been significantly supported by the media. The underlying conception of humanity isn’t flattering. The human race is considered to be fundamentally ruthless, greedy, short-sighted and evil. Threats against the climate and much other misery on earth are caused by human failure. However, if we take the time to study the progress that has been made by the human race throughout the ages, we actually get the opposite picture. Can it really be evil, greedy, and short-sighted beings who put their own lives at stake to treat people infected by Ebola or HIV in poor countries? Who are the ones that are continuously reducing the number of starving people on earth? Who are the ones that invent vaccines for the children of the world? Who are the ones that have developed a civilisation where an increasing number of people get educated, and who struggle to reduce the casualties of war? Why blame an entire species for atrocities that are actually committed by a mere fraction? Establishing a firm belief in humankind should be the first step on the road to sustainable development.

#### Exploitation’s ending---increasing efficiency and profit motive makes resource use sustainable

Bailey, 14 – Ronald Bailey, award-winning science correspondent for Reason, author of Liberation Biology: The Moral and Scientific Case for the Biotech Revolution, Spring 2014, “Liberty and the Environment”, New Atlantis Journal of Technology and Society, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/liberty-and-the-environment

Of Peaks and Population The Lockean response to these academics’ worries is that free-market capitalism is as much about growing inward as outward — about learning to derive progressively more value from a finite supply of natural resources, so that we need not consume ever more of those resources. On this understanding, there need be no contradiction between meeting human material needs and preserving a large portion of the natural environment. So we have two broad views of the sustainability of the system of liberty, and they could hardly be more opposed: one of steady growth and self-reinforcing gains in the efficient use of natural resources, and one in which this growth may be maintained for a deceptively bountiful period of human history before it collapses in on itself. As the Ehrlichs describe the latter view, “most ‘educated’ people are immersed in a culture that does not recognize that, in the real world, a short history (a few centuries) of exponential growth does not imply a long future of such growth.” The modern escape from Malthusian pressures was just an illusion, and liberal, open-access societies are doomed to stagnate and collapse. Which of these theories is closer to how the future will play out? The example of land use is instructive in sorting out these theories. Today, almost a third of the Earth’s land area is used for the purposes of agriculture, the vast majority of that land having been converted in the last three centuries from wilderness to cropland or pasture, according to a study from the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology. That rapid expansion in agricultural land use has happened largely for the reasons described by Ehrlich and his collaborators: a booming population has meant more mouths to feed, and better standards of living have meant more food going into those mouths. But the expansion may be coming to an end. A recent study in the journal Population and Development Review by Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel and his colleagues shows that globally “the number of hectares of cropland has scarcely changed since 1990,” suggesting that we are already at or near a peak of usage. The researchers offer the conservative projection that by 2060, the land currently employed for crops could be reduced by an area one and a half times the size of Egypt. The slowing growth of cropland conversion — and its apparently impending peak and then reversal — is occurring chiefly for the reasons described by Locke: innovators and entrepreneurs are competing to create new high-productivity crop varieties that require less fertilizer and fuel to grow, thus enabling farmers to grow more food on less land. Moreover countries with stronger property rights and freer markets produce higher agricultural yields than natural states without them. According to data from the World Bank, the average yield for cereal grains on cropland is 6.7 metric tons per hectare in the United States, 6.8 in the United Kingdom, and 7.2 in France, compared to 2.1 in Russia, 0.9 in Haiti, and 0.7 in Zimbabwe — which had more than double that yield in 1981, before the rule of law there collapsed. (One point for optimism is that technological development in open-access societies is likely to eventually spill over into dysfunctional ones, even if slowly.) Based on their analysis, Ausubel and his colleagues reckon, “The past half-century of disciplined and dematerializing demand and more intense and efficient land use encourage a rational hope that humanity’s pressure will not overwhelm Nature.” What is true for farmland also appears to be true for forestland, as the study’s authors write: “Peaks of forest destruction also have passed with a transition from less to more forests in many countries and regions.” A 2006 study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by some of the same researchers found that by the 1980s, wooded areas in all major temperate and boreal forests were expanding. Why? Because people are managing forests in ways that have increased their productivity,

treating trees more like crops to be perpetually harvested and renewed rather than extracted and depleted. The reforestation started taking place in Western Europe and the Eastern United States in the nineteenth century and is now spreading to other parts of the world. Reaching nadir forest, as it were, should give some tentative grounds for optimism about species extinction and the loss of other forms of wilderness and open land. Forests grow back, and nature can reclaim land once put under the plow. But what about nonrenewable natural resources, such as metals and minerals — do property rights and markets inevitably lead to their depletion? Warnings of coming shortages of these resources have been sounded for decades. But these dire predictions, as a rule, have not come true. The most notorious of these predictions were laid out in the Club of Rome’s 1972 report The Limits to Growth, which foretold depletion in the coming years of many resources, including copper, mercury, silver, zinc, petroleum, and natural gas. But, as I have reported on in detail before at Reason magazine, many of the deadlines associated with such predictions have already passed, and the foreseeable horizons to depletion of all of these resources actually recede as we seem to be marching toward them. The reason is ultimately the same as the reason we are hitting peak farmland: human ingenuity leads to advances in science and technology that steadily improve the efficiency with which we extract these resources from the Earth and reclaim them from our waste products. Moreover, market pressures give companies an incentive to search for and discover new reserves when they are needed, and to create new methods for extracting minerals from resources that were previously known but not profitable to exploit — as the recent boom in shale oil amply demonstrates. But what about population growth? Ehrlich and Dasgupta worry about the “reproductive externalities” of high fertility rates in poor countries, which they believe have already led to an overpopulated world in danger of collapse — but in fact, while the world’s population grew rapidly during the twentieth century and continues to grow now, the rate of that growth has already peaked. U.S. Census Bureau figures show that the world was adding around 37 million people per year in the early 1950s, a figure that plateaued at 87 million in the late 1980s and now has dropped to around 77 million. Most demographic projections show that the growth rate will fall to zero sometime by the end of the century, meaning global population will peak. Why isn’t the population explosion of the twentieth century going to continue indefinitely? As demographers have noted for decades, when nations rise out of poverty, their fertility rates plummet. As Brown University economist Oded Galor noted in a 2012 analysis, “increases in the rate of technological progress” in the late nineteenth century “induced a reduction in fertility, generating a decline in population growth and an increase in the average level of education.” Families came to need fewer children to help provide their income, and the cost of raising children also increased as the demand for education increased. But it is not economic growth alone that lowers population growth; a system of liberty does as well. This might come as a surprise to those who believe that the “freedom to breed is intolerable,” as the ecologist Garrett Hardin claimed in his astonishingly confused 1968 essay “The Tragedy of the Commons.” When individuals are at liberty to pursue what they consider their own best interests, Hardin believed, the net effect will be a situation harmful to their shared interests. “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all,” he wrote, and people should not be free to have as many children as they want. But a remarkable 2002 study by Wheaton College economics professor Seth W. Norton found that “Fertility rates are more than twice as high in countries with low levels of economic freedom and rule of law compared to countries with high levels of those measures.” This is because these structures produce prosperity, which dramatically lowers child mortality, which in turn reduces the incentive to bear more children. Increased prosperity also tends to bring more education for women and more productive economic opportunities for them, thereby increasing the opportunity costs of staying at home to rear children. Educating children to meet the productive challenges of growing economies also becomes more expensive and time-consuming.

## Cap Good

#### Growth and innovation solves warming.

Ogutonye, 21—Policy Lead, Science & Innovation Unit, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (Olamide, “Should Tech Make Us Optimistic About Climate Change?,” <https://institute.global/policy/should-tech-make-us-optimistic-about-climate-change>, dml)

In the middle of a climate emergency, it is challenging to stay upbeat. Yet the good news is that investment in climate technology has continued to grow since the early 2010s. US-listed companies involved with providing technology solutions that support global decarbonisation have consistently outperformed the average since 2019 (Figure 7). Venture capital (VC) investment in the sector grew tenfold between 2013 and 2018, representing five times the growth rate of the overall VC market. By comparison, the growth rate of VC investment in Artificial Intelligence was a third of climate tech between 2013 and 2018 although AI is renowned for its uptick within the same timeframe. Beyond VC, public investment in climate technology research has continued to grow too. In 2019, government research and development funding for energy technologies alone stood at $30 billion, with around 80 per cent of it aimed at low-carbon solutions.

In addition to the positive role of technology, political leaders are increasingly showing a willingness to make ambitious commitments on climate. The Paris Agreement is a case in point. The international treaty was adopted in 2015 and ratified internationally within a year – a much quicker pace than its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, which took eight years. The Paris deal grew into a political snowball, galvanising further commitment from most of the world’s leading emitters and arguably becoming the most symbolic climate event of the 21st century. The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2019 dealt a political blow to the global pact although the decision, since reversed by President Biden, did not resonate or last long enough to have any major impact.

The Biden-Harris administration has already indicated that it will not sit on the fence but will instead revive the country’s leadership on climate action. In the UK and elsewhere, similar efforts can be observed as more countries commit to some form of net zero target. More than 100 countries have pledged a commitment towards net zero, with estimates suggesting that over 70 per cent of global GDP and 55 per cent of CO2 emissions are now covered by a similar target. A Climate Action Tracker Report indicates that the cumulative effect of countries’ pledges to the Paris Agreement – if kept and fully achieved – could keep global temperature rise below 2.1°C by 2100, putting the stated goal of 1.5°C within striking distance.

As explored in our recent Institute paper, there are also important insights for politicians in terms of applying lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic to the climate emergency. Although the pandemic is different in scale, complexity and timeline, it offers an immediate window into how policy leaders can adapt and make decisions in order to better support climate innovation. Countries can also apply the “recovering better together” principles outlined by the UN, which calls for a commitment to climate-related actions as economies recover from the Covid-19 slowdown. More than 60 countries, including high emitters, are already making an explicit promise to link their nationally determined contributions (NDC) to Covid-19 recovery, supported by the United Nations Development Programme’s Climate Promise programme. Countries in the Global South are equally aligning their climate mission with international support for various NDC support programmes. A green recovery can cut the level of 2030 emissions to 25 per cent lower than projections based on pre-Covid commitments and put the world close to a 2°C pathway. The pandemic has also highlighted the significance of tech innovation, not least in record-breaking vaccine delivery but also in the suite of digital solutions developed for contact tracing, compliance monitoring and management of health-care records.

The global financial landscape is evolving to become more responsive to climate innovation. Since they were first issued in 2007, green bonds have grown into what is now estimated to become a $1 trillion market. Analysts expect as much as $500 billion of green bonds this year as the EU raises capital for its Covid recovery fund. From target-linked to transition bonds, innovations in this green market are being used to bring projects in energy, transport, buildings and other economic sectors to life. Investor-led initiatives such as Climate Action 100+, whose members control over $50 trillion of assets, are actively using funds to ensure the world’s largest corporate greenhouse gas emitters commit to climate action. Other investor networks are pursuing a similar agenda, including Europe’s Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) and Australia and New Zealand’s Investor Group on Climate Change (IGCC). Humanity’s competence in technology and innovation will be central to the race in mitigating and tackling climate change.

#### Income growth and tech diffusion pursuant to trade are good for the environment. Race to the bottom thesis is false.

Irwin 15 – Douglas, John Sloan Dickey Third Century Professor in the Social Sciences in the Economics Department at Dartmouth College (“FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE” Copyright © 2015 by Princeton University Press Library of Congress Control Number 2015936929 ISBN 978- 0- 691- 16625- 4 pp 65-67)

Fortunately, the objectives of free trade and a cleaner environment often work together. For example, numerous studies have traced the relationship between pollution emissions and a country’s per capita income. They have generally found a relationship shaped like an inverted U: as per capita incomes rise from low levels, pollution increases, but beyond a certain point (about $5,000), further increases in income tend to diminish pollution.70 The initial increase in pollution is due to industrialization, while the decrease is due to cleaner production technologies and more effective environmental regulation that come with higher incomes. Both Delhi and New York City have traffic jams, for example, but the locally made cars and scooters in developing countries tend to belch out worse fumes than those with cleaner exhaust systems in the United States. Beyond the threshold, higher incomes do not mean more pollution and lower incomes do not mean less pollution. To the extent that trade increases a country’s income beyond the turning point in the inverted U relationship, it helps indirectly to improve the environment. More directly, new technology is cleaner technology and trade facilitates the diffusion of new technology. Furthermore, the “dirty industry migration” hypothesis, that polluting industries will move to developing countries where environmental regulations are lax, has received little empirical support. There is no “race to the bottom” in environmental standards because the costs of abating pollution are not a significant determinant of industries’ location, and consequently not a significant determinant of trade flows.71

One important study examined three channels by which trade can affect sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions: the scale effect (increases in economic activity increase SO2 emissions), the technique effect (increases in income lead to cleaner production methods and reduce emissions), and the composition effect (trade alters the composition of activity and hence the average pollution intensity of national output). The authors were surprised to conclude that free trade is good for the environment because, as an empirical matter, the technique effect outweighs the scale and composition effects.72 The effect of income growth on pollution depends largely on the underlying source of growth: growth achieved through capital accumulation tends to raise pollutants, while growth achieved by trade and technological change appears to reduce pollutants.

This could also account for the inverted- U- shaped relationship of pollution to income—developing countries initially tend to achieve growth through (dirtier) capital accumulation, whereas growth in developed countries is based on human capital accumulation and technology (cleaner methods). Another study focused on the issue of causality in estimating the effect of trade on the environment for a given level of income.73 This study looked at the links between trade and seven measures of environmental quality and found that trade had a strongly beneficial impact in reducing SO2 emissions, and a less significant but still positive impact in reducing NO2 emissions and total suspended particulate matter. Trade also reduced energy depletion and increased access to clean water, while having no impact on deforestation. The one exception was CO2 emissions, where increased openness was related to greater emissions, perhaps because of the free- rider problem afflicting countries that seek to limit greenhouse gas emissions. But the study found no evidence for a “race to the bottom” in environmental standards or the “pollution haven” hypothesis, in which trade encourages some countries to specialize in dirtier industries.

In terms of the United States, real manufacturing output has increased by more than 70 percent over the past thirty years, while pollution emissions have fallen significantly (ranging from 30 percent for nitrogen oxides to 66 percent for sulfur dioxides). The United States even reduced its carbon dioxide emissions from energy sources by 12 percent between 2005 and 2012, although those emissions rose 2 percent in 2013. Most of this overall decline is due to improved production technology or abatement processes, not importing dirtier products from abroad to avoid domestic regulation. Indeed, the average pollution content of U.S. imports has fallen over time, and the United States does not seem to have been offshoring pollution by importing polluting goods.74

#### Neolib solves global poverty and structural violence---prefer long-run, macro-level trends over short term disruptions to individual communities. Their K artificially amplifies the minor downsides of the system---this tactic is straight out of Trump’s pocket and ignores that every alternative system decimates quality of life.

Bowman 17 [Sam, September 2017, Executive Director of the Adam Smith Institute (British think tank) in London, “IN DEFENCE OF NEOLIBERALISM,” <https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2017/09/33-3-bowman-sam.pdf>]

To free marketeers, there is little question that this change is worth it. Automation and technological progress may disrupt people’s lives but ultimately we think of new things for people to do and the extra wealth and tools that technological advances create raise everybody’s living standards in the long run. Trade, usually blamed for hurting ordinary workers while helping the rich, is actually especially good for the poor. A 2014 study in the United States estimated the gains from trade to different parts of American society based on baskets of goods designed to represent different consumption patterns along the income distribution, and then calculated how much poorer the bottom 10% would be without global trade, compared with the top 10%.5 The gains from trade accruing from cheaper goods were not felt equally between rich and poor: the real income loss from closing off trade is 63% at the bottom 10% of the income distribution and 28% for the top 10%. Globally, extreme poverty has fallen from 44% of the world’s population in 1981 to 9.6% today.6 Openness to trade, better property rights and the de-nationalisation of state-run industries in China have between them driven at least two-thirds of that country’s growth since 1980, lifting millions of people out of poverty. Under communism, Chinese GDP per capita was $300 a year. Today it’s $10,000 a year and rising. Migration, generally a mild net positive for natives, can make the migrants themselves far richer. World Bank officials have argued that there is ‘simply no contest’ between guest worker programs and other anti-poverty programs like cash transfers or microfinance—participants in New Zealand’s seasonal worker program experience huge increases in income, greater subjective well-being, and more schooling for their kids.7 But the shocks are real enough and the trend is not particularly encouraging. David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson recently evaluated the ‘China shock’ of greater Chinese imports to the US between 1990 and 2007.8 They found that in areas with existing manufacturing that were competing with Chinese imports, rising imports raised local unemployment, cut wages, and drove more people out of the labour force altogether, whether onto disability benefits or into early retirement. Other studies have looked at the declining labour share of GDP—a trend observable in most OECD countries since the early 1990s, ending a previously stable ‘stylized fact’ of the ratio between returns to capital and labour.9 The reason seems to be entirely driven by the rise of so-called ‘superstar firms’ like Google, Facebook and Amazon in new kinds of markets where very low marginal costs mean there is no inherent ceiling on firm size. Software often does not have the same diseconomies of scale that normal products do, so one firm would be expected to dominate each market at a time. These ‘winner takes all’ markets are not inherently monopolistic, because these large firms are still vulnerable to rivals with better products, but whoever has the best product on offer at a given time is likely to have a very large amount of market share. Low marginal costs and high fixed costs (of innovating better products) have, so far, meant that only a small number of extremely talented workers are necessary for success. The result has been something of a divergence between economic growth and wage growth which may continue. Trying to reverse or undo these trends would be counterproductive, yet this is often the usual political answer. Regulation to try to brute-force firms into paying workers more usually backfires, and protectionism is not the answer to disruption caused by trade. As Paul Krugman writes: The lesson I took from the widely cited Autor, Dorn, and Hanson paper on the China shock was that Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin were less relevant to the political economy of trade than the sheer pace of change, which disrupted local manufacturing concentrations and the communities they supported. The point is that a protectionist turn, reversing the trade growth that has already happened, would be the same kind of shock given where we are now. It’s like the old joke about the motorist who runs over a pedestrian, then tries to undo the damage by backing up— and runs over the victim a second time.10 The neoliberal agenda There is no new ‘neoliberal moment’, though it is convenient to suggest that France’s Emmanuel Macron represents one. But for a group of us the term is a useful differentiation from fellow travellers (see the box overleaf on how to spot a neoliberal). We are globalist consequentialists who have concluded that free markets, property rights, free trade and liberal migration policies are effective tools for fostering economic growth and improving the well-being of the global poor. We’re suspicious of politics; democracy is not the panacea for our problems that many on the left and, increasingly, the populist right seem to think. We cannot hope to solve political problems by chucking out experts and replacing them with politicians or referendums. We are comfortable with redistribution of income, done simply through cash transfers instead of a complicated welfare state. In a sentence, a neoliberal’s worldview might be something like this: Governments should facilitate as much wealth creation as possible, and redistribute some of it after. This differs from left-liberal Blairism in its scepticism about the effectiveness of government as a piecemeal problem-solver and its prima facie preference for markets in most cases where scarce resources must be allocated. It differs from libertarianism and classical liberalism in its support for a fairly large degree of income redistribution, though done differently to how most developed nations do this at present. Neoliberals are alarmed at the right’s embrace of nationalism and the populist idea that economics and good policy doesn’t matter, that ‘experts’ are systematically biased and should be ignored. At the same time, the lurch towards the hard left in the form of people like Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Beppe Grillo and Jean-Luc Melenchon suggests that the old ideological battles that many thought had been settled must be fought once again. The ‘neoliberal agenda’, then, is to resist both zombie Marxism and right-wing populism in the areas where these are making the biggest gains. Trade, in particular, is vulnerable. Defending and extending the global liberal order means, above all, resisting moves away from trade openness favoured by the Trump administration and some ‘hard’ Brexiteers who have toyed with the idea of tariffs and subsidies to protect British jobs from better foreign competition. Seen costs dominate unseen benefits. The negative consequences of trade openness and automation—the ‘destruction’ of some old jobs and the low status of many of the new ones—seem to be much more salient to people than the benefits. A cheaper iPhone is seen as a frivolity compared to a rewarding, high status job in manufacturing, and the other benefits of trade and automation are nearly invisible. Welfare and labour market reforms may at least mitigate some of the harms here. Replacing complicated welfare systems (in Britain there are over 50 different kinds of benefit payments available) with simple cash payments, whether in the form of a Negative Income Tax, a workcontingent payment (similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit) or wage subsidies to employers may make uneconomic jobs that give workers a greater sense of self-worth (such as some of those involving manual labour or manufacturing) more viable. Combined with labour market deregulation, greater innovation about how to use workers may stop or reverse the shift of income away from workers’ wages. Ultimately, a lack of economic growth across much of the developed world seems like the biggest cause of our present woes. People will put up with a lot if they feel like their family’s lives are getting better. ‘Going for growth’ involves a focus on the lowesthanging policy fruit. For example, in most Englishspeaking countries, urban zoning and planning laws have created housing crises in prosperous cities. Living in Sydney, London or San Francisco is astonishingly expensive now by historical or international standards. Apart from the first-order effects this has of raising people’s cost of living, the second-order effect is probably a significant drag on growth. By preventing people from moving to where they could be most productive, expensive housing holds economic growth back. This ‘spatial misallocation’ is estimated by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti to have lowered aggregate US growth by more than 50% between 1964 and 2009.11 The same is likely true in other Englishspeaking countries. (Continental Europe has different problems.) Another example is tax, where the structure of corporation tax is such that investment is usually taxed heavily. This need not be the case: full capital expensing would effectively shift the burden of corporation tax away from investment towards consumption and be far less of a drag on growth. This would also probably allow the creation of more manufacturing jobs in developed countries, since it is machinery and property investment that are typically hit hardest by corporation tax. (In the UK, former Chancellor George Osborne funded his headline corporation tax cuts by increasing the relative tax burden on machinery and property investment.) Neoliberals will always be a small group. But the idea of neoliberalism has captured some people’s imaginations and seems to be filling an open niche in the political market. Online especially, many younger people who are uncomfortable with libertarianism’s dogmatic image and enjoy the naughtiness of re-appropriating a political swear word have adopted the label.